Epiphenomenal Qualia
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
Items 801–900 of 1,003
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes
Moore, D. (2012) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217312000674 · Cited by 4
Free will in light of neuroscience
Glannon, W. (2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139565820.002 · Cited by 6
Understanding Suffering: The Phenomenology and Neurobiology of the Experience of Illness and Pain
Moskovitz, P. A. (2010) · CRC Press eBooks · doi:10.1201/b10403-5 · Cited by 4
Does Matter Matter? Should We Mind the Mind? —Can Philosophy Be Reduced to Neurophysiology?
Korzeniewski, B. (2017) · Open Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.4236/ojpp.2017.73017 · Cited by 4
Why neurolinguistics needs first-person methods
Kowalewski, H. (2017) · Language Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2017.09.003 · Cited by 4
Philosophy and liturgy part 2: Liturgy and epistemology
Cockayne, J. (2018) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12522 · Cited by 4
Consciousness, Conceivability, and Intrinsic Reduction
VandenHombergh, J. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0069-6 · Cited by 4
Peters, M. A., & Stickney, J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.042 · Cited by 6
A puzzle about the experience of left and right
Cutter, B. (2020) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12325 · Cited by 5
Lycan, W. G. (2002) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470996362.ch7 · Cited by 9
Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!
Mizrahi, M. (2021) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-021-09560-9 · Cited by 4
A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap
Martinez‐Saito, M. (2021) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-021-09570-7 · Cited by 5
Qualia and Information in Philosophy and Neuroscience
Gouveia, S. S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95369-0_6 · Cited by 4
Hebishima, H., Arakaki, M., Dozono, C., Frolova, H., & Inage, S. (2023) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2023.104840 · Cited by 4
Can the World Be Indeterminate in All Respects?
Ho, C.-H. (2023) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.2278 · Cited by 4
Stolen gametes and mereorganic continuity
Morozov, K. E. (2024) · Omsk Scientific Bulletin Series Society History Modernity · doi:10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-3-110-117 · Cited by 4
Theorien der kognitiven Psychologie und das Problem der Intentionalität
Gerjets, P. H., & Westermann, R. (1997) · Deutscher Universitätsverlag eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-322-95358-2_12 · Cited by 4
Another Look at Functionalism and the Emotions
Nussbaum, C. O. (2003) · Brain and Mind · doi:10.1023/b:bram.0000005469.62248.00 · Cited by 4
Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument
Holman, E. L. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7791-4 · Cited by 8
Betting your life on an algorithm
Dennett, D. C. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080742 · Cited by 5
SORENSEN, R. A. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195326574.003.0001 · Cited by 4
Leslie, A. M., German, T. P., & Happe, F. G. E. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028934 · Cited by 4
The naked truth about first-person knowledge
Chandler, M. J., & Carpendale, J. I. M. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028727 · Cited by 5
A Point of View on Points of View
Biro, J. I. (2006) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500471835 · Cited by 4
A Qualia Framework for Awareness in Cyberspace
Lacey, T. H., Mills, R. F., Raines, R. A., Williams, P. D., & Rogers, S. K. (2007) · IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) · doi:10.1109/milcom.2007.4455285 · Cited by 4
Materialism, Functionalism and Supervenient Qualia
Marras, A. (1993) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217300012270 · Cited by 4
Ross, D. (1993) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217300012257 · Cited by 4
Stanovich, K. E. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080985 · Cited by 4
Why you'll never know whether Roger Penrose is a computer
Glymour, C., & Kelly, K. T. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0008081x · Cited by 4
MacLennan, B. J. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080882 · Cited by 5
How neuropsychology helps us understand normal cognitive function
Shallice, T. (1991) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00070795 · Cited by 4
Confusing structure and function
Steele, K. M. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00067546 · Cited by 4
Ontogeny and ontology: Ontophyletics and enactive focal vision
Lia, B. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00067443 · Cited by 4
What Is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color‐Blind Person Know about Color?
