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Cited by 1Blockchain Technology Applications and SecurityDigital Platforms and EconomicsOpen Source Software Innovations

Reorganization and Participation in Decentralized Platform Ecosystems: Evidence from Blockchain Forking

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Hsieh, Ying-Ying, Andersen, Jonas·2023·Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
DOI 10.24251/hicss.2023.654
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Abstract

Like any organizational system, platform ecosystems reorganize to update its alignment with the internal and external environments. However, unlike reorganizations of centrally managed platforms performed by the owners, reorganizations of decentralized platforms ecosystems do not rely on formal authority. Instead, the network self-reorganizes to renew the structure, rules, and information to evolve. Little is known about how self-reorganizations influence the participation of various types of networks. In this study, we investigate nine reorganization events on Ethereum, a blockchain-based decentralized smart contract platform, to unpack how self-reorganization related to hard forking influence participation in the development, validation, transaction, and complementor networks. We find that, while participation increases across all networks show a small increase after hard forking events, more complex dynamics are at play within each network that builds on delicate trade-offs between participation structure, configuration, and incentives. Our findings have implications for blockchain research as well as for start-ups building decentralized applications on top of decentralized smart contract platforms.

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  • Some, but not all, relicensing events by vendors have resulted in hard forks of the original project.

    “Some, but not all, relicensing events by vendors have resulted in hard forks of the original project, providing an option for organizations and individuals to decide that they cannot or will not continue using the original project under the terms of a new licence.”

    From Freeriding and Rebellion: An Investigation of Open Source Vendor Relicensing and Member Hard Forking Events (2026) · cites this paper as Hsieh and Andersen 2023

    The Introduction describes nine Ethereum hard forks, and §2.1 defines a hard fork as a backward-incompatible blockchain protocol change. Neither passage addresses vendor relicensing or whether some—but not all—relicensing events produce forks; searches for vendor licensing and relicensing found no such passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Research works printed but not linked: 38

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Authors
Hsieh, Y.-Y., & Andersen, J.
Affiliations
  • Imperial College London (GB)
  • IT University of Copenhagen (DK)
Corresponding author
Hsieh, Ying-Ying
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Publisher
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Published
2023
ISSN
  • 1530-1605 (ISSN-L)
  • 2572-6862
DOI
10.24251/hicss.2023.654
OpenAlex
W4391904388
Cited by
1
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 1
FWCI
0.26
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) (publishedVersion)
  • ScholarSpace (University of Hawaii at Manoa) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
Keywords
platform ecosystems, decentralized platforms, blockchain, hard forks, Ethereum, self-reorganization, network participation, smart contracts, decentralized applications, development networks, transaction networks, incentives

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