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The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 93 of the 99 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 39 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Falsification and consciousness

Open access
Kleiner, Johannes, Hoel, Erik · 2021 · Neuroscience of Consciousness

Abstract

The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that standard tests of theories of consciousness face a dilemma: if inference data (often report/behavior) and prediction data are independent, then minimally informative theories are automatically falsified; if they are strictly dependent, the theories become empirically unfalsifiable. The authors formalize this with a substitution argument and conclude that many contemporary theories, including IIT and GNW in their usual testing setups, are caught between these two problems.

Key findings

  • If inference and prediction data are independent, the authors prove that universal substitutions exist, and Theorem 3.10 states that “either every single inference operation is wrong or the theory under consideration is already falsified.”
  • They define a minimal-information assumption for theories and show that, under independence, for every possible inference content there is an or-falsification; this applies broadly to contemporary consciousness theories that use internal observables for prediction and report/behavior for inference.
  • If inference and prediction data are strictly dependent, Theorem 4.3 shows the theory is “either already falsified or empirically unfalsifiable”; the paper gives examples including behaviorist theories and theories where prediction data are a subset of inference data (e.g. \(oi \subseteq or\)).
  • The paper argues that these results apply not just to IIT but also to GNW and related theories, and notes that no current theory or testing paradigm known to the authors satisfies their “lenient dependency” condition.

Methods

  • The paper is a formal theoretical analysis of the experimental testing setup for consciousness theories, defining physical systems \(P\), datasets \(O\), prediction correspondences \(pred: O \to E\), and inference functions \(inf: O \to E\).
  • It models falsification as a mismatch between inferred and predicted experience, then proves results using a substitution argument, lemmas, propositions, and two main theorems (one for independence, one for strict dependence).
  • The argument is illustrated with examples drawn from IIT, GNW, artificial neural networks, Turing machines, universal intelligence, and standard neuroscience reporting paradigms.

Limitations

  • The paper states that some contemporary theories may lack the specificity needed to make precise predictions in their current form, so the formalism may describe a more advanced version of a theory rather than its present version.
  • It explicitly notes that “no current theory or testing paradigm that we know of” satisfies the proposed lenient dependency case; this is a limitation of the paper’s survey of existing approaches, not a proof of impossibility.
  • Evident from the text: the results are formal and depend on assumptions such as the minimal-information condition and the way the inference/prediction split is modeled; the paper discusses “possible ways out” but does not empirically test any alternative framework.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niab001

Cites

93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Figures

Figure 1. We assume that an experimental setup apt for a particular model of consciousness has been chosen for some class of physical systems P, wherein p∈P represents the dynamics or configurations of a particular physical system. O then denotes all datasets that can arise from observations or measurements on P. Measuring the observables of p maps to datasets o∈O, which is denoted by the obs correspondence. E represents the mathematical description of experience given by the theory or model of consciousness under consideration. In the simplest case, this is just a set whose elements indicate whether a stimulus has been perceived consciously or not, but far more complicated structures can arise (e.g. in IIT). The correspondence pred describes the process of prediction as a map from O to E.
Figure 1. We assume that an experimental setup apt for a particular model of consciousness has been chosen for some class of physical systems P, wherein p∈P represents the dynamics or configurations of a particular physical system. O then denotes all datasets that can arise from observations or measurements on P. Measuring the observables of p maps to datasets o∈O, which is denoted by the obs correspondence. E represents the mathematical description of experience given by the theory or model of consciousness under consideration. In the simplest case, this is just a set whose elements indicate whether a stimulus has been perceived consciously or not, but far more complicated structures can arise (e.g. in IIT). The correspondence pred describes the process of prediction as a map from O to E.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2. Two maps are necessary for a full experimental setup, one that describes a theory’s predictions about experience (pred), another that describes the experimenter’s inference about it (inf). Both map from a dataset o∈O collected in an experimental trail to some subset of experiences described by the model, E.
Figure 2. Two maps are necessary for a full experimental setup, one that describes a theory’s predictions about experience (pred), another that describes the experimenter’s inference about it (inf). Both map from a dataset o∈O collected in an experimental trail to some subset of experiences described by the model, E.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 This figure represents the same setup as Fig. 2. The left circle depicts one single dataset o. oi (orange) is the part of the dataset used for prediction. or (green) is the part of the dataset used for inferring the state of experience. Usually the green area comprises verbal reports or button presses, whereas the orange area comprises the data obtained from brain scans. The right circle depicts the experience space E of a theory under consideration. ep denotes a predicted experience while er denotes the inferred experience. Therefore, in total, to represent some specific experimental trial we use p∈P,o∈O,er∈E and ep∈E, where ep∈pred(o).
Fig. 3 This figure represents the same setup as Fig. 2. The left circle depicts one single dataset o. oi (orange) is the part of the dataset used for prediction. or (green) is the part of the dataset used for inferring the state of experience. Usually the green area comprises verbal reports or button presses, whereas the orange area comprises the data obtained from brain scans. The right circle depicts the experience space E of a theory under consideration. ep denotes a predicted experience while er denotes the inferred experience. Therefore, in total, to represent some specific experimental trial we use p∈P,o∈O,er∈E and ep∈E, where ep∈pred(o).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 This picture illustrates substitutions. Assume that some dataset o with inference content or is given. A substitution is a transformation S of physical systems which leaves the inference content or invariant but which changes the result of the prediction process. Thus whereas p and S(p) have the same inference content or, the prediction content of experimental datasets is different; different in fact to such an extent that the predictions of consciousness based on these datasets are incompatible (illustrated by the nonoverlapping gray circles on the right). Here, we have used that by definition of Por, every p˜∈Por yields at least one dataset o′ with the same inference content as o and have identified o and o′ in the drawing.
Figure 4 This picture illustrates substitutions. Assume that some dataset o with inference content or is given. A substitution is a transformation S of physical systems which leaves the inference content or invariant but which changes the result of the prediction process. Thus whereas p and S(p) have the same inference content or, the prediction content of experimental datasets is different; different in fact to such an extent that the predictions of consciousness based on these datasets are incompatible (illustrated by the nonoverlapping gray circles on the right). Here, we have used that by definition of Por, every p˜∈Por yields at least one dataset o′ with the same inference content as o and have identified o and o′ in the drawing.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 5 The case of an inverse prediction. Rather than comparing the inferred and predicted state of consciousness, one predicts the physical configuration of a system based on the system’s report and compares this with measurement results.
Fig. 5 The case of an inverse prediction. Rather than comparing the inferred and predicted state of consciousness, one predicts the physical configuration of a system based on the system’s report and compares this with measurement results.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 99 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Aaronson, 2014, Shtetl-Optimized: The Blog of Scott Aaronson
  2. Ball, 2019, Neuroscience readies for a showdown over consciousness ideas, Quanta Mag, 6
  3. Block, 1996, How can we find the neural correlate of consciousness?, Trends Neurosci, 19, 456
  4. Crick, 1990, Seminars in the Neurosciences, 263
  5. Skinner, 1938, Appleton-Century

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E.
Affiliations
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
  • Tufts University (US)
Corresponding author
Hoel, Erik
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2021-01-01
Volume
2021
Issue
1
Pages
niab001-niab001
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3015208662
Cited by
46
References
99
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 4
FWCI
7.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
falsifiability, theory of consciousness, subjective experience, neuroimaging, philosophy of science

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Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021). Falsification and consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab001

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