Nordby, K. S. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0005 · Cited by 4
Steps to an Ecology of Knowing, and to Teaching Embodied Transdisciplinary Hermeneutics
Dieleman, H. (2016) · Transdisciplinary Journal of Engineering & Science · doi:10.22545/2016/00081 · Cited by 4
El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría
Brigard, F. D. (2017) · Ideas y Valores · doi:10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3supl.65652 · Cited by 8
Maloney, J. C. (1986) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568648609506256 · Cited by 4
What in the world determines the structure of color space?
Shepard, R. N. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00067522 · Cited by 4
Self-ascription of belief and desire
Gordon, R. M. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028818 · Cited by 4
The case against AI from imagistic expertise
Bringsjord, S., & Bringsjord, E. L. (1996) · Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1080/095281396147384 · Cited by 4
Ethological and ecological aspects of color vision
Kondrashev, S. L. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0006742x · Cited by 4
Colors really are only in the head
McGilvray, J. A. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00067492 · Cited by 4
Umiltà, C. A. (1991) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00070771 · Cited by 4
Rowlands, M. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-012373873-8.00053-0 · Cited by 4
Gendler, T. S. (2005) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00195 · Cited by 4
Dreams and the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Solms, M. (2020) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.24093-5 · Cited by 4
Enaction for QBistsPreprint
Gefter, A. (2024) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.04230 · Cited by 4
The conductor model of consciousness, our neuromorphic twins, and the human-AI deal
Benitez, F., Pennartz, C., & Senn, W. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gbzd6 · Cited by 3
Arguing for Embodied Consciousness
Fromm, H. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1165652 · Cited by 3
Is phenomenal consciousness really a special case in science?
Gärtner, K., & Cordovil, J. L. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1422050 · Cited by 3
A dualist theory of experience
Saad, B. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3 · Cited by 4
How Russellian Physicalism Helps Solve the Mind-Body Problem
Brown, C. D. (2025) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00880-3 · Cited by 3
D'Angiò, M., Chiarella, S. G., Simione, L., Pace, E. D., van Leeuwen, C., & Raffone, A. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106445 · Cited by 5
House of Mirrors: The Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness
Kammerer, F. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.001.0001 · Cited by 7
Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts
Fazekas, P. (2010) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9274-5 · Cited by 3
Dois conceitos e dois problemas da consciência
Júnior, J. G. A. (2014) · Griot Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.31977/grirfi.v9i1.577 · Cited by 4
Tafner, G. (2021) · Sozioökonomische Bildung und Wissenschaft · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-32910-5_6 · Cited by 3
Harman, G. H. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238029.003.0001 · Cited by 3
How art contributes to scientific knowledge
Sherman, A., & Anderson, D. E. (2023) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2241499 · Cited by 3
Stuff, Quality, Structure: The Whole Go
Strawson, G. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780198903680.001.0001 · Cited by 6
Antill, G. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00511-9 · Cited by 3
Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough
Saad, B. (2024) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4 · Cited by 4
The Development of Gilbert Ryle’s Conception of Knowledge
Kremer, M. J. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191954856.003.0005 · Cited by 3
The Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts
Lindauer, M. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197633830.001.0001 · Cited by 3
Epistemically Transformative Medical Procedures and Informed Consent
Dutta, R. R. (2025) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhaf025 · Cited by 3
Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach
Builes, D., & Impagnatiello, M. O. (2026) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.70001 · Cited by 4
La théorie représentationnelle de la conscience phénoménale et le problème des apparences visuelles
BERNIER, P. (2013) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217313000371 · Cited by 3
Roberts, T. (2012) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2011.629671 · Cited by 3
Darwin's Doubt Defended: Why Evolution Supports Skepticism
Littmann, G. (2011) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2011.560028 · Cited by 3
Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism
Ellis, J. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9278-1 · Cited by 7
Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability?
