Cited by 575Regulation and Compliance StudiesManagement and Organizational StudiesLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective

Open access
Gunningham, Neil, Rees, Joseph·1997·Law & Policy

Abstract

Throughout the advanced countries of the world self‐regulatory regimes are being introduced. This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self‐regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory. The article examines the strengths and to a lesser extent the weaknesses of industry self‐regulation from five closely related yet distinct vantage points: mediating institutions; industrial morality; institutionalizing responsibility; institutions responding to external pressure; and the roles of the state and third parties.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 77 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisecitation

    In financial futures markets, the most effective mechanism for maintaining market order and curbing trading abuses has proved to be informal mechanisms of social control rather than state regulation.

    “Contrary to conventional wisdom, the most effective mechanism for maintaining market ``order'' and curbing trading abuses has proved to be informal mechanisms of social control rather than state regulation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gunningham 1991 source
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

    In at least some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control.

    “This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.”
    • Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · boosted
      “Indeed, there is growing evidence of a range of circumstances where self-regulation (either alone, or more commonly, in conjunction with other policy instruments) can be a remarkably effective and efficient means of social control.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Premisecitation

    At each California OSHA Cooperative Compliance Program project, accident rates dropped significantly as a result of the CCP.

    “As for outcomes, suffice it to say that, at each project, accident rates dropped significantly as a result of the CCP (Rees 1988).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rees 1988

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Interpretationnone given

    Self-regulatory mechanisms underpinned by some form of state intervention are more resilient and effective than self-regulation in isolation.

    “As we will see in part VI, there is reason to believe that self-regulatory mechanisms underpinned by some form of state intervention are more resilient and effective than self-regulation in isolation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationcitation

    Industry associations, like persons, have multiple selves, a complexity that reflects the complexity of the social world.

    “Much the same can be said of industry associations which, like persons, have multiple selves, a complexity that also reflects the complexity of the social world.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Walzer 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 57
  • May combine two claims. 42
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The key to realizing the potential of industry associations for self-regulation is the development of an effective industrial morality that brings the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering.

    “And for reasons that will become clear as we proceed, the key to realizing that potential is the development of an effective industrial morality that brings the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation varies enormously among industries, due partly to social and economic context and partly to the self-regulation program's institutional design.

    “The proponents and critics both have a point because the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation varies enormously among industries, due partly to its social and economic context, which varies widely, and partly to the self-regulation program's institutional design, a highly variable matter as well.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Max Weber concluded that Germany's legal system was not very effective in curbing gambling and wild speculation, especially compared to the English and American exchanges.

    “In the 1890s, Max Weber wrote a series of articles examining the regulation of European and American stock exchanges in which he concluded that Germany's legal system was not very effective in curbing ``gambling and wild speculation,'' especially when compared to the English and American exchanges.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bendix 1977

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Across a variety of nations, governments of very different political complexions are experimenting with various forms of self-regulation in search of a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and state-centered regulation.

    “And why, across a variety of nations, governments of very different political complexions are experimenting with various forms of self-regulation in search of a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and state-centered regulation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Industry self-regulation is a special kind of normative institution whose crucial feature is its variable capacity (or incapacity) to bring the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering responsive to broader social values.

    “Industry selfregulation is a special kind of normative institution from this vantage point, and the crucial thing to understand is its variable capacity (or incapacity) to bring the behavior of industry members within a normative ordering responsive to broader social values.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    To moralize industrial life, an industry association must establish a normative framework (industrial morality) for its members and develop ways to ensure its efficacy.

    “To moralize industrial life, as Durkheim would put it, an industry association must establish a normative framework (industrial morality) for its members, and, equally important, develop ways to ensure its efficacy.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

    Premisecitation

    A voluntary code enforced through market sanctions has the potential to be the most efficient method of improving working conditions because of the international dimensions of the situation.

    “Rhone's case study (1996) of the scheme concludes that: ``because of the international dimensions of the situation, a voluntary code enforced through market sanctions has the potential to be the most efficient method of improving working conditions.''”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rhone 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Shrinking tax bases, the swing towards neoliberal ideology and away from government intervention, and the resistance of multinational companies in a global marketplace have made direct government regulation less attractive politically and economically in recent years.

    “Add to this shrinking tax bases, the swing towards neoliberal ideology and away from government intervention, the resistance of multinational companies operating in an increasingly global marketplace, and it is hardly surprising why, both politically and economically, direct government regulation has become less attractive in recent years.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Durkheim argued that mediating institutions between the state and the individual have a distinctive capacity for becoming agencies of moral education, an advantage that comes from their special knowledge and influence.

