The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Analysis of Stock Recommendations
Abstract
We study the information content of stock reports when investors are uncer-tain about a Þnancial analysts incentives. Incentives may be aligned, in which case the analyst wishes to credibly convey his information, or incentives may be misaligned. We Þnd that: (a) Any investor uncertainty about incentives makes full revelation of information impossible. (b) Categorical ranking systems, such as those commonly used by brokerages, arise endogenously as equilibria. (c) Under certain conditions, analysts with aligned incentives can credibly convey unfavorable information, but can never credibly convey favorable information. (d) Policies that improve transparency of analyst incentives might reduce the information content of stock reports. Finally, we examine testable implications of the model compared to empirical analyses of stock recommendations. JEL #s: G24, D82
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Cited by
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
Authority and Communication in Organizations
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Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Morgan, J., & Stocken, P. C.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 183
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121519289
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 24.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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