PreprintCited by 25Ethics and Social Impacts of AIArtificial Intelligence in Healthcare and EducationDigital Mental Health Interventions

Delusions by design? How everyday AIs might be fuelling psychosis (and what can be done about it)

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Morrin, Hamilton, Nicholls, Luke, Levin, Michael, Yiend, Jenny, Iyengar, Udita, DelGuidice, Francesca, Bhattacharyya, Sagnik, MacCabe, James +4 more·2025

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are poised to become a ubiquitous feature of our lives, mediating communication, decision-making and information curation across nearly every domain. Within psychiatry and psychology the focus to date has remained largely on bespoke therapeutic applications, sometimes narrowly focused and often diagnostically siloed, rather than on the broader and more pressing reality that individuals with mental illness will increasingly engage in agential interactions with AI systems as a routine part of daily existence. While their capacity to model therapeutic dialogue, provide 24/7 companionship and assist with cognitive support has sparked understandable enthusiasm, recent reports suggest that these same systems may contribute to the onset or exacerbation of psychotic symptoms: so-called ‘AI psychosis’ or ‘ChatGPT psychosis’. Emerging, and rapidly accumulating, evidence indicates that agential AI may mirror, validate or amplify delusional or grandiose content, particularly in users already vulnerable to psychosis, due in part to the models’ design to maximise engagement and affirmation, although notably it is not clear whether these interactions have resulted or can result in the emergence of de novo psychosis in the absence of pre-existing vulnerability. Even if some individuals may benefit from AI interactions, for example where the AI functions as a benign and predictable conversational anchor, there is a growing concern that these agents may also reinforce epistemic instability, blur reality boundaries and disrupt self-regulation. In this paper, we outline both the potential harms and therapeutic possibilities of agential AI for people with psychotic disorders. In this perspective piece, we propose a framework of AI-integrated care involving personalised instruction protocols, reflective check-ins, digital advance statements and escalation safeguards to support epistemic security in vulnerable users. These tools reframe the AI agent as an epistemic ally (as opposed to ‘only’ a therapist or a friend) which functions as a partner in relapse prevention and cognitive containment. Given the rapid adoption of LLMs across all domains of digital life, these protocols must be urgently trialled and co-designed with service users and clinicians.

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  • Morrin et al. (2025) list several recent incidents in which chatbot users felt they were interacting with a conscious god-like AI, and this severely disrupted their life functioning, sometimes leading to suicide.

    “Morrin et al. (2025) list several recent incidents in which chatbot users felt they were interacting with a conscious”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Morrin et al., 2025

    The case summaries in “Future directions” describe users treating AI as sentient or a higher power, alongside serious disruptions to relationships, work, and mental health. One case reports an attempted hanging, but the passages found do not report a completed suicide; another user was shot and killed by police. The claim’s reference to suicide therefore overstates the reported outcomes. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Romantic non-bizarre delusions can emerge when a chatbot's ability to mimic human conversation is misinterpreted by the user as a conscious AI's affection.

    “romantic non-bizarre delusions can emerge when a chatbot's ability to mimic human conversation is misinterpreted (e.g., due to motivated reasoning) by the user as a conscious AI's affection (Morrin et al., 2025).”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Morrin et al., 2025

    The Introduction describes romantic or attachment-based delusions in which a user interprets an AI’s human-like conversation as genuine love from a sentient AI. It does not characterize these delusions as “non-bizarre” or identify motivated reasoning as the mechanism. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • These incidents suggest that polythematic bizarre delusions about chatbot consciousness may exist.

    “these incidents (and others, see Morrin et al., 2025) suggest that polythematic bizarre delusions about chatbot consciousness may exist.”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Morrin et al., 2025

    In “AI is programmed to provide the confirmation that psychotic thinking may require” (page unavailable), the paper says that perceiving an AI as conscious may become part of a delusional belief system, and it describes users seeing AI as supernatural or omniscient. Its case descriptions include elaborate beliefs involving chatbots, but our copy does not establish that the reported delusions were specifically polythematic and bizarre. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Even if delusion-based consciousness attributions to chatbots are sometimes epistemically innocent, they can also reinforce epistemic instability by blurring reality boundaries and disrupting self-regulation.

    “However, even if delusion-based consciousness attributions to chatbots are sometimes epistemically innocent, they can also reinforce epistemic instability, understood here as a reduced ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate representations of reality and to respond appropriately to counterevidence, by blurring reality boundaries and disrupting selfregulation (Morrin et al., 2025).”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Morrin et al., 2025

  • Prolonged interaction with LLM-CBs may facilitate delusional thoughts and cause an epistemic drift towards delusional beliefs.

    “Prolonged interaction with LLM-CBs may facilitate delusional thoughts and cause an epistemic drift towards delusional beliefs139.”

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Authors
Morrin, H., Nicholls, L., Levin, M., Yiend, J., Iyengar, U., DelGuidice, F., Bhattacharyya, S., MacCabe, J., Tognin, S., Twumasi, R., Alderson-Day, B., & Pollak, T.
Affiliations
  • King's College London (GB)
  • The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
  • Tufts University (US)
Published
2025-07-11
OpenAlex
W4412347940
Cited by
24
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 7
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Digital Mental Health Interventions
Keywords
AI psychosis, large language models, psychosis, delusions, grandiosity, epistemic instability, relapse prevention, epistemic security, AI companionship

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