    “``Occupational groups,'' ``business groups,'' ``professional groups'' ± for Durkheim these and other mediating institutions ``between the state and the individual'' (Durkheim 1933: 28) have a distinctive capacity for becoming ``agencies of moral education'' (Cladis 1993: 144), an advantage that comes from their special knowledge and influence.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Durkheim 1933

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Cladis 1993

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Autonomous associations like the exchanges could be more flexible than the state in restraining members and in choosing sanctions for noncompliance.

    “Because they were governed autonomously, the American and English exchanges that Weber studied could be far more flexible than the state in restraining their members”
    • Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · hedged
      “such autonomous associations could be far more flexible in their choice of sanctions for non compliance with rules, as well as apply rules in a far more effective and discretionary manner.(Haines 1996)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Haines 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation are rarely found in the real world, where distinctions between them are incremental rather than dichotomous.

    “However, those pure forms are rarely found in the real world, in which distinctions between self-regulation and government regulation are incremental rather than dichotomous (see further Sinclair 1997).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Sinclair 1997 source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Most business actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility; business executives have profit-maximizing and law-abiding selves, and different selves prevail at different moments and contexts.

    “[M]ost business actors are bundles of contradictory commitments to values of economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility.Business executives have profit-maximizing selves and law-abiding selves; at different moments, in different contexts, the different selves prevail.' ' (1995: 31)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1995

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    A normative institutional perspective emphasizes that values and normative frameworks structure choices, and actors conform because it is expected of them and they are obliged to do so, not because it serves narrowly defined individual interests.

    “This way of thinking about industry associations -as normative institutions above all ± ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices. . . .Actors conform not because it serves their individual interests, narrowly defined, but because it is expected of them; they are obliged to do so'' (Scott 1995: 38±39).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Scott 1995

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Regulatory overload has made the continuing use of highly detailed prescriptive regulation problematic and, in many circumstances, counterproductive.

    “There are a number of reasons for this, including the broader problem of regulatory overload.This has made the continuing use of highly detailed prescriptive regulation problematic and, in many circumstances, counterproductive.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    There is no clear dichotomy between self-regulation and government regulation; rather, there is a continuum with pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite ends.

    “From the above, it will be apparent that there is no clear dichotomy between self-regulation on the one hand and government regulation on the other.Rather, there is a continuum, with pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite ends.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The safety of nuclear plants has increased significantly since Three Mile Island, and INPO's contribution to improved nuclear safety has been highly significant.

    “By all accounts, the safety of nuclear plants has increased significantly since TMI, and there is wide agreement among knowledgeable observers (proponents and critics of nuclear power alike) that INPO's contribution to improved nuclear safety has been highly significant (Rees 1994).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rees 1994

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Self-regulation has an extremely tarnished image and is often reviled by conservationists, consumer organizations and other public interest groups for being a charade.

    “Indeed, self-regulation has an extremely tarnished image, and is often reviled by conservationists, consumer organizations and other public interest groups for being a charade”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Braithwaite & Fisse 1987

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Blakeney & Barnes 1984

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Page 1980

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

    Industry self-regulation has been prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.

    “and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory.”
    • Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
      “The subject of this special issue of Law & Policy is self-regulation, a topic which has often received short shrift in mainstream regulatory literature.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Industry associations are both economic and normative institutions, and the market model of institutions enriches and supplements, but does not supplant, the normative model.

    “Which leads to the conclusion that industry associations are both economic and normative institutions, and that the market model of institutions enriches and supplements, but does not supplant, the normative model.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The English and American exchanges Weber studied were governed autonomously in accordance with their own statutes, which allowed self-regulation to flourish in support of ethical behavior and sound business practices.

    “Because the English and American exchanges were ``governed autonomously in accordance with their own statutes''”
    • Also stated in: § II. MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS · plain
      “This allowed a situation where self-regulation could flourish in a direction which supported ethical (virtuous) behavior, by supporting sound business practices and frowning on pure speculation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Bendix 1977

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Haines 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The Alanya fishers' self-regulatory system has proved very effective in removing conflict, providing predictability, and facilitating investment.

    “The evidence suggests that the system has proved very effective in removing conflict, providing predictability, and thereby facilitating investment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ostrom 1990

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

    Industry self-regulation has been largely ignored by economics, which focuses on individual rather than group behavior.

