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The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth
Abstract
There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don't countries strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries appear to be stuck in vicious circles of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it. Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt to illustrate this formally.
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Citations
Cited by
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Elbahnasawy, N. G. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.005 · Cited by 342
Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications
Kaufmann, D., & Bellver, A. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.808664 · Cited by 271
Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth
de Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2011) · Review of Development Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00596.x · Cited by 185
Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
Camacho, A., & Conover, E. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.3.2.41 · Cited by 144
Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 · Cited by 132
Metadata
- Authors
- Mauro, P.
- Venue
- IMF Staff Papers
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-18
- ISSN
- 1020-7635 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-5150
- OpenAlex
- W3125505754
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 43.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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