Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective
Open accessAbstract
Throughout the advanced countries of the world self‐regulatory regimes are being introduced. This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self‐regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory. The article examines the strengths and to a lesser extent the weaknesses of industry self‐regulation from five closely related yet distinct vantage points: mediating institutions; industrial morality; institutionalizing responsibility; institutions responding to external pressure; and the roles of the state and third parties.
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Claims the paper makes
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- Premisecitation
In financial futures markets, the most effective mechanism for maintaining market order and curbing trading abuses has proved to be informal mechanisms of social control rather than state regulation.
“Contrary to conventional wisdom, the most effective mechanism for maintaining market ``order'' and curbing trading abuses has proved to be informal mechanisms of social control rather than state regulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gunningham 1991 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective
In at least some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control.
“This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.”
- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · boosted
“Indeed, there is growing evidence of a range of circumstances where self-regulation (either alone, or more commonly, in conjunction with other policy instruments) can be a remarkably effective and efficient means of social control.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · boosted
- Premisecitation
At each California OSHA Cooperative Compliance Program project, accident rates dropped significantly as a result of the CCP.
“As for outcomes, suffice it to say that, at each project, accident rates dropped significantly as a result of the CCP (Rees 1988).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1988
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
Self-regulatory mechanisms underpinned by some form of state intervention are more resilient and effective than self-regulation in isolation.
“As we will see in part VI, there is reason to believe that self-regulatory mechanisms underpinned by some form of state intervention are more resilient and effective than self-regulation in isolation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Industry associations, like persons, have multiple selves, a complexity that reflects the complexity of the social world.
“Much the same can be said of industry associations which, like persons, have multiple selves, a complexity that also reflects the complexity of the social world.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Walzer 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective
Self-regulatory regimes have proliferated in advanced countries, with a surge in the United States, Europe, and other advanced economies over the past twenty years.
“Throughout the advanced countries of the world self-regulatory regimes are being introduced.”
- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
“The past twenty years have witnessed a surge in self-regulatory regimes in the United States, Europe, and other advanced economies (see, e.g., Bardach & Kagan 1982;Washington and Lee Law Review 1988;Teubner, Farmer, & Murphy 1994).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Bardach & Kagan 1982
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Washington and Lee Law Review 1988
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Teubner, Farmer, & Murphy 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
- Premisenone given
INPO has spent tens of millions of dollars over the past seventeen years developing an elaborate system for verifying and monitoring nuclear plant performance.
“INPO's much more sophisticated oversight effort has spent tens of millions of dollars over the past seventeen years developing a remarkably elaborate system for verifying and monitoring nuclear plant performance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 then there is fluid and impatient capital, as when ``funds supplied by external capital providers move rapidly from company to company, usually based on perceptions of opportunities for near-term appreciation'' (Porter 1992: 69).The list goes on: stock market myopia (Druck 1986: 31), information assymmetry (Myers & Majluf 1984: 187±221); but the essential point remains.If a business culture of short-termism is one of the central challenges facing industry self-regulation, and we hope to moderate its undesirable effects, then we need to learn a lot more about how the norms by which corporations operate actually encourage such behavior.
American management has produced a culture of short-sidedness.
“Hence, we agree with Selznick that ``American management has produced a culture of short sidedness'' (Selznick 1992: 353) and that an institutional perspective has special relevance for addressing the problem.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Selznick 1992: 353
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
In the chemical manufacturing industry's Responsible Care program and the nuclear power industry's INPO, a common meaning system at the industry level-a new industrial morality-emerged in response to major changes in society (environmentalism and Bhopal; nuclear fear and Three Mile Island).
“Good examples of this are the chemical manufacturing industry's Responsible Care program and the nuclear power industry's Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a private regulatory bureaucracy created by the industry after the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident.What we find in each case is the emergence of a common meaning system at the industry level ± a new industrial morality”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
From the credibility gap of industry self-regulation follows the need for some kind of independent confirmation of the industry's claims, by checking their accuracy and monitoring the actual performance of member companies.
“And from this credibility gap follows the need for some kind of independent confirmation of the industry's claims, by checking their accuracy, by monitoring the actual performance of member companies, and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
INPO's normative system socially constructs the identity of the 'good' nuclear plant manager by providing an elaborate 'script' that delineates the managerial, technical, and moral parts of the role.
“For a nice example of one such constitutive framework, consider how INPO's normative system socially constructs the identity of the ``good'' nuclear plant manager by providing a very elaborate ``script'' that delineates the managerial, technical, and moral parts of the role.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
By giving the industry information to quantitatively compare individual nuclear units with the entire nuclear industry, INPO enabled utility officials to interpret a plant's performance relative to an industry-wide field rather than in isolation.
“By giving the industry the information to quantitatively compare the performance of individual nuclear units with that of the entire nuclear industry, INPO enabled utility officials to interpret a plant's performance in a new light: not how each stands alone, but where they stand relative to an industry-wide field of performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License communicate their progress in implementing the industry codes); and (2) the industry collects and analyzes the data.There is wide agreement that reporting and data collection are ``the dullest of tasks'' (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 173).Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.All this varies widely ± both the quality of the response and the effectiveness with which the information is analyzed ± because there is no set pattern in the nature and scope of the data gathering process among programs of industry selfregulation.In the case of Responsible Care, for example, the chemical industry's data gathering process has a long way to go, partly because the industry has not yet developed the analytical capacity to examine the data with sufficient care, and partly because it lacks the institutional mechanisms for using the information in a way that significantly enhances the accountability (and self-discipline) of chemical company officials.By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).
One way to deal with the problem of self-reporting is for an industry's data collection efforts to piggyback to some extent on reporting requirements already mandated by government regulation.
“One way to deal with this problem has been for an industry's data collection efforts to piggyback to some extent on the reporting requirements already mandated by government regulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Reporting requirements usually adopt some form of self-reporting.
- Premisecitation
A customary morality has a characteristic shortcoming of a failure to adapt to new circumstances, such as the chemical industry's slow response to the rise of environmentalism and public concern with environmental values.
“The other is a failure to adapt to new circumstances, such as the chemical industry's slow response to the rise of environmentalism and the public's growing concern with environmental values (see Rees 1997).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The effectiveness of self-regulation depends enormously on the system's ability to produce and promulgate information about the normative standards the industry has set for itself and about the performance of member companies in terms of those standards.
“While much remains to be learned, there are good grounds for thinking that the effectiveness of self-regulation depends enormously on the system's ability to produce and promulgate two kinds of information: (1) about the normative standards the industry has set for itself; and (2) about the performance of member companies in terms of those standards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
- Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
An international survey of business firms ranked United States firms twenty-second of twenty-three nations, ahead only of Hungarian firms.
“On this score, an international survey of business firms ranked United States firms twenty-second of twenty-three nations, ahead only of Hungarian firms (see Thurow 1991: 183).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Thurow 1991: 183
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning
Responsible Care is currently moving from self-evaluation to third-party verification.
“In hopes of overcoming the chemical industry's yawning credibility gap, it is currently in the painful process of moving from self-evaluation to third-party verification.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License communicate their progress in implementing the industry codes); and (2) the industry collects and analyzes the data.There is wide agreement that reporting and data collection are ``the dullest of tasks'' (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 173).Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.All this varies widely ± both the quality of the response and the effectiveness with which the information is analyzed ± because there is no set pattern in the nature and scope of the data gathering process among programs of industry selfregulation.In the case of Responsible Care, for example, the chemical industry's data gathering process has a long way to go, partly because the industry has not yet developed the analytical capacity to examine the data with sufficient care, and partly because it lacks the institutional mechanisms for using the information in a way that significantly enhances the accountability (and self-discipline) of chemical company officials.By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).
Piggybacking on government-mandated reporting is only a partial solution to the problem of self-reporting.
“Yet that solution is partial at best, which brings us to monitoring and verification.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Despite concerns, the development of an independent monitoring capability continues in the chemical industry and some other industries because strong forces sometimes press industry self-regulation toward increased transparency and public accountability.
“Yet, despite these and other concerns, the development of an independent monitoring capability continues in the chemical industry, and some other industries as well, because sometimes strong forces seem to press industry self-regulation in the direction of increased transparency and public accountability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The ordering force in nuclear industry self-regulation can be understood in terms of three inextricably related yet analytically distinct bases of compliance: punitive, cognitive, and normative.
