The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information
Abstract
Recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in American, comparative, and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power—revolutions, civil wars, high levels of public debt, international conflict, and costly policy insulation—in terms of commitment problems. This paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies. This common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings. The present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an “inefficiency condition” that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient. This condition has a natural substantive interpretation: Large, rapid changes in the actors' relative power (measured in terms of their minmax payoffs) may cause inefficiency.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555042 · Cited by 1,939
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
A Theory of Political Transitions
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.938 · Cited by 1,554
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences
Persson, T., & Svensson, L. E. O. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937850 · Cited by 1,211
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Muthoo, A. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511607950 · Cited by 1,162
An economic model of moral motivation
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Cited by
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49 · Cited by 772
Metadata
- Authors
- POWELL, R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 231-241
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2081566624
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 16.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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