The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.
Open accessAbstract
Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View Of Trust
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.926617 · Cited by 10,274
Affect and Cognition Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations
McAllister, D. J. (1995) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256727 · Cited by 7,346
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Cox, D. R., & Oakes, D. (2018) · Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks · doi:10.1201/9781315137438 · Cited by 6,234
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
Statistical Models and Methods for Lifetime Data
Lawless, J. F. (2002) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9781118033005 · Cited by 4,470
Breslow, N., Cox, D. R., & Oakes, D. (1985) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2530888 · Cited by 4,333
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1979) · Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9257-3_8 · Cited by 3,367
Statistical Models and Methods for Lifetime Data.
Francis, B., & Lawless, J. F. (1983) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2531129 · Cited by 2,763
Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114 · Cited by 2,332
Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1990) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393314 · Cited by 2,178
Statistical Models and Methods for Lifetime Data
Schafer, R. E. (1983) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1983.10487833 · Cited by 2,094
Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations
Donaldson, L. (1997) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/031289629702200205 · Cited by 1,770
The liability of newness: age dependence in organizational death rates
Freeman, J., Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (1983) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2094928 · Cited by 1,700
A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259103 · Cited by 1,591
Self-citationZaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. (1995) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250160504 · Cited by 1,543
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Mørck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 1,108
The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and Performance
Katz, R. (1982) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392547 · Cited by 1,102
Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations
Reger, R. K., Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259414 · Cited by 1,084
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308826 · Cited by 1,017
EFFECTS OF BOARD AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON CORPORATE R&D STRATEGY.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. (1991) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256308 · Cited by 947
Resetting the Clock: The Dynamics of Organizational Change and Failure
Amburgey, T. L., Kelly, D., & Barnett, W. P. (1993) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393254 · Cited by 905
Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust
Bigley, G. A., & Pearce, J. L. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259286 · Cited by 758
Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. S. (1991) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1991.4279621 · Cited by 757
Neubauer, F., & Lank, A. G. (1998) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-14465-5 · Cited by 615
Organizational Change and Organizational Mortality
Singh, J. V., House, R. J., & Tucker, D. J. (1986) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392965 · Cited by 515
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258017 · Cited by 449
Work and Family in the United States: A Critical Review and Agenda for Research and Policy
Kanter, R. M. (1989) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.1989.00077.x · Cited by 410
Reframing Execufive Compensation: An Assessment and Outlook
Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. M. (1997) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639702300304 · Cited by 403
Self-citationGamson, W. A., & Scotch, N. A. (1964) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/223739 · Cited by 378
Risk Taking: A Managerial Perspective
Clarke, L., & Shapira, Z. (1996) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259170 · Cited by 371
TOSI, H. L., KATZ, J. P., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257054 · Cited by 347
Self-citationManagerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., & Hill, C. W. L. (1993) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.4.2.325 · Cited by 332
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1978) · PubMed · Cited by 331
The Influence of Family on the Family Business Succession Process: a Multi-Generational Perspective
Davis, P. S., & Harveston, P. D. (1998) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1177/104225879802200302 · Cited by 331
Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The Succession Effect
Brown, M. C. (1982) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392543 · Cited by 322
Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
Lambert, R. A. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003645 · Cited by 321
Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organizational Culture: An Exchange Perspective
Jones, G. R. (1983) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392252 · Cited by 272
(1991) · Cited by 268
Managerial control and performance
McEachern, W. (1975) · Cited by 252
Power, Performance, and Succession in the Large Corporation
Allen, M. P., & Panian, S. K. (1982) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392529 · Cited by 249
CEO COMPENSATION MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE.
TOSI, Jr., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. (1994) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256609 · Cited by 244
Self-citationRisk measures in strategic management research: auld lang syne?
Ruefli, T. W., Collins, J. M., & LaCugna, J. (1999) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199902)20:2<167::aid-smj9>3.0.co;2-q · Cited by 238
Time and Entrepreneurial Risk Behavior
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (1998) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1177/104225879802200206 · Cited by 236
Dynamics of Publisher Succession in Newspaper Organizations
Carroll, G. R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393082 · Cited by 207
MEASURING ORGANIZATIONAL DOWNSIDE RISK
MILLER, K. D., & REUER, J. J. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199611)17:9<671::aid-smj838>3.0.co;2-1 · Cited by 197
Risk taking: a managerial perspective
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-6317 · Cited by 192
Toward a Strategic Theory of Risk Premium: Moving beyond Capm
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Schulze, W. S. (1999) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259142 · Cited by 169
Litz, R. A. (1997) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1177/104225879702100304 · Cited by 164
GHOST OF MANAGERS PAST: MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION AND ORGANIZATIONAL MORTALITY.
Haveman, H. A. (1993) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256762 · Cited by 159
James, D. R., & Soref, M. (1981) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095023 · Cited by 153
Potential Contributions of Organizational Behavior to the Study of Family-Owned Businesses
Dyer, W. G. (1994) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.1994.00109.x · Cited by 144
Markets, false hierarchies and the evolution of the modern corporation
Kay, N. M. (1992) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(95)90011-x · Cited by 71
Cited by
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00567 · Cited by 5,122
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.52.1.106 · Cited by 4,380
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486511435355 · Cited by 2,724
Self-citationManaging Resources: Linking Unique Resources, Management, and Wealth Creation in Family Firms
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2003) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/1540-8520.t01-1-00013 · Cited by 2,518
The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms
Gómez‐Mejía, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & Castro, J. O. D. (2011) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2011.593320 · Cited by 2,230
Metadata
- Authors
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2001-02-01
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-95
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2065067355
- Cited by
- 1,305
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 31.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.