The DOI matches its Crossref record; 186 of the 186 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
Abstract
Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.
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Cited by
Kolthoff, E., Erakovich, R., & Lasthuizen, K. (2010) · International Journal of Public Sector Management · doi:10.1108/09513551011078879 · Cited by 63
Testa, C. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.04.010 · Cited by 50
Effects of corruption on human development. Evidence for developed and developing countries
Castillo, O. N., Santibáñez, A. L. V., & Márquez, H. F. (2024) · Acta Oeconomica · doi:10.1556/032.2024.00024 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2007-09-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 45-0389-45-0389
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2106866736
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 186
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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