Epiphenomenal Qualia
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Items 301–400 of 1,003
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DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1
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Self-citationThe Knowledge Argument and the Self
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jackson, F.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Jackson, Frank
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1982-04
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 127
- Pages
- 127
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248621836
- Cited by
- 2,477
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 188 · 2025: 183 · 2024: 161 · 2023: 94 · 2022: 95 · 2021: 105 · 2020: 81 · 2019: 193 · 2018: 78 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 63 · 2014: 65 · 2013: 48 · 2012: 39
- FWCI
- 2.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- qualia, epiphenomenalism, consciousness, mind-body problem, phenomenal experience
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