The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling
Abstract
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Feltovich, N., Harbaugh, R., & To, T.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 630
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122794217
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 8.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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