    “that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior)”
    • Also stated in: § I. INTRODUCTION · plain
      “which has made it easy for many economists and political scientists to overlook some of the crucial ways industry self-regulation actually operates in society.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The process of socialization and institutionalization both involve the formation of moral actors, whether individual or corporate, by inculcating them with values and endowing them with a disposition to be governed by moral concerns.

    “That is because the process of socialization and institutionalization both involve the formation of moral actors, whether individual or corporate, by inculcating them with values and endowing them with a disposition to be governed by moral concerns.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    There are many plausible and hotly contested explanations of short-termism, each with different implications for how self-regulatory regimes should be designed.

    “Answering such a question is tricky because, as a recent survey of the literature reveals, there are many plausible (and hotly contested) explanations of short-termism (Laverty 1996: 825), each with different implications for thinking about how self-regulatory regimes should be designed.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Laverty 1996: 825 source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The organizational field has emerged as a critical unit bridging the organizational and societal levels in the study of social and community change.

    “Furthermore, ``the organizational field has emerged as a critical unit bridging the organizational and societal levels in the study of social and community change'' (Scott 1991: 174, quoting DiMaggio 1986).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Scott 1991

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites DiMaggio 1986

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    With chief executives gathered annually, INPO uses its indicators to classify the social world of nuclear power hierarchically, endowing each plant with an official status from 'excellent' 1 to 'marginal' 5, publicly proclaimed.

    “Furthermore, with the industry's chief executives gathered in a single room each year, INPO uses those indicators to classify their social world of nuclear power in a distinctive way ± hierarchically ± as each nuclear plant is endowed with an official status (ranging from the ``excellent'' 1 to the ``marginal'' 5), a status publicly proclaimed before everyone's eyes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Building transparency into the social structure of an industry sets the stage for a 'theatre of external judgment', and as transparency increases so does the likelihood of being called to account for one's industrial conduct.

    “Building transparency into the social structure of the industry sets the stage for a ``theatre of external judgment'' (Noll 1971: 15±19), and as transparency increases so does the likelihood of being called to account for one's industrial conduct.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Noll 1971

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The moral logic applied to the development of self-regulating institutions strongly resembles the logic applied to the formation of moral persons.

    “Framed this way, the idea of institutionalization moves us very quickly into thinking about socialization, because the moral logic we apply to the development of self-regulating institutions strongly resembles the logic applied to the formation of moral persons.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The SFI asks member companies to resist the single-minded pursuit of any objective, including profits, and to become morally self-aware institutions capable of balancing economic self-interest with other values.

    “In other words, by recognizing the complexity of the moral world, the SFI asks member companies to resist the single-minded pursuit of any objective, including profits; it asks them, in short, to become morally self-aware institutions capable of responsibly balancing economic self-interest with other values.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    From a utilitarian perspective, the norms and institutions of self-regulation affect member companies' behavior by manipulating cost/benefit calculations, and member companies behave expediently in light of those incentives.

    “From this essentially utilitarian perspective, the norms and institutions of self-regulation thus affect the behavior of member companies by manipulating cost/benefit calculations, and member companies behave expediently in light of those incentives.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The organizational field can exert powerful forces on individual organizations, and the structure and behavior of an organization depend importantly on the characteristics of the sector/field in which it operates.

    “there is good reason to think the organizational field can exert ``powerful forces'' (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 65) on individual organizations, and that the ``structure and behavior of an organization depend importantly on the characteristics of the sector [read ``field''] in which it operates'' (Scott & Meyer 1991: 120).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites DiMaggio & Powell 1991

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Scott & Meyer 1991

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The ratings set into motion mimetic pressures on all nuclear plants to imitate the practices of exemplary plants, because organizations tend to imitate other organizations they regard as more successful.

    “It set into motion mimetic pressures on all the nuclear plants to imitate the practices of the exemplary plants, because, as institutional theorists would explain it, organizations tend to imitate other organizations that they regard as more successful (see DiMaggio & Powell 1991).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites DiMaggio & Powell 1991

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationnone given

    An industrial morality legitimates aspirations other than profit as a good reason for action.

    “An industrial morality legitimates aspirations other than profit as a good reason for action.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationnone given

    An industrial morality creates a normative framework that defines and upholds a special organizational competence.

    “Fifth, an industrial morality creates a normative framework that defines and upholds a special organizational competence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    In a recent agreement to end sweatshops by creating an industry code of conduct for apparel factories used by American companies, the question of who should do the monitoring was one of the major sticking points.

