Insider Threat Detection in PRODIGAL
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper reports on insider threat detection research, during which a prototype system (PRODIGAL) was developed and operated as a testbed for exploring a range of detection and analysis methods. The data and test environment, system components, and the core method of unsupervised detection \ of insider threat leads are presented to document this work and benefit others working in the insider threat domain. \ \ We also discuss a core set of experiments evaluating the prototype’s ability to detect both known and unknown malicious insider behaviors. The experimental results show the ability to detect a large variety of insider threat scenario instances imbedded in real data with no prior knowledge of what scenarios \ are present or when they occur. \ \ We report on an ensemble-based, unsupervised technique for detecting potential insider threat instances. When run over 16 months of real monitored computer usage activity augmented with independently developed and unknown but realistic, insider threat scenarios, this technique robustly achieves results within five percent of the best individual detectors identified after the fact. We discuss factors that contribute to the success of the ensemble method, such as the number and variety of unsupervised detectors and the use of prior knowledge encoded in detectors designed for specific activity patterns. \ \ Finally, the paper describes the architecture of the prototype system, the environment in which we conducted these experiments and that is in the process of being transitioned to operational users.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.37 · Cited by 344
Cited by
Al-Shehari, T., & Alsowail, R. A. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23101258 · Cited by 193
Analyzing Data Granularity Levels for Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning
Le, D. C., Zincir-Heywood, N., & Heywood, M. I. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2020.2967721 · Cited by 191
“In [18], [22], various anomaly detection algorithms, including Hidden Markov Models and Gaussian Mixture Models, were employed in an ensemble on user activity log data for identifying insider threat indicators.”
BackgroundMethodExploring anomalous behaviour detection and classification for insider threat identification
Le, D. C., & Zincir‐Heywood, N. (2021) · International Journal of Network Management · doi:10.1002/nem.2109 · Cited by 56
Insider Threat Detection using Deep Autoencoder and Variational Autoencoder Neural Networks
Pantelidis, E., Bendiab, G., Shiaeles, S., & Kolokotronis, N. (2021) · 2021 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr51186.2021.9527925 · Cited by 55
Al-Shehari, T. A., Rosaci, D., Al-Razgan, M., Alfakih, T., Kadrie, M., Afzal, H., & Nawaz, R. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3373694 · Cited by 51
“The approaches in [8] and [9] applied different anomaly detection techniques (e.g., hidden Markov model (HMM), Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), etc.).”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldberg, H., Young, W., Reardon, M., Phillips, B., & Senator, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
- Published
- 2017
- ISSN
- 1530-1605 (ISSN-L)
- 2572-6862
- OpenAlex
- W2603951493
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.97
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Insider Threat Detection in PRODIGAL. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.24251/hicss.2017.320
- The paper
- Goldberg, H., Young, W., Reardon, M., Phillips, B., & Senator, T. (2017). Insider Threat Detection in PRODIGAL. Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. https://doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2017.320
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.