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Taxation with Costly Administration
Abstract
The concept of a tax technology is used here as providing a unified framework for analyzing both administrative activity by tax authorities and tax-resisting activity by taxpayers. This framework provides a simple formalization of Adam Smith's four components of tax costs: administration, substitution, active noncompliance, and passive compliance. The model is used to derive policy implications concerning the proper measurement of the cost of public funds and concerning the criterion for optimal administration.
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“Reducing tax evasion through stiffer penalties could be a more efficient way to generate revenue than raising distortionary taxes even if evasion has no resource cost 1Louis Kaplow 1990; Joram Mayshar 19912.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Joram Mayshar 1991
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Citations
Cited by
Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion
Slemrod, J. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.25 · Cited by 1,168
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
Tax Compliance and Enforcement
Slemrod, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181437 · Cited by 563
Truby, J. (2018) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2018.06.009 · Cited by 499
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
Kaplow, L. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400839223 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- Mayshar, J.
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 0
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- Mayshar, J. (1991). Taxation with Costly Administration. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3440422
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.