Why Can't We Tickle Ourselves?
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Abstract
When we tickle ourselves something prevents the sensation being as strong as when someone else does it. It is suggested that the ‘something’ may be: (i) the predictability of the stimulus; (ii) the presence of feedback from the movement of the arm doing the tickling; (iii) the presence of a corollary discharge from the voluntary movement of the tickling arm; (iv) the absence of a social/sexual context. To study these, Ss rated perceived ‘tickle-strength’ in situations where they were tickled: (a) with their eyes closed; (b) with their eyes open; (c) with their own arm doing the tickling, but being moved by someone else; (d) by themselves. One group of Ss was divided into same sex and different sex subject-experimenter pairs. The results showed significant effects of predictability and sensorimotor feedback.
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Citations
Cited by
Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (1998) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/2870 · Cited by 1,467
Why canʼt you tickle yourself?
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2000) · NeuroReport · doi:10.1097/00001756-200008030-00002 · Cited by 904
Spatio-Temporal Prediction Modulates the Perception of Self-Produced Stimuli
Blakemore, S.-J., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (1999) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/089892999563607 · Cited by 829
Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 · Cited by 488
“Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions.”
BackgroundEvidence for sensory prediction deficits in schizophrenia
Shergill, S. S., Samson, G., Bays, P. M., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (2005) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.162.12.2384 · Cited by 432
Metadata
- Authors
- Claxton, G.
- Venue
- Perceptual and Motor Skills
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1975-08
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 335-338
- ISSN
- 0031-5125 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-688X
- OpenAlex
- W2058323281
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Claxton, G. (1975). Why Can't We Tickle Ourselves? Perceptual and Motor Skills. https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1975.41.1.335
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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