The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Theories of Economic Regulation
Abstract
A major challenge to social theory is to explain the pattern of government intervention in the market - what we may call regulation. Properly defined, the term refers to taxes and subsidies of all sorts as well as to explicit legislative and administrative controls over rates, entry, and other facets of economic activity. Two main theories of economic regulation have been proposed. One is the theory, bequeathed by a previous generation of economists to the present generation of lawyers. This theory holds that regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. It has a number of deficiencies that we shall discuss. The second theory is the theory - a poor term but one that will do for now. Espoused by an odd mixture of welfare state liberals, Marxists, and free-market economists, this theory holds that regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their members. There are crucial differences among the capture theorists. I will argue that the economists' version of the theory is the most promising but shall also point out the significant weaknesses in both the theory and the empirical research that is alleged to support it.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.258514 · Cited by 2,097
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553042476215 · Cited by 2,124
The roles of accounting in organizations and society
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/0361-3682(80)90017-3 · Cited by 1,506
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.08.005 · Cited by 1,204
TOLLISON, R. D. (1982) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00174.x · Cited by 785
The Legal Environments of Organizations
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.479 · Cited by 730
Critical and interpretive histories: insights into accounting’s present and future through its past
Carnegie, G. D., & Napier, C. J. (1996) · Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal · doi:10.1108/09513579610121956 · Cited by 531
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082716 · Cited by 499
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
McChesney, F. S. (1988) · The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15 · Cited by 397
Shleifer, A. (2005) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00291.x · Cited by 350
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
How do country regulations and business environment impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows?
Contractor, F. J., Dangol, R., Nuruzzaman, N., & Raghunath, S. (2020) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2019.101640 · Cited by 294
Metadata
- Authors
- Posner, R. A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1974
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 335
- ISSN
- 0005-8556 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2107431528
- Cited by
- 1,151
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.