“we wish to suggest the beginnings of an answer by drawing on institutional theory and by noting how the ordering force in one suggestive case ± nuclear industry self-regulation ± can be understood in terms of three inextricably related yet analytically distinct bases of compliance ± punitive, cognitive, and normative (Scott 1995).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scott 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Responsible Care generates a demand that chemical companies actually deliver on the values they claim to embrace, values which their critics also hold.
“Responsible Care generates a demand that chemical companies actually deliver on the values that they claim to embrace (values which their critics really hold);”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A customary morality has a characteristic shortcoming of an overly narrow moral perspective that too closely identifies right industrial conduct with the norms of a particular institution.
“One is an overly narrow moral perspective that too closely identifies right industrial conduct with the norms of a particular institution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
From a punitive perspective, what mainly motivates nuclear utilities to live up to demanding industrial principles and practices is not so much the threat of formal sanctions but the possibility of informal sanctions, such as peer pressure generated by INPO's industrywide mechanisms for shaming deviant members.
“And from a punitive perspective what mainly seems to motivate nuclear utilities to live up to these demanding industrial principles and practices is not so much the threat of formal sanctions, though that possibility may well loom in the background, but the possibility of more informal sanctions, such as the peer pressure generated by INPO's industrywide institutional mechanisms for shaming its de”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Braithwaite 1989 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License communicate their progress in implementing the industry codes); and (2) the industry collects and analyzes the data.There is wide agreement that reporting and data collection are ``the dullest of tasks'' (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 173).Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.All this varies widely ± both the quality of the response and the effectiveness with which the information is analyzed ± because there is no set pattern in the nature and scope of the data gathering process among programs of industry selfregulation.In the case of Responsible Care, for example, the chemical industry's data gathering process has a long way to go, partly because the industry has not yet developed the analytical capacity to examine the data with sufficient care, and partly because it lacks the institutional mechanisms for using the information in a way that significantly enhances the accountability (and self-discipline) of chemical company officials.By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).
The effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.
“Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
- Interpretationcitation
Responsible Care's ethical framework, through the new expectations and demands its public commitments generate, has set into motion a process of internal or immanent criticism that constantly challenges existing industrial practices.
“In other words, Responsible Care's ethical framework, thanks to the new expectations and demands its public commitments generate, has set into motion a process of internal or immanent criticism (Walzer 1994: 41±42) that constantly challenges existing industrial practices (see Rees 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Walzer 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Rees 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisenone given
From a punitive perspective, what is important is the capacity of industry self-regulation to back its norms with the threat of sanctions.
“From a punitive perspective, what is important is the capacity of industry self-regulation to back its norms with the threat of sanctions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The meaning of 'good' and 'bad' nuclear plants is constructed in terms of INPO's ten performance indicators.
“For example, the meaning of ``good'' and ``bad'' nuclear plants is constructed in terms of INPO's ten performance indicators.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Without a close understanding of the mimetic pressures generated by socially constructed role models, it is impossible to explain the ordering force of nuclear industry self-regulation.
“And without a close understanding of the mimetic pressures those socially constructed role models generate, it is impossible to explain the ordering force of nuclear industry self-regulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Industry self-regulation is not an all-or-nothing matter but inescapably a matter of degree.
“That question asks us to change our focus and consider industry selfregulation from a developmental perspective ± not an all-or-nothing matter, but inescapably a matter of degree.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
From a cognitive perspective, understanding what motivates nuclear utilities to live up to INPO's normative system requires appreciating how INPO creates categories of social actors, both individual and collective, and associated ways of acting.
“From a cognitive perspective, to understand what motivates nuclear utilities to live up to INPO's normative system, it is necessary to appreciate how INPO creates categories of social actors, both individual and collective, and associated ways of acting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).
By constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding and an industrywide interpretive framework for construing roles and appropriate behavior.
“And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
With increasing transparency, accountability is more readily maintained.
“With increasing transparency, in short, accountability is more readily maintained.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
- Interpretationreasoning
At least part of the answer to what motivates an industry to create a monitoring system is the overriding public reaction to programs of industry self-regulation, especially towards claims and pronouncements made by skeptical industry officials.
“At least part of the answer can be found in the overriding public reaction to programs of industry self-regulation, especially towards the claims and pronouncements made by skeptical industry officials.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
INPO's inspection program has a team of about twenty highly trained inspectors who visit each nuclear plant at about eighteen-month intervals for two intensive weeks to scrutinize and evaluate the plant's performance from the standpoint of nuclear power's industrial morality.
“The centerpiece of that endeavor, the inspection program, has a team of twenty or so highly trained inspectors going to each nuclear plant at about eighteen-month intervals, where for two intensive weeks they scrutinize and evaluate the plant's performance from the standpoint of nuclear power's industrial morality.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License meaningful and legitimate from the standpoint of their publics.These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.None of this means that the SFI's industrial morality is entirely new, however.Wood products companies, like many other industries, have long had informal codes for governing intra-industry relations, such as not disparaging competitors' products.What is new is the way these norms, a product of collective industry deliberation, challenge traditional ways of doing business and redefine the industry's responsibilities in light of social values widely shared outside the industry.
The Defense Industry Initiative falls short of being an effective method of self-regulation.
“These are good intentions, no doubt; yet according to a study of the Initiative's implementation, it ``falls short of being an effective method of self-regulation'' and ``reflect[s] the misplaced confidence that behavioral change will follow from mere ethical preaching and ethical modeling'' (Kurland 1993: 143, quoting Cressey & Moone 1983).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kurland 1993: 143 source
- cites Cressey & Moone 1983
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
INPO orchestrated the firing of a nuclear utility's senior officers when they failed to remedy substandard performance at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant.
“A striking example of this was when INPO orchestrated the firing of a nuclear utility's senior officers when they failed to remedy substandard performance at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant (see Rees 1994).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Industry self-regulation is closely linked to regulation by the government.
“In fact, to overlook how these regulatory spheres coexist and interact is to obscure one of the most important things we need to understand about how industry self-regulation works in society, for a growing body of evidence suggests that industry self-regulation is closely linked to regulation by the government, like two partners joined in a mazy dance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License OSHA 1988: 26341).For OSHA, in short, the purpose is to recognize and encourage self-regulation in the workplace.The VPP now covers about 241,000 employees at 370 worksites, 14 where OSHA encourages their selfregulatory efforts in a variety of ways, such as ceasing routine compliance inspections in favor of a more consultative and problem-solving approach, and also by encouraging a mentoring program in which companies with exemplary safety and health programs share their experience and expertise with those companies striving to improve their in-house programs (Catanzaro & Weinberg 1994: 22±25).
The EPA's Common Sense Initiative encourages self-regulation in six industry sectors by bringing together stakeholder representatives to craft solutions to environmental problems.
“CSI encourages self-regulation in six industry sectors (auto manufacturing, printing, petroleum refining, among others) by bringing together groups of stakeholder representatives (from industry, environmental groups, community groups, environmental justice groups, among others) to craft solutions to environmental problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites U.S. EPA 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
A legislative underpinning to self-regulation is not necessarily the only way of giving it bite and credibility.
“While a legislative underpinning to self-regulation is perhaps the most obvious way of giving it ``bite'' and credibility, it is not necessarily the only way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Given serious problems of free riding, effective monitoring and enforcement is a prerequisite for successful self-regulation.
“Given the serious problems of free riding, a prerequisite for successful self-regulation will be effective monitoring and enforcement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
The capacity of an agency to withdraw its endorsement may provide a significant inducement to the target group to self-regulate effectively.
“In these circumstances, the capacity of the agency to withdraw its endorsement may provide a significant inducement to the target group to self-regulate effectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The basic obstacle to effective self-regulation in the circumstances described is an assurance problem.
“This suggests that the basic obstacle to effective self-regulation in the circumstances described above is an ``assurance problem'' (see Runge 1984).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Runge 1984 source
- Rests on an assumption: In the case of Responsible Care, many leading players in the industry recognize that 'each must be his brother's keeper.'
- Interpretationreasoning
Self-regulation is rarely effective without third-party involvement.
“Indeed, it is arguable that self-regulation is rarely effective without such involvement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
With the enactment of Medicare in 1965, JCAHO was radically changed from a private voluntary accreditation program to an agency with a major role in public health care regulation and financing.
“With the enactment of Medicare in 1965 (Social Security Amendments 1965), JCAHO ``was radically changed from a private voluntary accreditation program to an agency with a major role in public health care regulation and financing'' (Jost 1983: 852).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jost 1983
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).
One of the most telling indicators of a cooperative approach is the extent to which an industry has developed a capacity for mutual assistance, such as sharing best practices and helping companies that lack technical and organizational capability.