    “in a recent agreement that seeks to end sweatshops by creating an industry code of conduct on wages and working conditions for apparel factories that American companies use around the world, the question of who should do the monitoring was ``one of the major sticking points'' (Greenhouse 1997).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Greenhouse 1997

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    An industrial morality provides a legitimate account of the industry's activities to the public.

    “Seventh, an industrial morality provides a legitimate account of the industry's activities to the public.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    Monitoring performance is the third and final step in achieving transparency.

    “The third and final step in achieving transparency ± monitoring performance ± also seems to be the most demanding and controversial.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Accountability disciplines decision making and constrains what corporate executives do.

    “Chances are that will discipline your decision making and constrain what you do.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The SFI's normative framework asks member companies to enlarge their horizons beyond considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, recognize broader moral issues, and exercise self-restraint.

    “The SFI's normative framework ± the ``Forest Principles,'' ``Implementation Guidelines,'' and ``Broad Policy Goals'' ± thus asks member companies to enlarge their horizons beyond considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, recognize the broader moral issues at stake in logging forests and manufacturing forest products, and exercise selfrestraint in light of those considerations.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    An industrial morality is critical, presuming that any existing pattern of industrial conduct is subject to criticism and reconstruction in light of reflection and inquiry.

    “Fourth, an industrial morality is critical, as it presumes that any existing pattern of industrial conduct is subject to criticism and reconstruction in light of reflection and inquiry.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    An industrial morality carries an expectation of obedience.

    “Sixth, an industrial morality carries an expectation of obedience.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    The shift to third-party verification in Responsible Care has been the subject of heated industry debate since Responsible Care's creation almost a decade ago, with opponents highlighting risks to business autonomy, trade-secret confidentiality, and vulnerability to regulators, environmentalists, and litigation.

    “Painful because this shift has been the subject of heated industry debate since Responsible Care's creation almost a decade ago, with no end in sight, as opponents highlight the risk inspections pose to business autonomy, the confidentiality of trade secrets, as well as the danger that verification results could make them increasingly vulnerable to regulators, environmentalists, and litigation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License communicate their progress in implementing the industry codes); and (2) the industry collects and analyzes the data.There is wide agreement that reporting and data collection are ``the dullest of tasks'' (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 173).Dull yet extremely important, for the effectiveness of industry self-regulation depends vitally on its data gathering capabilities, particularly the quality of member response to the reporting requirements and the industry's capacity to collect and analyze that data.All this varies widely ± both the quality of the response and the effectiveness with which the information is analyzed ± because there is no set pattern in the nature and scope of the data gathering process among programs of industry selfregulation.In the case of Responsible Care, for example, the chemical industry's data gathering process has a long way to go, partly because the industry has not yet developed the analytical capacity to examine the data with sufficient care, and partly because it lacks the institutional mechanisms for using the information in a way that significantly enhances the accountability (and self-discipline) of chemical company officials.By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).

    INPO's data gathering process uses information to rank all nuclear plants in terms of safety performance and communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline.

    “By contrast, INPO's data gathering process, having largely overcome those limitations, uses that information to rank all the nuclear plants in terms of their safety performance, and, what's more, communicates that information to the industry in a manner that assigns a very high importance to ensuring accountability and fostering self-discipline (Rees 1994).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rees 1994

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License meaningful and legitimate from the standpoint of their publics.These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.None of this means that the SFI's industrial morality is entirely new, however.Wood products companies, like many other industries, have long had informal codes for governing intra-industry relations, such as not disparaging competitors' products.What is new is the way these norms, a product of collective industry deliberation, challenge traditional ways of doing business and redefine the industry's responsibilities in light of social values widely shared outside the industry.

    Industry norms serve as a connective tissue between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.

    “These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License meaningful and legitimate from the standpoint of their publics.These industry norms serve as a connective tissue, in short, between what the industry does and what the public considers socially acceptable and desirable.None of this means that the SFI's industrial morality is entirely new, however.Wood products companies, like many other industries, have long had informal codes for governing intra-industry relations, such as not disparaging competitors' products.What is new is the way these norms, a product of collective industry deliberation, challenge traditional ways of doing business and redefine the industry's responsibilities in light of social values widely shared outside the industry.

    The petroleum industry's self-regulatory program, Strategies for Today's Environmental Partnership, amounts to little more than pleasant-sounding corporate rhetoric.

