Comprehensive Income: Who's Afraid of Performance Reporting?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Firms can report comprehensive income in either an income-statement-like performance statement or the statement of equity. Traditional theories of contracting incentives cannot explain this reporting location choice that only affects where comprehensive income data appear, because the contractible values of net income, other comprehensive income items, and comprehensive income are exactly the same regardless of the location where the firm reports comprehensive income. Drawing on theory, analysis of comment letters, and results of survey-based and behavioral research, we identify two factors—equity-based incentives and concerns over job security—that help explain why most firms do not follow policymakers' preference to report comprehensive income in a performance statement. Our empirical evidence on a broad cross-section of firms shows that managers with stronger equity-based incentives and less job security are significantly less likely to use performance reporting. Overall, our study suggests that even though the reporting location choice is inconsequential in a traditional rational markets view, managers act as if they believe that comprehensive income reporting location matters.
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Cites
1 retracted
Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management (Retracted)
Hunton, J. E., Libby, R., & Mazza, C. L. (2006) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.135 · Cited by 232 · cited 2×
“Our evidence suggests that at the time managers made the initial comprehensive income reporting location decision, they believed performance reporting would be more salient— consistent with views of the FASB and IASB and evidence from laboratory studies (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Maines and McDaniel 2000; Hunton e…”
Retracted(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00896-3 · Cited by 5,669
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
Klein, A. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 · Cited by 4,622 · cited 1×
“Although weak governance has been associated with less transparent reporting in other contexts (e.g., Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Farber 2005), we expect governance to be at most a second-order effect in our setting.”
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491273 · Cited by 2,637
Metadata
- Authors
- Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J. (., Petroni, K. R., & Wang, I. Y.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2010-01-01
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 97-126
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3123224220
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 33.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J. (., Petroni, K. R., & Wang, I. Y. (2010). Comprehensive Income: Who's Afraid of Performance Reporting? The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.1.97
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