The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth
Abstract
There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don't countries strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries appear to be stuck in vicious circles of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it. Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt to illustrate this formally.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-6408 · Cited by 14,307
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Self-citationGovernment Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth
Barro, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261726 · Cited by 6,340
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Krueger, A. O. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8 · Cited by 5,272
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00111.x · Cited by 5,084
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Schout, A., & North, D. C. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234910 · Cited by 4,775
Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues
Bardhan, P. (2017) · Political Corruption · doi:10.4324/9781315126647-30 · Cited by 2,616
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937945 · Cited by 2,092
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
Cooper, R., & John, A. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885539 · Cited by 1,663
Tirole, J. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298112 · Cited by 1,065
de Soto, H. (2002) · Cited by 788
The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India
Wade, R. (1982) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388208421833 · Cited by 573
Andvig, J. C., & Moene, K. O. (1990) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-g · Cited by 546
Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis.
Snyder, D., & Hibbs, D. A. (1978) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2065938 · Cited by 469
Cadot, O. (1987) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(87)90075-2 · Cited by 279
Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development
Ciccone, A., & Matsuyama, K. (1996) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(95)00052-6 · Cited by 182
More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures
Huang, P. H., & Wu, H.-M. (1994) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856 · Cited by 112
Cited by
Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets
Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/527495 · Cited by 1,090
Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms
Kurtz, M. J., & Schrank, A. (2007) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00549.x · Cited by 665
Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law: the bulging pocket makes the easy life
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-3495 · Cited by 406
Government Spending, Corruption and Economic Growth
d’Agostino, G., Dunne, J. P., & Pieroni, L. (2016) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.011 · Cited by 373
E-Government, Internet Adoption, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation
Elbahnasawy, N. G. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.005 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Mauro, P.
- Venue
- IMF Staff Papers
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-18
- ISSN
- 1020-7635 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-5150
- OpenAlex
- W3125505754
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 43.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.