    “And as Rees points out later in this Special Issue, much the same can be said for the ethical codes found in the petroleum industry's self-regulatory program ± Strategies for Today's Environmental Partnership ± which also amounts to little more than ``pleasant-sounding corporate rhetoric'' (Rees 1997: xxx).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rees 1997: xxx

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    Problems with how corporations are institutionalized in American society cannot be solved simply by improving individual organizations; institutional changes in how organizations are conceived and in the norms by which they operate are needed.

    “But there are problems with how corporations are institutionalized in American society. . .and we cannot solve the problems of corporate life simply by improving individual organizations: we have to reform the institution itself. . . .[C]hanges in how organizations are conceived, changes in the norms by which they operate ± institutional changes ± are the only way to get at the source of our”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bellah et al. 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    An industrial morality is a form of moral discourse capable of challenging conventional industry practices, including the economic assumptions underlying taken-for-granted policies and practices.

    “First, an industrial morality is a form of moral discourse capable of challenging conventional industry practices ± ``This is the way we always do business around here'' ± including the economic assumptions underlying many of those taken-for-granted policies and practices.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    An industrial morality recognizes multiple values and commitments.

    “Third, an industrial morality recognizes multiple values and commitments.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    An industrial morality is a product of conscious deliberation.

    “Second, an industrial morality is a product of conscious deliberation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationnone given

    An industry's capacity for self-regulation can be more or less developed, more or less capable of guiding and restraining its members, more or less institutionalized.

    “An industry's capacity for selfregulation can be more or less developed, more or less capable of guiding and restraining its members, more or less institutionalized.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    All types of social actors are social constructions; they depend on constitutive frameworks that emerged in interaction and are sustained and changed by ongoing interaction.

    “But all of these types of actors ± and a multitude of others ± are social constructions; all depend on constitutive frameworks that emerged in interaction and are sustained and changed by ongoing interaction (Scott 1995: 42).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Scott 1995

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).

    In nuclear industry self-regulation, both collective and role-specific norms exist, but the most prominent by far are norms that articulate obligations of role.

    “In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    To verify its claims, the Sustainable Forest Initiative invites a panel of independent experts, including conservationists and university scientists, to review self-reported data and meet with company officials to discuss and occasionally observe their operations.

    “To verify its claims, the industry invites a panel of independent experts, including conservationists and university scientists, to review the self-reported data and meet with company officials to discuss (and occasionally observe) their operations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).

    The normative approach to institutions emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices.

    “``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'':”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Scott 1995

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    Where an enterprise cannot effectively trade without industry membership, expulsion may be potent, but may raise concerns about restrictive trade practices and anti-trust laws.

    “Where an enterprise cannot effectively trade without industry membership, it may be potent indeed, though, in these circumstances, serious concerns may be raised about restrictive trade practices and contravention of any relevant anti-trust laws.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The origins of Responsible Care cannot be understood apart from changes in government regulation, and INPO's development into a powerful regulatory watchdog was made possible by the NRC's commanding presence.

    “This includes the origins of Responsible Care, which cannot be understood apart from changes in government regulation, and it also includes INPO's development into a powerful regulatory watchdog, which was made possible by the NRC's commanding presence not too far from INPO's side (see Rees 1997).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rees 1997

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    Many self-regulatory programs are vulnerable to failure when they lack ultimate capacity to invoke sanctions at the tip of an enforcement pyramid, which also weakens the credibility of lower-level sanctions.

    “Lacking ultimate capacity to invoke sanctions at the tip of an ``enforcement pyramid'' (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), the credibility of sanctions at lower levels also weakened.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).

    From a normative perspective, it is better to think of industry self-regulation in terms of a 'morality of cooperation' or 'moralizing social control' rather than emphasizing punishment and obedience.

    “From a normative perspective, moreover, rather than emphasizing punishment and obedience, it would be better to think of industry self-regulation in terms of a ``morality of cooperation'' (Selznick 1992) or ``moralizing social control'' (Braithwaite 1989: 9±11).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Selznick 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Braithwaite 1989 source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).

    The trick is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion because strategic punishment underwrites regulatory persuasion as something that ought to be attended to.

    “The trick, as Ayres and Braithwaite put it, is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion because ``[s]trategic punishment underwrites regulatory persuasion as something that ought to be attended to'' (1992: 25).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License OSHA 1988: 26341).For OSHA, in short, the purpose is to recognize and encourage self-regulation in the workplace.The VPP now covers about 241,000 employees at 370 worksites, 14 where OSHA encourages their selfregulatory efforts in a variety of ways, such as ceasing routine compliance inspections in favor of a more consultative and problem-solving approach, and also by encouraging a mentoring program in which companies with exemplary safety and health programs share their experience and expertise with those companies striving to improve their in-house programs (Catanzaro & Weinberg 1994: 22±25).

