Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,305

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.

Open access
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., Gutierrez, I.·2001·Academy of Management Journal
DOI 10.2307/3069338
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/3069338

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 1,305

Metadata

Authors
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Publisher
Academy of Management
Published
2001-02-01
Volume
44
Issue
1
Pages
81-95
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
DOI
10.2307/3069338
OpenAlex
W2065067355
Cited by
1,305
References
1
FWCI
31.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3069338
The paper
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069338

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.