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Cited by 420

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What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.

Solomon, Robert C., Griffiths, Paul E. · 1999 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

This study argues that much research of the emotions has been misguided. It attempts to show that emotion encompasses psychological states of very different, and thus not comparable, kinds. Some emotions, such as a brief flaring up of anger in response to some experience, are evolutionary ancient, reflex-like responses which appear insensitive to culture. Others, like moral guilt, differ importantly across cultures, despite their long history in humans, and affinity to behaviour seen in other species. Yet other emotions appear to be the acting-out of today's psychological myths, as ghost possession acted out the metaphysical myths of past centuries. These three kinds of responses have different evolutionary origins, different adaptive functions, different biological bases, and different roles in human psychology. The concept that binds them together, emotion, plays no useful role, since there is no object of scientific knowledge that corresponds to it. A detailed overview of the relevant theoretical approaches is provided in this text, assessing the relative merits of three main theoretical approaches: affect programme theory, evolutionary psychology, and social constructionism.

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  • Untitled work

    (1994) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 10,542

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Metadata

Authors
Solomon, R. C., & Griffiths, P. E.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1999-01
Volume
108
Issue
1
Pages
131
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2076614289
Cited by
420
References
1
FWCI
21.05
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2998275
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Solomon, R. C., & Griffiths, P. E. (1999). What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2998275

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