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Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Open accessAbstract
Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects--and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement--like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism--syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission.
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“In other words, we have to infer both the cause of our sensations and the context, in terms of the (expected or subjective) precision of sensory evidence.”
From Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016) · cites this paper as [38]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“All perceptual inference is at some level active – in the sense that we actively sample our sensorium to create our own sensations (Wurtz et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2013).”
From Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming (2014) · cites this paper as Brown et al., 2013
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In the citing paper
“Acting thus involves both generating a prediction of the sensory input expected to result from intended movement, and ‘fulfilling’ this prediction by executing the movement, thus effectively suppressing a prediction error signal that would otherwise emerge”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Brown et al., 2013
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“Action initiation involves ‘systematic misrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Brown et al. 2013
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“The first to consider is ‘physiological sensory attenuation’ (Palmer et al. 2016), which is critical for movement initiation in active inference (Brown et al. 2013).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Brown et al. 2013
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“Within predictive coding formulations of perception (Rao and Ballard 1999; Friston 2005), prediction errors play a crucial role in perception, but again, they are not the percept itself; the percept is a synthesis of prior beliefs and sensory evidence that is conveyed by prediction errors.”
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Cited by
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
Self-citationThe Computational Anatomy of Psychosis
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047 · Cited by 850
Self-citationAn aberrant precision account of autism
Lawson, R. P., Rees, G., & Friston, K. J. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00302 · Cited by 641
Self-citationPredictive Processes and the Peculiar Case of Music
Koelsch, S., Vuust, P., & Friston, K. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.10.006 · Cited by 557
Self-citationHohwy, J. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12062 · Cited by 578
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Brown, Harriet
- Venue
- Cognitive Processing
- Published
- 2013-06-07
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 411-427
- ISSN
- 1612-4782 (ISSN-L)
- 1612-4790
- PMC
- PMC3824582
- OpenAlex
- W2151496011
- Semantic Scholar
- 6291e49d4e7c30272a43a212e14aec9fe37dac38
- Cited by
- 488
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 48 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 5
- FWCI
- 2.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Processing (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- St George's Online Research Archive (St George's University of London) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (091593, 088130)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- active inference, sensory attenuation, proprioception, prediction error, sensory precision, schizophrenia, parkinsonism, perception-action coupling, neuromodulation
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Attention, Bayes Theorem, Behavior, Humans, Illusions, Psychophysics, Sensation
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- Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013). Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions. Cognitive Processing. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3
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