A reply to “the unfolding argument”: Beyond functionalism/behaviorism and towards a truer science of causal structural theories of consciousness
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Abstract
In their recent article, the unfolding argument, Doerig et al argue that a theory of consciousness cannot be based in the characterization of the physical structure of the brain. They argue that such theories must be “either false or outside the realm of science”. Instead, they prefer theories of consciousness based only on “input-output” descriptions. By their implicit treatment of phenomenal structure as impossible to study, the authors seem to be advocating for a new mode of extreme methodological behaviorism. We take issue with their view, and describe an alternate approach to consciousness science. We clarify some ambiguities in Doerig et al’s argument, critiquing three of their four premises, leading to different conclusions. We then explain what makes causal structure theories of consciousness empirical and falsifiable. Specifically, we propose that consciousness science must work on ways to consider phenomenal structure - i.e. to derive the structure of experience from reports, and to search for isomorphism between physical and phenomenal structures. In essence, we argue that to really take consciousness seriously as an object of study, it is unavoidable that both phenomenal structure and the causal structure of a system must be central to any theory of consciousness.
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Citations
Cited by
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab001 · Cited by 46
Falsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.03541 · Cited by 46
The search for the neural correlate of consciousness: Progress and challenges
Lepauvre, A., & Melloni, L. (2021) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2021.87 · Cited by 38
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument.
Kleiner, J. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jdcfh · Cited by 37
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument
Kleiner, J. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsuchiya, N., Andrillon, T., & Haun, A.
- Publisher
- Center for Open Science
- Published
- 2019-06-07
- OpenAlex
- W4252779538
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 0
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Tsuchiya, N., Andrillon, T., & Haun, A. (2019). A reply to “the unfolding argument”: Beyond functionalism/behaviorism and towards a truer science of causal structural theories of consciousness. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/a2ms9
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