    CSI is a prime example of responsive regulation, recognizing that different industry structures are conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation, including self-regulation.

    “Exactly: CSI is a prime example of responsive regulation, one that recognizes how different industry structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation ± including self-regulation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    A state agency's endorsement of a self-regulatory program, such as permitting use of its logo, can give the public greater confidence in the code's credibility and help the industry commercially.

    “For example, it may be appropriate for a state agency to endorse a particular self-regulatory program by permitting it to use the agency's logo or other official seal of approval, thereby giving the public greater confidence in the code's credibility.13 This in turn may help the industry sell its product or provide other commercial benefits.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [13] 13. BERKES, FIKRET (1986) ``Marine Inshore Fishery Management in Turkey.'' In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License to do,'' they generate a sense of obligation.``The normative approach to institutions,'' writes Scott (1995: 38), ``emphasizes how values and normative frameworks structure choices'': Some values and norms are applicable to all members of the collectivity; others apply only to selected types of actors or positions.Such specialized values and norms are termed roles: conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions.(Scott 1995: 38) In the case of nuclear industry self-regulation, for example, one can find both kinds of norms, collective and role-specific, but the most prominent by far seem to be the ones that articulate obligations of role.Whether someone is a nuclear utility CEO or control room operator, a nuclear plant manager or maintenance superintendent, each position embodies a distinctive cluster of responsibilities from the standpoint of INPO's normative system.It is all part of seeing the nuclear industry as a social landscape of responsibilitygenerating institutional roles.And by constructing the social world of nuclear power operations in this way, INPO's normative system integrates the industry around a common language of self-understanding, an industrywide interpretive framework for construing what it means to occupy a particular role and what it means to behave in a manner appropriate to that position (see Rees 1994: 67±90).

    The problem of willful disobedience is significant for industry self-regulation not only for dealing with bad apples but also because it threatens the sense of fairness essential to nurturing voluntary compliance among good apples.

    “The problem is significant for industry self-regulation, not only for dealing with an industry's bad apples, but also because it threatens the sense of fairness essential to nurturing voluntary compliance among the industry's good apples (ibid.: 1992: 26).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Leading examples of industry self-regulation involve varying degrees of interaction with government regulation, a symbiosis that influences the dynamics of industry self-regulation.

    “When we look closely at the leading examples of industry self-regulation (including health care), we see that they involve varying degrees of interaction with government regulation, a symbiosis that influences the dynamics of industry self-regulation in important ways (such as JCAHO's ratification by Medicare and its ongoing monitoring by HCFA).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    The range of enforcement mechanisms that self-regulation might potentially invoke is quite broad.

    “We have seen that the range of enforcement mechanisms that selfregulation might potentially invoke is quite broad.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    JCAHO's influence in health care regulation is enormous.

    “As for JCAHO's influence in this regulatory arena, a Washington Post story described it as ``enormous'':”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Scharge 1995

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • Rests on an assumption: JCAHO is the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the ozone-depleting substances case, there was consensus on the science, tangible short- and long-term effects, available alternative substances, and a major player saw first-mover advantages in voluntary action under threat of state intervention.

    “With the former, there is consensus on the science, the effects are tangible and are short-term as well as long-term, alternative substances (or at least less depleting substances) are available, and a major player saw ``first mover'' advantages in voluntary action, against the shadow of threatened state intervention.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [9] 9. BECKER, JOSEPH M. (1961) The Adequacy of the Benefit Amount in Unemployment Insurance. Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [10] 10. BELLAH, ROBERT N., RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER, and STEVE M. TIPTON (1992) The Good Society. New York: Vintage Books.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Meaningful involvement by consumer and other public interest groups is often what sets apart successful voluntary codes from those with less support.

    “Meaningful involvement by consumer and other public interest groups is often what sets apart the successful codes from those which have received less support from government and the general public.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Office of Consumer Affairs 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.

    “Considering the national debate that has surrounded the changing quality of American health care, one of the most prominent examples of co-regulation in American industry, it is remarkable how that regulatory mix has been largely neglected by students of regulation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.
  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Consumers, rival traders, and other commercial third parties such as insurance companies or lenders can have sufficient self-interest to police a code effectively.

