The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION: THE EFFECTS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY.
Abstract
We examined the roles of institutional investors, boards of directors, and technological opportunity in relation to international diversification. Our research contributes to both agency and foreign direct investment theories. In data on 197 large U.S. firms, we found significant relationships between institutional ownership and international diversification. International diversification was favored by (1) professional invest-ment funds along with outside board members and (2) pension funds along with inside board members. Also, pension funds ’ long-term orientation facilitated international-ization in industries with high technological opportunities. The results suggest that different institutional owners have different stakes in firms ’ international strategies, and the effects of boards of directors and technological opportunity accentuate these differences. Nearly 60 percent of U.S. corporate equity is owned by institutional investors, such as profes-sional investment and pension funds (Useem, 1996). Corporate governance research suggests that these institutional shareholders are playing an in-creasingly active role in firm strategies (David, Hitt,
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Kim, H. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256948 · Cited by 2,855
Self-citationPreferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
FALKENSTEIN, E. G. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05204.x · Cited by 1,058
Cited by
Diamantopoulos, A., & Siguaw, J. A. (2006) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2006.00500.x · Cited by 3,410
Corporate Reputation and Philanthropy: An Empirical Analysis
Brammer, S., & Millington, A. (2005) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-005-7443-4 · Cited by 984
Ownership and the Internationalization of Small Firms
George, G., Wiklund, J., & Zahra, S. A. (2005) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206304271760 · Cited by 537
Persuasion in crowdfunding: An elaboration likelihood model of crowdfunding performance
Allison, T. H., Davis, B. C., Webb, J. W., & Short, J. C. (2017) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2017.09.002 · Cited by 462
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, M., & Cho, C. H. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1331-5 · Cited by 434
Metadata
- Authors
- Tihanyi, L., Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 195-211
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2163785472
- Cited by
- 491
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 41.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Tihanyi, L., Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION: THE EFFECTS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/30040614
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