Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument
Abstract
Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness ("unfolding argument"). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.
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A similar result, using a different characterization of theories of consciousness than minimally informative, has been shown in Kleiner (2020).
“A similar result (using a different characterization of theories of consciousness than minimally informative) has been shown in Kleiner (2020).”
From Falsification and consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Kleiner (2020)
Cites
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · see citing works
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001 · Cited by 1,149 · see citing works
The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K., & Herzog, M. H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
PyPhi: A toolbox for integrated information theory
Mayner, W. G. P., Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., Findlay, G., Marchman, R., & Tononi, G. (2018) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006343 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Kim, H., Hudetz, A. G., Lee, J., Mashour, G. A., Lee, U., & the ReCCognition Study Group (2018) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2018.00042 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Lau, H., & Michel, M. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/hjp3s · Cited by 52 · see citing works
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Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
“The unfolding argument does not apply, because predictive processing can be unfolded (Doerig, Schurger, et al. (2019); but see Kleiner (2019) and Kleiner and Hoel (2020)).”
BackgroundInfluentialFalsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab001 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
“A similar result (using a different characterization of theories of consciousness than minimally informative) has been shown in Kleiner (2020).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationFalsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.03541 · Cited by 46
Self-citationFirst-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“Not surprisingly, our contribution provoked critical responses (Albantakis, 2020; Kent & Wittmann, 2021; Kleiner, 2020; Kleiner & Hoel, 2021; Mallatt, 2021; Negro, 2020; Tsuchiya et al., 2020; Usher, 2021) but also support (Ganesh, 2020; Hanson, 2021; Hanson & Walker, 2019, 2020; Hanson & Walker,…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluential
- Authors
- Kleiner, J.
- Affiliations
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Kleiner, Johannes
- ORCID
- Kleiner, Johannes
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-10
- Volume
- 85
- Pages
- 102981
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3088997805
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3
- FWCI
- 2.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, theory of consciousness, consciousness, brain states
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Humans
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