The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Combined Effect of Wages and Firm Profit on Employee Effort
Open accessAbstract
This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.
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Cites
Adams, J. S. (1965) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60108-2 · Cited by 10,818 · cited 1×
“Although I rely on gift exchange and reciprocity theories to develop the hypotheses, fairness theories ( Adams 1965; Walster et al. 1973) would make similar predictions.”
BackgroundNew directions in equity research.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0033967 · Cited by 1,649
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining
Loewenstein, G., Issacharoff, S., Camerer, C., & Babcock, L. (1993) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468160 · Cited by 292
Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias
Babcock, L., Wang, X., & Loewenstein, G. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946655 · Cited by 238
Cited by
Managers’ green investment disclosures and investors’ reaction
Martin, P. R., & Moser, D. V. (2016) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.08.004 · Cited by 431
4. Other-Regarding Preferences A Selective Survey of Experimental Results
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2016) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume Two · doi:10.1515/9781400883172-005 · Cited by 360
Metadata
- Authors
- Hannan, R. L.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2005-01-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 167-188
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2166621224
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 16.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.