The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracts and the Market for Executives
Abstract
The paper reviews empirical findings on executive compensation in light of marginal productivity and contract theories.The executive labor market performs three functions.First, control must be distributed and assigned among executives.The most talented executives are efficiently assigned to control positions in the largest firms when talent and the marginal product of control are complements.These gains or rents are partially captured in larger earnings.In fact, the elasticity of top execu- tive pay lies within a tight band around .25 among industries, time periods, and countries where it has been estimated.Second, executive contracts must provide incentives for managers to act in the interests of shareholders.Potential loss of reputation, bonding and takeovers probably substitute for direct monetary incentives in this task.Nevertheless, the elasticity of top executive pay with respect to accounting rates of return lie near 1.0.The elasticity with respect to stock market returns is much smaller, though precisely estimated, near 0.1.Differences of opinion remain on whether the market provides enough incentives to align interests between ownership and control.Third, the market must identify new talent and reassign control over careers from older to younger generations.Competition among executives for top positions and the diminishing incentive effect of future rewards with age implies that compensation should increasingly tilt rewards to current performance over the course of a career.Available evidence supports this prediction.
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Citations
Cites
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Cited by
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States
Kaplan, S. N. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261944 · Cited by 860
The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom
Conyon, M. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00577 · Cited by 621
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Metadata
- Venue
- Markets and Diversity
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 2009-06-30
- Pages
- 315-350
- OpenAlex
- W1488154693
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 137.13
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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