The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Temporal Analysis of Quarterly Earnings Thresholds: Propensities and Valuation Consequences
Open accessAbstract
Applying a Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)/Degeorge et al. (1999) type methodology to quarterly data for the 1985–2002 time period, we show that, since the mid-1990s, but not before then, managers seek to avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid either quarterly losses or quarterly earnings decreases. Our findings suggest that the quarterly earnings threshold hierarchy proposed by Degeorge et al. (1999) does not apply to recent years, and that managers' claim that avoiding quarterly earnings decreases is the threshold they most seek to achieve (Graham et al. 2004) is inconsistent with their actions. We provide an intuitively appealing economic rationale for why the shift in threshold hierarchy occurred; since the mid-1990s, but not before then, investors unambiguously rewarded (penalized) firms for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts' estimates more than they did for meeting (missing) the other two thresholds. We provide several explanations for why investors unambiguously reward firms for reporting quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts' estimates more than for meeting the other two thresholds late (but not early) in our sample period: increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts.
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Citations
Cites
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses
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Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/209601 · Cited by 2,751
Improved Methods for Tests of Long‐Run Abnormal Stock Returns
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Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises
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Self-citationThe Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting
Graham, J., Harvey, C., & Rajgopal, S. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10550 · Cited by 621
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Self-citationEarnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*
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SERVING CONSTITUENCIES IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS: M.B.A. PROGRAM VERSUS RESEARCH PERFORMANCE.
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Does Mandated Audit Communication Reduce Opportunistic Corrections to Manage Earnings to Forecasts?
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Cited by
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
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The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.491627 · Cited by 1,999
Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting
Frank, M. M., Lynch, L. J., & Rego, S. O. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.467 · Cited by 1,523
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2005-04-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 423-440
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2028237122
- Cited by
- 698
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 130.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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