The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards.
Open accessAbstract
This article provides the beginnings of a positive theory of accounting by exploring those factors influencing management's attitudes on accounting standards which are likely to affect corporate lobbying on accounting standards. Certain factors are expected to affect a firm's cashflows and in turn are affected by accounting standards. These factors are taxes, regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping costs, and political costs, and they are combined into a model which predicts that large firms which experience reduced earnings due to changed accounting standards favor the change. All other firms oppose the change if the additional bookkeeping costs justify the cost of lobbying. This prediction was tested using the corporate submissions to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on General Price Level Adjustments. The empirical results are consistent with the theory.
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“For instance, larger, more highly visible firms are often well-suited targets for activist campaigns and also subject to more media scrutiny subsequent to poor CSR performance, compared to smaller, lesser known firms (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978).”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Watts and Zimmerman 1978
In the citing paper
“Contrary to the literature that states that external stakeholder pressure has significant impacts on corporate social responsibility implementation [138], and that companies may invest in philanthropic activities to improve external perceptions and influence external decision-makers that affect the company [139], Benefit Corporations had an internally driven proactive behavior.”
From Sustainability Reporting and Performance Measurement Systems: How do Small- and Medium-Sized Benefit Corporations Manage Integration? (2018) · cites this paper as [139]
Citations
Cites
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Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00518.x · Cited by 15,699
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Political Processes
Watts, R. L. (1977) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/031289627700200104 · Cited by 582
Self-citationSOME TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
Ball, R., & Watts, R. (1972) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00991.x · Cited by 454
Self-citationThe Municipal Accounting Maze: An Analysis of Political Incentives
Zimmerman, J. L. (1977) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490636 · Cited by 447
Self-citation
Cited by
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
“…theory literature focuses on management's motives for making accounting choices when markets are semi-strong form efficient, there are significant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costs arising out of the regulatory process (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986).”
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Auditor size and audit quality
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 · Cited by 5,813
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
Metadata
- Authors
- Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Rochester (US)
- ORCID
- Zimmerman, Jerold L.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 1978-01-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 112-134
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W40198218
- Cited by
- 2,667
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 72 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 118 · 2023: 119 · 2022: 118 · 2021: 128 · 2020: 147 · 2019: 134 · 2018: 140 · 2017: 117 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 121 · 2014: 175 · 2013: 123 · 2012: 115
- FWCI
- 97.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- The Accounting Review (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Keywords
- accounting standards, corporate lobbying, managerial attitudes, price level adjustment, executive compensation, corporate taxation, political costs, firm size
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- Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-4500569
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.