    “Moreover, consumers are not the only ones with a sufficient self-interest in policing a code as to make it effective.Rival traders provide another important group who have a strong self interest in ensuring a level playing field, and that their competitors do not abuse self-regulation and thereby gain a competitive advantage.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    The Canadian cable television industry's voluntary standards code works well because consumers have enough knowledge to act as monitors and because of the background presence of a government regulator (CRTC).

    “For example, the Canadian cable television industry has a voluntary standards code that works well both because consumers have enough knowledge to act as monitors and because of the background presence of a government regulator (the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Council (CRTC)).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites McChesney 1996

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    There are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions for co-regulatory design.

    “Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    Precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.

    “As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    Government might act as a facilitator or catalyst, steering the boat rather than rowing.

    “Sometimes less direct forms of state oversight or control will be sufficient; government might act as a facilitator or catalyst, ``steering the boat rather than rowing.''”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Complementary combinations of self-regulation, government regulation, and third-party oversight may work better than any one or even two of these instruments acting together.

    “Often, the best solution is to design complementary combinations using a number of different instruments, thus: self-regulation; government regulation; and third-party oversight may be capable of being combined in complementary combinations that work better than any one or even two of these instruments acting together.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 14679930, 1997, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033,Wiley Online Library on [23/06/2026].See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

    Self-regulation can invoke higher-level sanctions such as removal of benefits, public disclosure of breaches, remedial measures, fines, breach of contract liability, and expulsion from the association.

    “At the higher levels, sanctions might include removal of benefits (e.g., the right to use the industry logo), a requirement of public disclosure of breaches (making the perpetrator vulnerable to adverse publicity), the taking of remedial measures (product recall, reparation of environmental damage), or fines.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Self-regulatory initiatives with ozone-depleting substances have been relatively successful, whereas attempts to self-regulate greenhouse gas emissions have had limited impact.

    “In this regard, the relative success of self-regulatory initiatives with ozone-depleting substances (Australian & New Zealand Environment & Conservation Council 1994;Australian Environment Protection Agency 1994) contrasted with the limited impact of attempts to self-regulate greenhouse gas emissions may be instructive.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Australian & New Zealand Environment & Conservation Council 1994

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Australian Environment Protection Agency 1994

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functions and near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their spheres of action.

    “Descriptively, suffice it to recall Durkheim's observation cited earlier: occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functions [and] near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their spheres of action.(Durkheim 1933: 28)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Durkheim 1933

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The mix and interplay of private and public regulation works to assist or impede solution of the policy problem.

    “It is this mix, this interplay, that works to assist or impede solution of the policy problem.(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992: 3)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ayres & Braithwaite 1992

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997 its weaknesses as a stand alone mechanism?This implies an underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience.As we have indicated, precisely what form of state intervention will provide the most appropriate underpinning is likely to vary with the particular circumstances of the case.Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets or universally appropriate prescriptions.However, it is at least possible to identify some of the most commonly important variables, and to illustrate by example how co-regulation might operate to optimal effect in particular circumstances.

    In New Zealand, if net emissions are not on track for a 3 to 4 percent reduction by 1997, the government has committed itself to introducing a carbon tax; thus, if the code is effective, the regulation is never invoked.

    “This has been the case in New Zealand in the case of greenhouse emissions.If New Zealand's net emissions are not on track for a 3 to 4 percent reduction by 1997, then the government has committed itself to introducing a carbon tax.Thus, if the code is effective, then the regulation is never invoked.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    A major role for government in these circumstances may be that of facilitator or broker rather than direct participant.

    “Indeed, a major role for government in these circumstances may be that of facilitator or broker (ensuring the effective involvement of appropriate third parties) rather than that of direct participant.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    A tripartite approach involving co-regulation and third-party oversight mechanisms may be a viable option for Responsible Care.

    “However, a tripartite approach, involving co-regulation and a range of third-party oversight mechanisms, may well be a viable option (Gunningham 1995).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gunningham 1995 source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    A three-dimensional instrument pyramid model encapsulates the potential dynamic between government, business, and third parties in achieving effective co-regulation.

    “One convenient means of encapsulating the potential dynamic between government, business, and third parties in achieving effective co-regulation, is a three-dimensional instrument pyramid, 17 conceived of as having three faces (or sides); each side represents one of the three parties: government, business, and commercial and non-commercial third parties.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [17] 17. BRAITHWAITE, JOHN, and BRENT FISSE (1987) ``Self Regulation and the Costs of Corporate Crime.'' In Private Policing, edited by C.D. Shearing & P.C. Stenning. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Critical variables for institutionalizing responsibility in industry self-regulation include the development of industrywide policies and procedures to ensure commitment to the values or ideals the industry claims to uphold, the integration of accountability and transparency in corporate decision making, and the capacity to moralize social control and institutionalize responsibility.

