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A Path Analysis of Goodwill Impairment – Does Corporate Governance Matter?

Ferreira, Leonor Fernandes, Fernandes, Joaquim Santana, Rebelo, Efigénio·2024·Journal of Intercultural Management
DOI 10.2478/joim-2024-0001
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Abstract

Objective: This paper examines the extent to which different corporate governance mechanisms affect the recognition and measurement of goodwill impairment, considering that these decisions are affected by a complex set of factors such as variables associated with corporate governance, economic/financial variables, and the market. Methodology: We used data from 110 companies, both Spanish (75) and Portuguese (35), with listed securities, in the period 2010–2016 (unbalanced panel), and the path analysis method to infer financial and non-financial data relationships. Findings: The results support the hypothesis that attributes linked to management and internal and external control mechanisms, as well as economic/financial, market and location variables, are directly and indirectly associated with the recognition of goodwill impairment. Value Added: This paper outlines a company behavioral profile where opportunity seems to prevail over timely recognition and measurement of goodwill impairment. Big bath practices appear to be well founded, as well as the alignment of this strategy with market signals. Recommendations: To foster the adoption of accounting practices close to the interests of all stakeholders, regulators should be encouraged to incentivize corporate governance models that promote the periodic rotation of the chief executive officer/chairman, the independence of all members of the statutory audit board, and training in economic and financial areas.

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Metadata

Authors
Ferreira, L. F., Fernandes, J. S., & Rebelo, E.
Venue
Journal of Intercultural Management
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published
2024-03-01
Volume
16
Issue
1
Pages
5-48
ISSN
2543-831X
DOI
10.2478/joim-2024-0001
Cited by
0
Language
en
Licence
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0 (unspecified)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Path Analysis of Goodwill Impairment – Does Corporate Governance Matter? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2478/joim-2024-0001
The paper
Ferreira, L. F., Fernandes, J. S., & Rebelo, E. (2024). A Path Analysis of Goodwill Impairment – Does Corporate Governance Matter? Journal of Intercultural Management. https://doi.org/10.2478/joim-2024-0001

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.