Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper views corruption as a form of contracting amenable to analysis from the viewpoint of transaction-cost economics. Concepts such as transaction, bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are shown to apply to cases of corruption. Both market and parochial corruption are hypothesized to vary in accordance with changes in the specificity of assets invested to support the corruption transaction. Evidence from a number of different studies tends to support the hypothesized relation. The implications of the transaction-cost perspective are developed for policy makers and directions for future research are suggested.
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Citations
Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Cited by
Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment
Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. (2002) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8491017 · Cited by 1,321
Wealth, Culture, and Corruption
Husted, B. W. (1999) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490073 · Cited by 853
Self-citationTonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M., & Perlitz, M. (2010) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00394.x · Cited by 455
The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0389 · Cited by 320
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2002) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1020320327526 · Cited by 284
Metadata
- Authors
- Husted, B. W.
- Venue
- Business Ethics Quarterly
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 17-27
- ISSN
- 1052-150X (ISSN-L)
- 2153-3326
- OpenAlex
- W2050534964
- Cited by
- 147
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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