“That is why one of the most telling indicators of a cooperative approach is the extent to which an industry has developed a capacity for mutual assistance ± sharing best industry practices, helping companies that lack the technical and organizational capability to implement the codes, and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The phenomenon is better thought of as industry co-regulation rather than industry self-regulation.
“So rather than industry self-regulation, we come up with a mixture of public and private regulation that we might better think of in terms of industry co-regulation (Grabosky & Braithwaite 1986: 83;Ayres & Braithwaite 1992: 102±3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grabosky & Braithwaite 1986
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Without effective monitoring and enforcement, free-rider problems may be insurmountable.
“Without it, free-rider problems may be insurmountable, for reasons described above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Almost all of the salient factors present in the ozone-depleting substances case are missing in the case of the greenhouse effect.
“While this is by no means a complete explanation of a complex issue (Canan & Reichman 1993) these are at least salient factors, and almost all of them are missing in the case of the greenhouse effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Canan & Reichman 1993 source
- Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
Fear of government regulation drives the large majority of self-regulatory initiatives.
“Certainly there is considerable evidence from a variety of jurisdictions that it is largely fear of government regulation that drives the large majority of self-regulatory initiatives, 12”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [12] 12. BENNETT, COLIN J. (1996) ``Privacy Codes of the Canadian Bankers Association and the Canadian Standards Association.'' Draft paper presented at the Voluntary Codes Symposium, Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada and Regulatory Affairs, Treasury Board, 12±13 September, Ottawa. Included in Cohen & Webb forthcoming 1998.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Third parties can be harnessed to act as surrogate regulators, monitoring or policing the code as a complement or alternative to government involvement.
“Sometimes, there may also be a possibility of harnessing third parties to act as surrogate regulators; monitoring or policing the code as a complement or alternative to govern-ment involvement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
In some circumstances, the mere threat of imposing legislation may provide sufficient incentive to the target group to make its actual imposition unnecessary.
“In some circumstances, the mere threat of imposing legislation may provide sufficient incentive to the target group to make its actual imposition unnecessary.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
The impact of expulsion as a sanction varies from case to case.
“The impact of this will vary from case to case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The state is not the only possible institution capable of compensating for the weaknesses of pure self-regulation.
“The state is not the only possible institution capable of compensating for the weaknesses of self-regulation in its pure form.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The assumption that business is invariably rational and self-interested, and will therefore free ride, may be too strict, at least in some circumstances.
“Finally, on this point, it should be noted that the assumption that business is invariably rational and self-interested, and accordingly will free ride, may be too strict, at least in some circumstances.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).
A commitment to dialogue, persuasion, and cooperative problem solving only makes sense when the principal source of non-compliance with industry norms is not willful disobedience but a lack of organizational capability to understand or implement those norms.
“But it is also the case that a commitment to dialogue, persuasion and cooperative problem solving only makes sense under the right circumstances; namely, when the principal source of non-compliance with industry norms is not willful disobedience, but rather a lack of organizational capability to either understand or implement those norms (Kagan & Scholz 1984).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kagan & Scholz 1984
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).
The cooperative approach can all too easily turn into weakness and undue permissiveness in cases of non-compliance that stem from willful disobedience.
“But what about those cases of non-compliance that stem from willful disobedience?Here the cooperative approach can all too easily turn into weakness and undue permissiveness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Firms may be prepared to shoulder equal or fair shares of expenditure necessary for their long-term interests rather than invariably seeking to maximize individual short-term gain.
“That is, it may be that firms are prepared to shoulder equal or fair shares of the expenditure necessary for their long-term interests to be achieved rather than invariably seeking to maximize individual short-term gain (often at the cost of a collective good).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even in circumstances favorable to collective action, effective collective action is not assured.
“However, even in circumstances such as these, effective collective action is not assured.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A group must come to perceive its common interests before it can engage in effective collective action.
- Interpretationreasoning
Some industrial moralities are more effective than others when it comes to restraining industrial conduct.
“Hence, some industrial moralities are more effective than others when it comes to restraining industrial conduct.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
Self-regulatory initiatives are unlikely to perform well in the absence of continuing government oversight and the threat of direct intervention.
“and it seems unlikely that they will perform well in the absence of continuing government oversight and the threat of direct intervention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the science is unclear, there has been no major disaster, or the threat does not seem imminent, it may be difficult to generate concern sufficient to engage members in group action for the common good.
“If, for example, the science is unclear, or there has been no major disaster to provide the group with a ``wake-up call,'' or the threat does not seem imminent, then it may be difficult to generate the necessary concern to engage members in group action for the common good of the group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A group must come to perceive its common interests before it can engage in effective collective action.
- Rests on an assumption: Communities of fate are at least in part social constructions.
- Premisecitation
Medicare mandated that, with few exceptions, only hospitals with JCAHO accreditation were eligible to receive Medicare funds.
“And it assumed that major role largely because Medicare mandated that, with few exceptions, only hospitals with JCAHO accreditation were eligible to receive Medicare funds (ibid.1983: 852±53).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jost 1983
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.
It is often crucial that self-regulation operates in the shadow of rules and sanctions provided by the general law, because these give regulatees the incentive to comply.
“First, it is often crucial that self-regulation operates in the shadow of rules and sanctions provided by the general law, for it is these which are the most obvious and visible (but not the only) means of giving regulatees the incentive to comply with the self-regulatory program.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Firms can be expected to regulate their own behavior if such regulation is necessary to ensure the long-term viability and prosperity of their industry, provided they are confident that other firms are doing the same.
“If so, then we can expect firms to regulate their own behavior if such regulation is necessary to ensure the long-term viability and prosperity of their industry, provided they are confident that other firms are doing the same (ibid.).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The capacity for self-regulation varies among industries; some industrial moralities are more or less well-defined, demanding, and institutionalized than others.
“To be responsive to industry structure, most importantly, regulatory policymakers must learn to appreciate how the capacity for self-regulation varies among industries; some industrial moralities are more (or less) well-defined than others, more (or less) demanding than others, more (or less) institutionalized than others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Self-regulation can invoke lower-level enforcement mechanisms such as education, incentives, and peer pressure.
“At the lower levels it could include education, incentives (e.g., under Responsible Care, the sharing of information) and peer pressure (e.g., Responsible Care leadership committees).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
A firm may withhold its contribution to a public good not because of a rational calculation of costs and benefits, but because it lacks assurance that other firms will contribute their fair share.
“On this view: the group member (i.e., firm) does not withhold its contribution to the public good (e.g., a cleaner environment) based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits involved . . .but rather does so because it is unable to obtain the necessary assurance that other firms will contribute their fair share.11 (Maitland 1985: 134)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Maitland 1985 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Where expulsion has little direct impact, associations will be reluctant to invoke it for fear of revealing their lack of regulatory clout.
“Where expulsion will have little direct impact, associations will be reluctant to invoke it for fear of revealing their ultimate lack of regulatory clout.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).
Examples of a punitive approach are very hard to find in industry self-regulation.
“At this point, however, a worrisome question arises about the capacity of industrial self-regulation to use strategic punishment in this way, for the fact of the matter is that examples of this kind of punitive approach are very hard to find in industry self-regulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Virtually all hospitals with more than twenty-five beds are JCAHO accredited.
“This influence is evident in the fact that virtually all hospitals with more than twenty-five beds are JCAHO accredited (Jost 1983: 845);”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jost 1983
- Interpretationreasoning
On the three-dimensional pyramid model, escalation of coercion is possible up any face, not merely through government action.
“On this model, escalation (i.e., increasing coercion) would be possible up any face of the pyramid, and not merely in terms of government action.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Strong coincidence between public and private interest in self-regulation (or external pressures sufficient to create it) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the success of self-regulation.
“However, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the success of self-regulation”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The model holds out the possibility of escalating degrees of coercion through interaction between different but complementary instruments and parties.
“Our model of three-dimensional regulation holds out the possibility of escalating degrees of coercion through interaction between different but complementary instruments and parties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The interaction between public and private regulation is crucially important.
“This suggests that the interaction between public and private regulation is crucially important”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Self-regulation is very rarely successful as a stand-alone mechanism of social control.
“we have emphasized that selfregulation is very rarely successful as a ``stand-alone'' mechanism of social control.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Unless adequate mechanisms can be put in place to deal with free riders, self-regulation may still fail.
“unless, for example, adequate mechanisms can be put in place to deal with free riders, selfregulation may still fail.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There are a substantial number of internal and external hurdles which must be overcome before self-regulation becomes a credible policy option.