Giberman, D. (2014) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzu142 · Cited by 3
A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity
Aranyosi, I. A. (2011) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axr001 · Cited by 5
Afference copy as a quantitative neurophysiological model for consciousness
Cornelis, H., & Coop, A. D. (2014) · Journal of Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.1142/s0219635214400020 · Cited by 3
Lady Lovelace had it right: Computers originate nothing
Bringsjord, S. (1994) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00035718 · Cited by 3
Color for pigeons and philosophers
Hardin, C. L. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00067376 · Cited by 4
Happiness, Cerebroscopes and Incorrigibility: Prospects for Neuroeudaimonia
Hare, S., & Vincent, N. A. (2016) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9254-y · Cited by 3
A Most Rare Achievement: Dennett’s Scientific Discovery in Content and Consciousness
Ross, D. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_2 · Cited by 3
Metaphysics of quantity and the limit of phenomenal concepts
Lam, D. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1446049 · Cited by 3
Is the Theatre a Zombie? On the Successful Failures of Émile Zola
Rebellato, D. (2018) · Anglia - Zeitschrift für englische Philologie · doi:10.1515/ang-2018-0011 · Cited by 3
Do Personality Features Influence Our Intuitions of the Mind-Body Problem? A Pilot Study
Havlík, M., Mladá, K., Fajnerová, I., & Horáček, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01219 · Cited by 3
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
Raleigh, T. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01907-x · Cited by 4
Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being
Pharoah, M. (2018) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-018-9344-9 · Cited by 5
Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory
Moore, D. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00184-5 · Cited by 3
Critical Environmental Philosophy
Hailwood, S. A. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.040 · Cited by 4
The Rediscovery of Metanormativity: From Prichard to Raz by Way of Falk
Tiffany, E. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.022 · Cited by 3
Subjective Physicalism as a Response to the Knowledge Argument
Kıymaz, T. (2019) · MetaZihin Yapay Zeka ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi · Cited by 3
Philosophical Perspectives on Imagination in the Western Tradition
Kind, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108580298.005 · Cited by 3
The moral parody argument against panpsychism
Blaesi, Z. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01731-z · Cited by 4
Gasparri, L. (2021) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1930579 · Cited by 3
Lutz, R. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080870 · Cited by 3
Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction
Zanotti, G. (2022) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-022-00512-5 · Cited by 4
Harman, G. H. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238029.003.0008 · Cited by 4
Metaphysical idealism revisited
Tse, C. Y. P. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12856 · Cited by 3
Russellian Representationalism and the Stygian Hues
Sharp, W. A. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00555-5 · Cited by 3
Cognitive phenomenology: in defense of recombination
Lennon, P. (2022) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2107060 · Cited by 3
The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism
Stockdale, B. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2130744 · Cited by 3
Worship, Apophaticism, and Non-Propositional Knowledge: A Creative Retrieval of Moses Maimonides
Yang, E. (2022) · Journal of Analytic Theology · doi:10.12978/jat.2022-10.304328502632 · Cited by 5
Alice Does not Care: Or: Why it Matters That Robots "Don't Give a Damn"
von Maur, I. (2022) · Edition Moderne, Postmoderne · doi:10.14361/9783839462652-009 · Cited by 4
Dissolving the Self: the cognitive turn of the extended mind theory
Júnior, L. P., & Stroparo, A. L. (2023) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46n2.p193 · Cited by 6
Psychological Epiphenomenalism
Mathieson, D. (2024) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.31.3.120 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Jackson, F.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Jackson, Frank
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1982-04
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 127
- Pages
- 127
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248621836
- Cited by
- 2,477
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 188 · 2025: 183 · 2024: 161 · 2023: 94 · 2022: 95 · 2021: 105 · 2020: 81 · 2019: 193 · 2018: 78 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 63 · 2014: 65 · 2013: 48 · 2012: 39
- FWCI
- 2.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- qualia, epiphenomenalism, consciousness, mind-body problem, phenomenal experience
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.