The Foundations Of Scientific Inference
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Abstract
Not since Ernest Nagel s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an authoritative and up-to-date treatment of the subject, and yet it is relatively brief and nontechnical.Hume s skeptical arguments regarding the justification of induction are taken as a point of departure, and a variety of traditional and contemporary ways of dealing with this problem are considered. The author then sets forth his own criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability. Utilizing these criteria he analyzes contemporary theories of probability, as well as the older classical and subjective interpretations.
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Mantere, S., & Ketokivi, M. (2013) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2011.0188 · Cited by 598
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The criterion problem: 1917-1992.
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McDermott, D. (1987) · Computational Intelligence · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8640.1987.tb00183.x · Cited by 332
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Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction
Mayo, D. G., & Spanos, A. (2006) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axl003 · Cited by 270
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Metadata
- Authors
- Salmon, W. C.
- Venue
- University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks
- Publisher
- University of Pittsburgh Press
- Published
- 1967-09-15
- OpenAlex
- W2156112534
- Cited by
- 678
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 78.13
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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