    “As regards the latter, critical variables will be the development of industrywide policies and procedures to ensure a strong and effective commitment to the values or ideals the industry claims to uphold, the integration of accountability and transparency in corporate decision making, and the capacity to ``moralize social control'' and institutionalize responsibility.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The most important internal hurdles to effective industry self-regulation are (1) the extent to which it is possible to build an industry morality, and (2) the extent to which a particular scheme is capable of institutionalizing responsibility.

    “Among the most important internal hurdles are first, the extent to which it is possible to build an industry morality: a set of industrial principles and practices that defines right conduct and spells out the industry's public commitment to moral restraint and aspiration; and second, the extent to which a particular scheme is capable of institutionalizing responsibility.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Achieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy.

    “we have stressed that achieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy, as the large number of failed selfregulatory initiatives bears witness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The most effective self-regulatory initiatives have involved an underpinning of government regulation, or third-party oversight, or more commonly both.

    “Rather, the most effective self-regulatory initiatives have involved an underpinning of government regulation, or third-party oversight, or more commonly both.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Self-regulation is most likely to flourish when there is either strong coincidence between the public and private interest in self-regulation or there are external pressures sufficient to create such a coincidence of interest.

    “As to external hurdles, self-regulation is most likely to flourish when there is either strong coincidence between the public and private interest in self-regulation or there are external pressures sufficient to create such a coincidence of interest.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
87 of 87
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    A corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.

    “A crucial assumption in this perspective bears repeating, and that is a corporate conscience consists of specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part of corporate decision making.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Short-termism is one of the central problems that many systems of industry self-regulation seek to address.

    “The business culture of short-termism ± ``[a] preoccupation with short-term results and instant economic gratification'' (Jacobs 1991: 7) is one of the central problems that many systems of industry self-regulation seek to address.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Reporting requirements usually adopt some form of self-reporting.

    “Reporting requirements usually adopt some form of self-reporting.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Short-termism is particularly strong in the United States.

    “Short-termism is much more prevalent in some business cultures than others, and is particularly strong in the United States.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Enterprises may be ignorant, irrational, or incompetent.

    “Enterprises may not act as economic rationalists would predict because they are ignorant, irrational or incompetent.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Public concern is deeply felt in the chemical and nuclear power industries.

    “public concern is deeply felt ± as in the case of both the chemical and nuclear power industries.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A group must come to perceive its common interests before it can engage in effective collective action.

    “First, the group must come to perceive their common interests.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Communities of fate are at least in part social constructions.

    “Communities of fate are at least in part, social constructions.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the case of Responsible Care, many leading players in the industry recognize that 'each must be his brother's keeper.'

    “For example, in the case of Responsible Care, there is a recognition by many of the leading players in the industry that ``each must be his brother's keeper.''”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    JCAHO is the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.

    “The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), founded in 1917, stands out as the oldest and most prominent example of regulation by industry association in the United States.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The regulatory mix in American health care has been largely neglected by students of regulation.

    “it is remarkable how that regulatory mix has been largely neglected by students of regulation.”
11 of 11

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • The promised New Zealand ozone example changes subject

    Minor

    The text says an example of ozone protection in New Zealand is considered below. The later New Zealand example concerns greenhouse emissions; the ozone example there is attributed to Australia.

  • Publication years are swapped for Rees's two books

    Minor

    The author biography dates the workplace book to 1994 and the nuclear-safety book to 1988. The reference list assigns those years to the opposite books.

  • A cited coauthor's name differs from the reference entry

    Minor

    The in-text citation names Cressey and Moone, whereas the corresponding 1983 reference names Cressey and Moore.

3 of 3

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 41

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Gunningham, N., & Rees, J.
Affiliations
  • Australian National University (AU)
  • Virginia Tech (US)
Venue
Law & Policy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1997-10
Volume
19
Issue
4
Pages
363-414
ISSN
  • 0265-8240 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9930
OpenAlex
W1969175364
Cited by
572
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 43 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 13
FWCI
10.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Law & Policy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Keywords
industry self-regulation, institutional theory, social control, mediating institutions, external pressure, role of the state, third parties, regulatory theory, group behavior

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.

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