“we have argued that there are a substantial number of internal and external hurdles which must be overcome before self-regulation becomes a credible policy option.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
In the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, collective action problems and the temptation to free ride mean that self-regulation and its related codes of practice alone will be insufficient to achieve the goal of improving environmental performance.
“For example, in the case of the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, even though the industry as a whole has a self-interest in improving its environmental performance, collective action problems and the temptation to free ride mean that self-regulation and its related codes of practice alone will be insufficient to achieve that goal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gunningham 1995 source
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 57
- May combine two claims. 42
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe key to realizing the potential of industry associations for self-regulation is the development of an effective industrial morality that brings the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering.
“And for reasons that will become clear as we proceed, the key to realizing that potential is the development of an effective industrial morality that brings the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation varies enormously among industries, due partly to social and economic context and partly to the self-regulation program's institutional design.
“The proponents and critics both have a point because the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation varies enormously among industries, due partly to its social and economic context, which varies widely, and partly to the self-regulation program's institutional design, a highly variable matter as well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMax Weber concluded that Germany's legal system was not very effective in curbing gambling and wild speculation, especially compared to the English and American exchanges.
“In the 1890s, Max Weber wrote a series of articles examining the regulation of European and American stock exchanges in which he concluded that Germany's legal system was not very effective in curbing ``gambling and wild speculation,'' especially when compared to the English and American exchanges.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bendix 1977
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningAcross a variety of nations, governments of very different political complexions are experimenting with various forms of self-regulation in search of a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and state-centered regulation.
“And why, across a variety of nations, governments of very different political complexions are experimenting with various forms of self-regulation in search of a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and state-centered regulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIndustry self-regulation is a special kind of normative institution whose crucial feature is its variable capacity (or incapacity) to bring the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering responsive to broader social values.
“Industry selfregulation is a special kind of normative institution from this vantage point, and the crucial thing to understand is its variable capacity (or incapacity) to bring the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering responsive to broader social values.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTo moralize industrial life, an industry association must establish a normative framework (industrial morality) for its members and develop ways to ensure its efficacy.
“To moralize industrial life, as Durkheim would put it, an industry association must establish a normative framework (industrial morality) for its members, and, equally important, develop ways to ensure its efficacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
PremisecitationA voluntary code enforced through market sanctions has the potential to be the most efficient method of improving working conditions because of the international dimensions of the situation.
“Rhone's case study (1996) of the scheme concludes that: ``because of the international dimensions of the situation, a voluntary code enforced through market sanctions has the potential to be the most efficient method of improving working conditions.''”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rhone 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningShrinking tax bases, the swing towards neoliberal ideology and away from government intervention, and the resistance of multinational companies in a global marketplace have made direct government regulation less attractive politically and economically in recent years.
“Add to this shrinking tax bases, the swing towards neoliberal ideology and away from government intervention, the resistance of multinational companies operating in an increasingly global marketplace, and it is hardly surprising why, both politically and economically, direct government regulation has become less attractive in recent years.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationDurkheim argued that mediating institutions between the state and the individual have a distinctive capacity for becoming agencies of moral education, an advantage that comes from their special knowledge and influence.
“``Occupational groups,'' ``business groups,'' ``professional groups'' ± for Durkheim these and other mediating institutions ``between the state and the individual'' (Durkheim 1933: 28) have a distinctive capacity for becoming ``agencies of moral education'' (Cladis 1993: 144), an advantage that comes from their special knowledge and influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Durkheim 1933
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Cladis 1993
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAutonomous associations like the exchanges could be more flexible than the state in restraining members and in choosing sanctions for noncompliance.
“Because they were governed autonomously, the American and English exchanges that Weber studied could be far more flexible than the state in restraining their members”
- Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · hedged
“such autonomous associations could be far more flexible in their choice of sanctions for non compliance with rules, as well as apply rules in a far more effective and discretionary manner.(Haines 1996)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Haines 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · hedged
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPure forms of self-regulation and government regulation are rarely found in the real world, where distinctions between them are incremental rather than dichotomous.
“However, those pure forms are rarely found in the real world, in which distinctions between self-regulation and government regulation are incremental rather than dichotomous (see further Sinclair 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sinclair 1997 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMost business actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility; business executives have profit-maximizing and law-abiding selves, and different selves prevail at different moments and contexts.
“[M]ost business actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to values of economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility.Business executives have profit-maximizing selves and law-abiding selves; at different moments, in different contexts, the different selves prevail.' ' (1995: 31)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationA normative institutional perspective emphasizes that values and normative frameworks structure choices, and actors conform because it is expected of them and they are obliged to do so, not because it serves narrowly defined individual interests.
“This way of thinking about industry associations -as normative institutions above all ± ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices. . . .Actors conform not because it serves their individual interests, narrowly defined, but because it is expected of them; they are obliged to do so'' (Scott 1995: 38±39).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scott 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenRegulatory overload has made the continuing use of highly detailed prescriptive regulation problematic and, in many circumstances, counterproductive.
“There are a number of reasons for this, including the broader problem of regulatory overload.This has made the continuing use of highly detailed prescriptive regulation problematic and, in many circumstances, counterproductive.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere is no clear dichotomy between self-regulation and government regulation; rather, there is a continuum with pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite ends.
“From the above, it will be apparent that there is no clear dichotomy between self-regulation on the one hand and government regulation on the other.Rather, there is a continuum, with pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite ends.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe safety of nuclear plants has increased significantly since Three Mile Island, and INPO's contribution to improved nuclear safety has been highly significant.
“By all accounts, the safety of nuclear plants has increased significantly since TMI, and there is wide agreement among knowledgeable observers (proponents and critics of nuclear power alike) that INPO's contribution to improved nuclear safety has been highly significant (Rees 1994).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSelf-regulation has an extremely tarnished image and is often reviled by conservationists, consumer organizations and other public interest groups for being a charade.
“Indeed, self-regulation has an extremely tarnished image, and is often reviled by conservationists, consumer organizations and other public interest groups for being a charade”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Braithwaite & Fisse 1987
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Blakeney & Barnes 1984
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Page 1980
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional PerspectiveIndustry self-regulation has been prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.
“and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.”
- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
“The subject of this special issue of Law & Policy is self-regulation, a topic which has often received short shrift in mainstream regulatory literature.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIndustry associations are both economic and normative institutions, and the market model of institutions enriches and supplements, but does not supplant, the normative model.
“Which leads to the conclusion that industry associations are both economic and normative institutions, and that the market model of institutions enriches and supplements, but does not supplant, the normative model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe English and American exchanges Weber studied were governed autonomously in accordance with their own statutes, which allowed self-regulation to flourish in support of ethical behavior and sound business practices.
“Because the English and American exchanges were ``governed autonomously in accordance with their own statutes''”
- Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · plain
“This allowed a situation where self-regulation could flourish in a direction which supported ethical (virtuous) behavior, by supporting sound business practices and frowning on pure speculation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bendix 1977
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Haines 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · plain
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe Alanya fishers' self-regulatory system has proved very effective in removing conflict, providing predictability, and facilitating investment.
“The evidence suggests that the system has proved very effective in removing conflict, providing predictability, and thereby facilitating investment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ostrom 1990
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional PerspectiveIndustry self-regulation has been largely ignored by economics, which focuses on individual rather than group behavior.
“that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior)”
- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
“which has made it easy for many economists and political scientists to overlook some of the crucial ways industry self-regulation actually operates in society.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe process of socialization and institutionalization both involve the formation of moral actors, whether individual or corporate, by inculcating them with values and endowing them with a disposition to be governed by moral concerns.
“That is because the process of socialization and institutionalization both involve the formation of moral actors, whether individual or corporate, by inculcating them with values and endowing them with a disposition to be governed by moral concerns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseThere are many plausible and hotly contested explanations of short-termism, each with different implications for how self-regulatory regimes should be designed.
“Answering such a question is tricky because, as a recent survey of the literature reveals, there are many plausible (and hotly contested) explanations of short-termism (Laverty 1996: 825), each with different implications for thinking about how self-regulatory regimes should be designed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Laverty 1996: 825 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe organizational field has emerged as a critical unit bridging the organizational and societal levels in the study of social and community change.
“Furthermore, ``the organizational field has emerged as a critical unit bridging the organizational and societal levels in the study of social and community change'' (Scott 1991: 174, quoting DiMaggio 1986).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Scott 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites DiMaggio 1986
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationWith chief executives gathered annually, INPO uses its indicators to classify the social world of nuclear power hierarchically, endowing each plant with an official status from 'excellent' 1 to 'marginal' 5, publicly proclaimed.
