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A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
Abstract
This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartelfrom 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior.An equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functionalform assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model.The hypothesis that no switch took place, so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.
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Citations
Cites
Oligopoly and the Theory of Games.
Binmore, K. G., & Friedman, J. W. (1978) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553264 · Cited by 740
Cited by
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
Increased debt and industry product markets an empirical analysis
Phillips, G. M. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00785-y · Cited by 447
Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power
Corts, K. S. (1999) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(98)00028-1 · Cited by 376
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
Baker, J. B. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003772034880 · Cited by 268
Ciliberto, F., & Williams, J. W. (2014) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12070 · Cited by 186
Populists at the Polls: Economic Factors in the 1896 Presidential Election
Eichengreen, B., Haines, M., Jaremski, M., & Leblang, D. (2017) · doi:10.3386/w23932 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Porter, R. H.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 301
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3023319508
- Cited by
- 431
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 7.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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