Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Reported Practices: Results From Three Randomized Studies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This study drew on teacher survey responses from randomized experiments exploring three different pay-for-performance programs to examine the extent to which these programs motivated teachers to improve student achievement and the impact of such programs on teachers' instruction, number of hours worked, job stress, and collegiality. Results showed that most teachers did not report their program as motivating. Moreover, the survey responses suggest that none of the three programs changed teachers' instruction, increased their number of hours worked or job stress, or damaged their collegiality. Future research needs to further examine the logic model of pay-for-performance programs and test alternative incentive models such as rewarding teachers based on their practices and job responsibilities rather than on student outcomes.
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Citations
Cites
Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing
Benjamini, Y., & Hochberg, Y. (1995) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology · doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.x · Cited by 109,482
Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement
Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00584.x · Cited by 4,501
Peer Interactions, Relationships, and Groups
Rubin, K. H., Bukowski, W. M., & Parker, J. G. (2007) · Handbook of Child Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470147658.chpsy0310 · Cited by 2,755
Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives
Locke, E. A. (1968) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(68)90004-4 · Cited by 2,409 · cited 1×
“theory (Vroom, 1964) and goal-setting theory (Locke, 1968).”
Clotfelter, C., Glennie, E., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.07.003 · Cited by 352
Cited by
Facts Are More Important Than Novelty: Replication in the Education Sciences
Makel, M. C., & Plucker, J. A. (2014) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x14545513 · Cited by 609
“…domains listed above, education research has several examples of notable replications, including recent research on paying students for performance (e.g., Fryer, 2011; Levitt, List, Neckermann, & Sadoff, 2011) as well as the impact of merit pay on teachers (e.g., Fryer, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013).”
BackgroundFrank, K. A., Maroulis, S. J., Duong, M. Q., & Kelcey, B. M. (2013) · Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis · doi:10.3102/0162373713493129 · Cited by 406
Teacher Evaluation Policy and Conflicting Theories of Motivation
Firestone, W. A. (2014) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x14521864 · Cited by 159
Metadata
- Authors
- Yuan, K., Le, V.-N., McCaffrey, D. F., Marsh, J. A., Hamilton, L. S., Stecher, B. M., & Springer, M. G.
- Venue
- Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis
- Published
- 2013-03
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-22
- ISSN
- 0162-3737 (ISSN-L)
- 1935-1062
- OpenAlex
- W2172085334
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 29.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Yuan, K., Le, V.-N., McCaffrey, D. F., Marsh, J. A., Hamilton, L. S., Stecher, B. M., & Springer, M. G. (2013). Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Reported Practices: Results From Three Randomized Studies. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis. https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373712462625
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