“Furthermore, with the industry's chief executives gathered in a single room each year, INPO uses those indicators to classify their social world of nuclear power in a distinctive way ± hierarchically ± as each nuclear plant is endowed with an official status (ranging from the ``excellent'' 1 to the ``marginal'' 5), a status publicly proclaimed before everyone's eyes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBuilding transparency into the social structure of an industry sets the stage for a 'theatre of external judgment', and as transparency increases so does the likelihood of being called to account for one's industrial conduct.
“Building transparency into the social structure of the industry sets the stage for a ``theatre of external judgment'' (Noll 1971: 15±19), and as transparency increases so does the likelihood of being called to account for one's industrial conduct.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Noll 1971
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe moral logic applied to the development of self-regulating institutions strongly resembles the logic applied to the formation of moral persons.
“Framed this way, the idea of institutionalization moves us very quickly into thinking about socialization, because the moral logic we apply to the development of self-regulating institutions strongly resembles the logic applied to the formation of moral persons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe SFI asks member companies to resist the single-minded pursuit of any objective, including profits, and to become morally self-aware institutions capable of balancing economic self-interest with other values.
“In other words, by recognizing the complexity of the moral world, the SFI asks member companies to resist the single-minded pursuit of any objective, including profits; it asks them, in short, to become morally self-aware institutions capable of responsibly balancing economic self-interest with other values.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenFrom a utilitarian perspective, the norms and institutions of self-regulation affect member companies' behavior by manipulating cost/benefit calculations, and member companies behave expediently in light of those incentives.
“From this essentially utilitarian perspective, the norms and institutions of self-regulation thus affect the behavior of member companies by manipulating cost/benefit calculations, and member companies behave expediently in light of those incentives.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe organizational field can exert powerful forces on individual organizations, and the structure and behavior of an organization depend importantly on the characteristics of the sector/field in which it operates.
“there is good reason to think the organizational field can exert ``powerful forces'' (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 65) on individual organizations, and that the ``structure and behavior of an organization depend importantly on the characteristics of the sector [read ``field''] in which it operates'' (Scott & Meyer 1991: 120).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites DiMaggio & Powell 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Scott & Meyer 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe ratings set into motion mimetic pressures on all nuclear plants to imitate the practices of exemplary plants, because organizations tend to imitate other organizations they regard as more successful.
“It set into motion mimetic pressures on all the nuclear plants to imitate the practices of the exemplary plants, because, as institutional theorists would explain it, organizations tend to imitate other organizations that they regard as more successful (see DiMaggio & Powell 1991).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites DiMaggio & Powell 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenAn industrial morality legitimates aspirations other than profit as a good reason for action.
“An industrial morality legitimates aspirations other than profit as a good reason for action.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenAn industrial morality creates a normative framework that defines and upholds a special organizational competence.
“Fifth, an industrial morality creates a normative framework that defines and upholds a special organizational competence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn a recent agreement to end sweatshops by creating an industry code of conduct for apparel factories used by American companies, the question of who should do the monitoring was one of the major sticking points.
“in a recent agreement that seeks to end sweatshops by creating an industry code of conduct on wages and working conditions for apparel factories that American companies use around the world, the question of who should do the monitoring was ``one of the major sticking points'' (Greenhouse 1997).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greenhouse 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationAn industrial morality provides a legitimate account of the industry's activities to the public.
“Seventh, an industrial morality provides a legitimate account of the industry's activities to the public.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenMonitoring performance is the third and final step in achieving transparency.
“The third and final step in achieving transparency ± monitoring performance ± also seems to be the most demanding and controversial.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAccountability disciplines decision making and constrains what corporate executives do.
“Chances are that will discipline your decision making and constrain what you do.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe SFI's normative framework asks member companies to enlarge their horizons beyond considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, recognize broader moral issues, and exercise self-restraint.
“The SFI's normative framework ± the ``Forest Principles,'' ``Implementation Guidelines,'' and ``Broad Policy Goals'' ± thus asks member companies to enlarge their horizons beyond considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, recognize the broader moral issues at stake in logging forests and manufacturing forest products, and exercise selfrestraint in light of those considerations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationAn industrial morality is critical, presuming that any existing pattern of industrial conduct is subject to criticism and reconstruction in light of reflection and inquiry.
“Fourth, an industrial morality is critical, as it presumes that any existing pattern of industrial conduct is subject to criticism and reconstruction in light of reflection and inquiry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAn industrial morality carries an expectation of obedience.
“Sixth, an industrial morality carries an expectation of obedience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenThe shift to third-party verification in Responsible Care has been the subject of heated industry debate since Responsible Care's creation almost a decade ago, with opponents highlighting risks to business autonomy, trade-secret confidentiality, and vulnerability to regulators, environmentalists, and litigation.
“Painful because this shift has been the subject of heated industry debate since Responsible Care's creation almost a decade ago, with no end in sight, as opponents highlight the risk inspections pose to business autonomy, the confidentiality of trade secrets, as well as the danger that verification results could make them increasingly vulnerable to regulators, environmentalists, and litigation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License communicate their progress in implementing the industry codes); and (2) the industry collects and analyzes the data.There is wide agreement that reporting and data collection are ``the dullest of tasks'' (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 173).Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.All this varies widely ± both the quality of the response and the effectiveness with which the information is analyzed ± because there is no set pattern in the nature and scope of the data gathering process among programs of industry selfregulation.In the case of Responsible Care, for example, the chemical industry's data gathering process has a long way to go, partly because the industry has not yet developed the analytical capacity to examine the data with sufficient care, and partly because it lacks the institutional mechanisms for using the information in a way that significantly enhances the accountability (and self-discipline) of chemical company officials.By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).INPO's data gathering process uses information to rank all nuclear plants in terms of safety performance and communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline.
“By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License meaningful and legitimate from the standpoint of their publics.These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.None of this means that the SFI's industrial morality is entirely new, however.Wood products companies, like many other industries, have long had informal codes for governing intra-industry relations, such as not disparaging competitors' products.What is new is the way these norms, a product of collective industry deliberation, challenge traditional ways of doing business and redefine the industry's responsibilities in light of social values widely shared outside the industry.Industry norms serve as a connective tissue between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.
“These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License meaningful and legitimate from the standpoint of their publics.These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.None of this means that the SFI's industrial morality is entirely new, however.Wood products companies, like many other industries, have long had informal codes for governing intra-industry relations, such as not disparaging competitors' products.What is new is the way these norms, a product of collective industry deliberation, challenge traditional ways of doing business and redefine the industry's responsibilities in light of social values widely shared outside the industry.The petroleum industry's self-regulatory program, Strategies for Today's Environmental Partnership, amounts to little more than pleasant-sounding corporate rhetoric.
“And as Rees points out later in this Special Issue, much the same can be said for the ethical codes found in the petroleum industry's self-regulatory program ± Strategies for Today's Environmental Partnership ± which also amounts to little more than ``pleasant-sounding corporate rhetoric'' (Rees 1997: xxx).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1997: xxx
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseProblems with how corporations are institutionalized in American society cannot be solved simply by improving individual organizations; institutional changes in how organizations are conceived and in the norms by which they operate are needed.
“But there are problems with how corporations are institutionalized in American society. . .and we cannot solve the problems of corporate life simply by improving individual organizations: we have to reform the institution itself. . . .[C]hanges in how organizations are conceived, changes in the norms by which they operate ± institutional changes ± are the only way to get at the source of our”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bellah et al. 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAn industrial morality is a form of moral discourse capable of challenging conventional industry practices, including the economic assumptions underlying taken-for-granted policies and practices.
“First, an industrial morality is a form of moral discourse capable of challenging conventional industry practices ± ``This is the way we always do business around here'' ± including the economic assumptions underlying many of those taken-for-granted policies and practices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenAn industrial morality recognizes multiple values and commitments.
“Third, an industrial morality recognizes multiple values and commitments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationAn industrial morality is a product of conscious deliberation.
“Second, an industrial morality is a product of conscious deliberation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenAn industry's capacity for self-regulation can be more or less developed, more or less capable of guiding and restraining its members, more or less institutionalized.
“An industry's capacity for selfregulation can be more or less developed, more or less capable of guiding and restraining its members, more or less institutionalized.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAll types of social actors are social constructions; they depend on constitutive frameworks that emerged in interaction and are sustained and changed by ongoing interaction.
