The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling
Abstract
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.
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Cites
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Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence
Han, Y. J., Nunes, J. C., & Drèze, X. (2010) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.74.4.015 · Cited by 1,649
Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption
Berger, J., & Ward, M. (2010) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/655445 · Cited by 652
The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric organ donation: A cross-country study
Abadie, A., & Gay, S. (2006) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.01.003 · Cited by 517
The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity
Bellezza, S., Gino, F., & Keinan, A. (2014) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/674870 · Cited by 346
Strategic Information Transmission in Peer-to-Peer Lending Markets
Caldieraro, F., Zhang, J. Z., Cunha, M., & Shulman, J. D. (2018) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.16.0113 · Cited by 101
Metadata
- Authors
- Feltovich, N., Harbaugh, R., & To, T.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 630
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122794217
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 8.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.