The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.
Open accessAbstract
Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.
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Cites
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Affect and Cognition Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations
McAllister, D. J. (1995) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256727 · Cited by 7,346
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Cited by
Items 101–105 of 105
Family involvement and new venture debt financing
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Kellermanns, F., & Wu, Z. (2011) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.11.002 · Cited by 266
Are Family Firms Good Employers?
Neckebrouck, J., Schulze, W., & Zellweger, T. (2018) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0765 · Cited by 265
Allouche, J., Amann, B., Jaussaud, J., & Kurashina, T. (2008) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.2008.00132.x · Cited by 257
Ling, Y., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00893.x · Cited by 252
Transaction Costs and Outsourcing Decisions in Small- and Medium-Sized Family Firms
Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2011) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486510396706 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2001-02-01
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-95
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2065067355
- Cited by
- 1,305
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 31.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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