“But all of these types of actors ± and a multitude of others ± are social constructions; all depend on constitutive frameworks that emerged in interaction and are sustained and changed by ongoing interaction (Scott 1995: 42).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scott 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).In nuclear industry self-regulation, both collective and role-specific norms exist, but the most prominent by far are norms that articulate obligations of role.
“In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningTo verify its claims, the Sustainable Forest Initiative invites a panel of independent experts, including conservationists and university scientists, to review self-reported data and meet with company officials to discuss and occasionally observe their operations.
“To verify its claims, the industry invites a panel of independent experts, including conservationists and university scientists, to review the self-reported data and meet with company officials to discuss (and occasionally observe) their operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).The normative approach to institutions emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices.
“``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'':”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scott 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseWhere an enterprise cannot effectively trade without industry membership, expulsion may be potent, but may raise concerns about restrictive trade practices and anti-trust laws.
“Where an enterprise cannot effectively trade without industry membership, it may be potent indeed, though, in these circumstances, serious concerns may be raised about restrictive trade practices and contravention of any relevant anti-trust laws.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe origins of Responsible Care cannot be understood apart from changes in government regulation, and INPO's development into a powerful regulatory watchdog was made possible by the NRC's commanding presence.
“This includes the origins of Responsible Care, which cannot be understood apart from changes in government regulation, and it also includes INPO's development into a powerful regulatory watchdog, which was made possible by the NRC's commanding presence not too far from INPO's side (see Rees 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rees 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseMany self-regulatory programs are vulnerable to failure when they lack ultimate capacity to invoke sanctions at the tip of an enforcement pyramid, which also weakens the credibility of lower-level sanctions.
“Lacking ultimate capacity to invoke sanctions at the tip of an ``enforcement pyramid'' (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), the credibility of sanctions at lower levels also weakened.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).From a normative perspective, it is better to think of industry self-regulation in terms of a 'morality of cooperation' or 'moralizing social control' rather than emphasizing punishment and obedience.
“From a normative perspective, moreover, rather than emphasizing punishment and obedience, it would be better to think of industry self-regulation in terms of a ``morality of cooperation'' (Selznick 1992) or ``moralizing social control'' (Braithwaite 1989: 9±11).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Selznick 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Braithwaite 1989 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).The trick is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion because strategic punishment underwrites regulatory persuasion as something that ought to be attended to.
“The trick, as Ayres and Braithwaite put it, is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion because ``[s]trategic punishment underwrites regulatory persuasion as something that ought to be attended to'' (1992: 25).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License OSHA 1988: 26341).For OSHA, in short, the purpose is to recognize and encourage self-regulation in the workplace.The VPP now covers about 241,000 employees at 370 worksites, 14 where OSHA encourages their selfregulatory efforts in a variety of ways, such as ceasing routine compliance inspections in favor of a more consultative and problem-solving approach, and also by encouraging a mentoring program in which companies with exemplary safety and health programs share their experience and expertise with those companies striving to improve their in-house programs (Catanzaro & Weinberg 1994: 22±25).CSI is a prime example of responsive regulation, recognizing that different industry structures are conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation, including self-regulation.
“Exactly: CSI is a prime example of responsive regulation, one that recognizes how different industry structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation ± including self-regulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.A state agency's endorsement of a self-regulatory program, such as permitting use of its logo, can give the public greater confidence in the code's credibility and help the industry commercially.
“For example, it may be appropriate for a state agency to endorse a particular self-regulatory program by permitting it to use the agency's logo or other official seal of approval, thereby giving the public greater confidence in the code's credibility.13 This in turn may help the industry sell its product or provide other commercial benefits.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [13] 13. BERKES, FIKRET (1986) ``Marine Inshore Fishery Management in Turkey.'' In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).The problem of willful disobedience is significant for industry self-regulation not only for dealing with bad apples but also because it threatens the sense of fairness essential to nurturing voluntary compliance among good apples.
“The problem is significant for industry self-regulation, not only for dealing with an industry's bad apples, but also because it threatens the sense of fairness essential to nurturing voluntary compliance among the industry's good apples (ibid.: 1992: 26).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningLeading examples of industry self-regulation involve varying degrees of interaction with government regulation, a symbiosis that influences the dynamics of industry self-regulation.
“When we look closely at the leading examples of industry self-regulation (including health care), we see that they involve varying degrees of interaction with government regulation, a symbiosis that influences the dynamics of industry self-regulation in important ways (such as JCAHO's ratification by Medicare and its ongoing monitoring by HCFA).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseThe range of enforcement mechanisms that self-regulation might potentially invoke is quite broad.
“We have seen that the range of enforcement mechanisms that selfregulation might potentially invoke is quite broad.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationJCAHO's influence in health care regulation is enormous.
“As for JCAHO's influence in this regulatory arena, a Washington Post story described it as ``enormous'':”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scharge 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Rests on an assumption: JCAHO is the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the ozone-depleting substances case, there was consensus on the science, tangible short- and long-term effects, available alternative substances, and a major player saw first-mover advantages in voluntary action under threat of state intervention.
“With the former, there is consensus on the science, the effects are tangible and are short-term as well as long-term, alternative substances (or at least less depleting substances) are available, and a major player saw ``first mover'' advantages in voluntary action, against the shadow of threatened state intervention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [9] 9. BECKER, JOSEPH M. (1961) The Adequacy of the Benefit Amount in Unemployment Insurance. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites [10] 10. BELLAH, ROBERT N., RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER, and STEVE M. TIPTON (1992) The Good Society. New York: Vintage Books.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMeaningful involvement by consumer and other public interest groups is often what sets apart successful voluntary codes from those with less support.
“Meaningful involvement by consumer and other public interest groups is often what sets apart the successful codes from those which have received less support from government and the general public.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Office of Consumer Affairs 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.
“Considering the national debate that has surrounded the changing quality of American health care, one of the most prominent examples of co-regulation in American industry, it is remarkable how that regulatory mix has been largely neglected by students of regulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.
The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationreasoningConsumers, rival traders, and other commercial third parties such as insurance companies or lenders can have sufficient self-interest to police a code effectively.
“Moreover, consumers are not the only ones with a sufficient self-interest in policing a code as to make it effective.Rival traders provide another important group who have a strong self interest in ensuring a level playing field, and that their competitors do not abuse self-regulation and thereby gain a competitive advantage.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.The Canadian cable television industry's voluntary standards code works well because consumers have enough knowledge to act as monitors and because of the background presence of a government regulator (CRTC).
“For example, the Canadian cable television industry has a voluntary standards code that works well both because consumers have enough knowledge to act as monitors and because of the background presence of a government regulator (the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Council (CRTC)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McChesney 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.There are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions for co-regulatory design.
“Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.Precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.
“As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.Government might act as a facilitator or catalyst, steering the boat rather than rowing.
“Sometimes less direct forms of state oversight or control will be sufficient; government might act as a facilitator or catalyst, ``steering the boat rather than rowing.''”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningComplementary combinations of self-regulation, government regulation, and third-party oversight may work better than any one or even two of these instruments acting together.
“Often, the best solution is to design complementary combinations using a number of different instruments, thus: self-regulation; government regulation; and third-party oversight may be capable of being combined in complementary combinations that work better than any one or even two of these instruments acting together.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons LicenseSelf-regulation can invoke higher-level sanctions such as removal of benefits, public disclosure of breaches, remedial measures, fines, breach of contract liability, and expulsion from the association.
“At the higher levels, sanctions might include removal of benefits (e.g., the right to use the industry logo), a requirement of public disclosure of breaches (making the perpetrator vulnerable to adverse publicity), the taking of remedial measures (product recall, reparation of environmental damage), or fines.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningSelf-regulatory initiatives with ozone-depleting substances have been relatively successful, whereas attempts to self-regulate greenhouse gas emissions have had limited impact.
“In this regard, the relative success of self-regulatory initiatives with ozone-depleting substances (Australian & New Zealand Environment & Conservation Council 1994;Australian Environment Protection Agency 1994) contrasted with the limited impact of attempts to self-regulate greenhouse gas emissions may be instructive.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Australian & New Zealand Environment & Conservation Council 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Australian Environment Protection Agency 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationOccupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functions and near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their spheres of action.
“Descriptively, suffice it to recall Durkheim's observation cited earlier: occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functions [and] near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their spheres of action.(Durkheim 1933: 28)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Durkheim 1933
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe mix and interplay of private and public regulation works to assist or impede solution of the policy problem.
