The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China
Open accessAbstract
Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 1×
“As reviewed by La Porta et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2008), the extant international corporate governance literature shows that failure to establish strong country-level investor protection carries significant economic costs for both firms individually and countries as a whole.”
BackgroundThe separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
Cited by
Corporate Governance in China: A Survey
Jiang, F., & Kim, K. A. (2020) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfaa012 · Cited by 815
Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes?
Guan, Y., Su, L. (., Wu, D., & Yang, Z. (2016) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.09.003 · Cited by 412
Self-citationThe Effect of China's Weak Institutional Environment on the Quality of Big 4 Audits
Ke, B., Lennox, C. S., & Xin, Q. (2015) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50943 · Cited by 253
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, Z., Ke, B., & Yang, Z.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2013-02-01
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1211-1238
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3121824869
- Cited by
- 208
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 20.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/accr-50424
- The paper
- Chen, Z., Ke, B., & Yang, Z. (2013). Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50424
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