“It is this mix, this interplay, that works to assist or impede solution of the policy problem.(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992: 3)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.In New Zealand, if net emissions are not on track for a 3 to 4 percent reduction by 1997, the government has committed itself to introducing a carbon tax; thus, if the code is effective, the regulation is never invoked.
“This has been the case in New Zealand in the case of greenhouse emissions.If New Zealand's net emissions are not on track for a 3 to 4 percent reduction by 1997, then the government has committed itself to introducing a carbon tax.Thus, if the code is effective, then the regulation is never invoked.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningA major role for government in these circumstances may be that of facilitator or broker rather than direct participant.
“Indeed, a major role for government in these circumstances may be that of facilitator or broker (ensuring the effective involvement of appropriate third parties) rather than that of direct participant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationA tripartite approach involving co-regulation and third-party oversight mechanisms may be a viable option for Responsible Care.
“However, a tripartite approach, involving co-regulation and a range of third-party oversight mechanisms, may well be a viable option (Gunningham 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gunningham 1995 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationA three-dimensional instrument pyramid model encapsulates the potential dynamic between government, business, and third parties in achieving effective co-regulation.
“One convenient means of encapsulating the potential dynamic between government, business, and third parties in achieving effective co-regulation, is a three-dimensional instrument pyramid, 17 conceived of as having three faces (or sides); each side represents one of the three parties: government, business, and commercial and non-commercial third parties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] 17. BRAITHWAITE, JOHN, and BRENT FISSE (1987) ``Self Regulation and the Costs of Corporate Crime.'' In Private Policing, edited by C.D. Shearing & P.C. Stenning. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCritical variables for institutionalizing responsibility in industry self-regulation include the development of industrywide policies and procedures to ensure commitment to the values or ideals the industry claims to uphold, the integration of accountability and transparency in corporate decision making, and the capacity to moralize social control and institutionalize responsibility.
“As regards the latter, critical variables will be the development of industrywide policies and procedures to ensure a strong and effective commitment to the values or ideals the industry claims to uphold, the integration of accountability and transparency in corporate decision making, and the capacity to ``moralize social control'' and institutionalize responsibility.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe most important internal hurdles to effective industry self-regulation are (1) the extent to which it is possible to build an industry morality, and (2) the extent to which a particular scheme is capable of institutionalizing responsibility.
“Among the most important internal hurdles are first, the extent to which it is possible to build an industry morality: a set of industrial principles and practices that defines right conduct and spells out the industry's public commitment to moral restraint and aspiration; and second, the extent to which a particular scheme is capable of institutionalizing responsibility.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAchieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy.
“we have stressed that achieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy, as the large number of failed selfregulatory initiatives bears witness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe most effective self-regulatory initiatives have involved an underpinning of government regulation, or third-party oversight, or more commonly both.
“Rather, the most effective self-regulatory initiatives have involved an underpinning of government regulation, or third-party oversight, or more commonly both.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSelf-regulation is most likely to flourish when there is either strong coincidence between the public and private interest in self-regulation or there are external pressures sufficient to create such a coincidence of interest.
“As to external hurdles, self-regulation is most likely to flourish when there is either strong coincidence between the public and private interest in self-regulation or there are external pressures sufficient to create such a coincidence of interest.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
“A crucial assumption in this perspective bears repeating, and that is a corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Short-termism is one of the central problems that many systems of industry self-regulation seek to address.
“The business culture of short-termism ± ``[a] preoccupation with short-term results and instant economic gratification'' (Jacobs 1991: 7) is one of the central problems that many systems of industry self-regulation seek to address.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Reporting requirements usually adopt some form of self-reporting.
“Reporting requirements usually adopt some form of self-reporting.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Short-termism is particularly strong in the United States.
“Short-termism is much more prevalent in some business cultures than others, and is particularly strong in the United States.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Enterprises may be ignorant, irrational, or incompetent.
“Enterprises may not act as economic rationalists would predict because they are ignorant, irrational or incompetent.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Public concern is deeply felt in the chemical and nuclear power industries.
“public concern is deeply felt ± as in the case of both the chemical and nuclear power industries.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A group must come to perceive its common interests before it can engage in effective collective action.
“First, the group must come to perceive their common interests.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Communities of fate are at least in part social constructions.
“Communities of fate are at least in part, social constructions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In the case of Responsible Care, many leading players in the industry recognize that 'each must be his brother's keeper.'
“For example, in the case of Responsible Care, there is a recognition by many of the leading players in the industry that ``each must be his brother's keeper.''”
The paper relies on this without support.
JCAHO is the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.
“The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), founded in 1917, stands out as the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.
“it is remarkable how that regulatory mix has been largely neglected by students of regulation.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
The promised New Zealand ozone example changes subject
MinorThe text says an example of ozone protection in New Zealand is considered below. The later New Zealand example concerns greenhouse emissions; the ozone example there is attributed to Australia.
“Sometimes, the mere threat of government regulation may provide an industry group with sufficient incentive to regulate itself effectively, as with the case of ozone protection in New Zealand, considered below.”
“This has been the case in New Zealand in the case of greenhouse emissions.If New Zealand's net emissions are not on track for a 3 to 4 percent reduction by 1997, then the government has committed itself to introducing a carbon tax.Thus, if the code is effective, then the regulation is never invoked.A similar approach operates in Australia, in the case of the regulation of ozone-depleting substances.”
Publication years are swapped for Rees's two books
MinorThe author biography dates the workplace book to 1994 and the nuclear-safety book to 1988. The reference list assigns those years to the opposite books.
“He is the author of two books: Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety (1994)and Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (1988).”
“REES, JOSEPH V. (1988) Reforming The Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. ÐÐ (1994) Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island.”
A cited coauthor's name differs from the reference entry
MinorThe in-text citation names Cressey and Moone, whereas the corresponding 1983 reference names Cressey and Moore.
“(Kurland 1993: 143, quoting Cressey & Moone 1983)”
“CRESSEY, DONALD R., and CHARLES A. MOORE (1983) ``Managerial Values and Corporate Codes of Ethics,'' California Management Review 25(4): 53±77.”
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Risk-based approaches to food safety regulation: what role for co-regulation?
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“…at different stages and levels of the regulatory process (Prosser 2005), and that even the purest forms of self-regulation may show traces of government involvement or pressures, the potential set of forms of regulation the label ‘co-regulation’ could cover is vast (Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundIntegrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy
GUNNINGHAM, N. A., & Sinclair, D. (1999) · Law & Social Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1999.tb00407.x · Cited by 74 · see citing works
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“In principle, ISR can provide flexible and innovative social improvements at lower cost than direct state regulation (Coglianese and Mendelson 2010; Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundInfluentialRegulatory Choice for Alternative Modes of Regulation: How Context Matters
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The effectiveness of NGO self‐regulation: theory and evidence from Africa
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Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector
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“Rees (1994, 1997) and Gunningham and Rees (1997) note that, theoretically speaking, industry-based schemes might offer significant organizational advantages for increasing the diffusion of coded practice broadly across members of an industry.”
BackgroundThe Dark Net: Self-Regulation Dynamics of Illegal Online Markets for Identities and Related Services
Wehinger, F. (2011) · European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference · doi:10.1109/eisic.2011.54 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
“The paper focuses on individual self-regulation within specific illegal online marketplaces in contrast to industry-wide selfregulation [8] [9] that does not exist in illegal markets.”
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Hutter, B. M. (2006) · London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 65 · see citing works
Towards a Better Understanding of Building Regulation
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“…can, in a broad sense, be considered to be taking place when a group of firms or individuals exercise control over its own membership and their behaviour (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, page 125), but often with a certain amount of government participation (Gunningham and Rees, 1997, page 365).”
Private Governance as Public Policy: A Paradigmatic Shift
Rudder, C. E. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s002238160808095x · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Meier, H. E., & García, B. (2015) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12208 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
The Diffusion of Voluntary Environmental Programs: The Case of ISO 14001 in Korea, 1996–2011
Baek, K. (2015) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2846-3 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
“This new regulatory process is called self-regulation (Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundChoice editing as a retailers’ tool for sustainable consumption
Gunn, M., & Mont, O. (2014) · International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management · doi:10.1108/ijrdm-12-2012-0110 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Rahim, M. M., & Alam, S. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1699-x · Cited by 58 · see citing works
“All of these governance devices have normally been created on a voluntary basis to constitute what is referred to as ‘corporate self-regulation’ (Parker 2002; Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
Comparing self-regulation and statutory regulation: Evidence from the accounting profession
Anantharaman, D. (2012) · Accounting Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2011.12.003 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
“…between selfregulation and statutory regulation is often characterized as a trade-off between independence and expertise (Glover et al., 2009; Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Palmrose, 2006), I identify variation across reviewers in these dimensions, and examine how it affects the likelihood of…”
BackgroundConsumer Protection on Kickstarter
Blaseg, D., Schulze, C., & Skiera, B. (2020) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2019.1203 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
“…could include private self-regulation, by which an individual enterprise regulates itself independent of others, and industry self-regulation, by which enterprises decide to cooperate with each other and build an industry-level organization that sets rules and standards (Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundHerzog, L. M. (2017) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3562-y · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Font, X., Bonilla-Priego, M. J., & Kantenbacher, J. (2019) · Journal of Sustainable Tourism · doi:10.1080/09669582.2018.1538231 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“Coercive or regulative mechanisms are based on rules, monitoring and sanctions (or recompense) (Gunningham & Rees, 1997).”
BackgroundInfluentialModes of Regulation in the Governance of the European Union: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation
Knill, C., & Lenschow, A. (2004) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781845420673.00020 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Howlett, M. P. (2003) · Marine Policy · doi:10.1016/s0308-597x(03)00086-1 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
“This has also been accompaniedwith some moves towards industry self-regulation through voluntary codes of conduct although this last is very problematic andhas not proceed edvery far [ 29 ].”
BackgroundRussian Legal Culture: An Analysis of Adaptive Response to an Institutional Transplant
Kurkchiyan, M. (2009) · Law & Social Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2009.01149.x · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Gossum, P. V., Arts, B. J. M., & Verheyen, K. (2009) · Forest Policy and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2009.08.010 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Private roles in food safety provision: the law and economics of private food safety
Fagotto, E. (2013) · European Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1007/s10657-013-9414-z · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Bowman, D. M., & Hodge, G. A. (2009) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01046.x · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Industry Self‐Regulation: A Game‐Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
Ashby, S., Chuah, S., & Hoffmann, R. F. (2004) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/1357151032000172255 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
“cle to avert more direct government regulation (Bomsel et al., 1996; Page, 1986; Baggot, 1989; Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Sinclair, 1997).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Role of Cooperation in Responsible AI DevelopmentPreprint
Askell, A., Brundage, M., & Hadfield, G. K. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.04534 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
“(Gunningham and Rees, 1997).39 Examples of self-regulation include Responsible Care: a self-regulation program in the US chemicals industry (Gamper-Rabindran and Finger, 2013), and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO): an industry organization that conducts inspections and facilitates…”
BackgroundThe Quantum Governance Stack: Models of Governance for Quantum Information Technologies
Perrier, E. (2022) · Digital Society · doi:10.1007/s44206-022-00019-x · Cited by 49 · see citing works
“Softer methods involve, at the communal level, industry codes or conduct or at the firm level Gunningham et al. (1998), Gunningham and Rees (1997), integrated risk management frameworks.”
MethodReeve, B. H., & Magnusson, R. (2015) · Public Health · doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2015.01.007 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Nanotechnology Regulation: A Study in Claims Making
Malloy, T. F. (2011) · ACS Nano · doi:10.1021/nn103480e · Cited by 45 · see citing works
The Diffusion, Regulation and Governance of Closed-Circuit Television in the UK
Webster, W. R. (2002) · Surveillance & Society · doi:10.24908/ss.v2i2/3.3376 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
“It implies the coexistence of traditional regulation and self-regulation in such a way that responsibilities about the provision of the technology are shared between the regulating and providing agencies (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Just and Latzer, 2004; Marsden, 2000).”
BackgroundHong, J., Zhou, Z.-H., Li, X., & Lau, K. H. (2020) · The International Journal of Logistics Management · doi:10.1108/ijlm-05-2018-0124 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Tarred and Untarred by the Same Brush: Exploring Interdependence in the Volatility of Stock Returns
Barnett, M. L. (2007) · Corporate Reputation Review · doi:10.1057/palgrave.crr.1550035 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Lu, J., Rong, D., Eweje, G., et al. (2024) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.4047 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
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“The third dimension of regulatory design highlighted in Table 1 is enforcement: the provision of “carrots” that encourage companies to join voluntary schemes and to change their products in line with their commitments, combined with “sticks” that deter non-compliance and prevent free-riding on voluntary schemes [107,1…”
BackgroundParkinson, J. (2003) · Journal of Corporate Law Studies · doi:10.1080/14735970.2003.11419892 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Strategies for improving complex construction health and safety regulatory environments
Umeokafor, N. I., Evangelinos, K. I., & Windapo, A. O. (2020) · International Journal of Construction Management · doi:10.1080/15623599.2019.1707853 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
“Self-regulation varies from country-to-country and industry-to-industry hence there is no satisfactory definition (Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundHitting the mark or falling short with nanotechnology regulation?
Ludlow, K., Bowman, D. M., & Kirk, D. D. (2009) · Trends in biotechnology · doi:10.1016/j.tibtech.2009.07.007 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Are Members of Business for Social Responsibility More Socially Responsible?
Tashman, P., & Rivera, J. E. (2010) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00371.x · Cited by 40 · see citing works
The private costs and benefits of environmental self‐regulation: which firms have most to gain?
Stoeckl, N. (2004) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.405 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Corporate Social Responsibility and the State
Lister, J. (2011) · University of British Columbia Press eBooks · doi:10.59962/9780774820356 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Engagement with disability: analysis of annual reports of Indian organizations
Kulkarni, M., & Rodrigues, C. (2013) · The International Journal of Human Resource Management · doi:10.1080/09585192.2013.837088 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
“Organizations abide by this morality because the complex process of interaction by which such norms are formed, interpreted and developed enhances their legitimacy (Gunningham and Rees 1997).”
BackgroundFrontline Safety: Understanding the Workplace as a Site of Regulatory Engagement
Almond, P., & Gray, G. (2016) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/lapo.12070 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
“…1992; Bardach and Kagan 1982; Braithwaite 1985; Hutter 2001; May and Burby 1998), the inherent and contextual features of organizations (Genn 1993; Gunningham and Rees 1997; Hawkins and Hutter 1993; Thornton, Guningham and Kagan 2005), and the socio-cultural and legal context within which…”
Lytton, T. D. (2017) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716217690330 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Alonso‐Almeida, M. D. M., & Antón, J. M. R. (2020) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph17062086 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
“[18] asserted that institutional pressure has a significant impact through three lines of action: (a) Coercive pressure is exerted by laws and based on a system of rules, sanctions, and rewards [19]; (b) normative pressure is promoted by regulations, recommendations, and rules provided to reach certain goal [17]; and…”
BackgroundGlobal Environmental Standards for Industry
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Monitoring and enforcement: Is two-tier regulation robust? — A case study of Ankleshwar, India
Kathuria, V. K., & Sterner, T. (2005) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.05.004 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
“, Institute of Nuclear power Operators of Nuclear Power industry) – both comprising of large units (Gunningham and Rees, 1997).”
BackgroundIndustry Associations as Change Agents: The Institutional Roles of Newspaper Associations
Nordqvist, M., Picard, R. G., & Pesämaa, O. (2010) · Journal of Media Business Studies · doi:10.1080/16522354.2010.11073511 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
“…through knowledge building, knowledge deployment, and standard setting (Damsgaard & Lyytinen, 2001), in developing and participating in self regulation and codes of practice (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Clark, 1999; Haufler, 2001), and promoting favorable trade policies (Procassini, 1995; Sell, 1995).”
BackgroundDorbeck-Jung, B. R., Vrielink, M. J. O., Gosselt, J. F., et al. (2010) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01079.x · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Lin‐Hi, N., & Blumberg, I. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3075-0 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Osborn, D., & Datta, A. (2006) · Ocean & Coastal Management · doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2006.06.020 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Gehman, J., Thompson, D. Y., Alessi, D. S., Allen, D. M., & Goss, G. G. (2016) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su8090912 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
“In other words, SLO emerged as a form of industry self-regulation [27–30].”
Background
- Authors
- Gunningham, N., & Rees, J.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Virginia Tech (US)
- ORCID
- Gunningham, Neil
- Venue
- Law & Policy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-10
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 363-414
- ISSN
- 0265-8240 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9930
- OpenAlex
- W1969175364
- Cited by
- 572
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 43 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 10.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Law & Policy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- industry self-regulation, institutional theory, social control, mediating institutions, external pressure, role of the state, third parties, regulatory theory, group behavior
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