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Lack of SARS Transmission among Public Hospital Workers, Vietnam

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Ha, Le Dang, Bloom, Sharon A., Hien, Nguyen Quang, Maloney, Susan A., Mai, Le Quynh, Leitmeyer, Katrin C., Anh, Bach Huy, Reynolds, Mary G., Montgomery, Joel M., Comer, James A., Horby, PeterW., Plant, Aileen J. · 2004 · Emerging Infectious Diseases
Cited by 94

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Abstract

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Vietnam was amplified by nosocomial spread within hospital A, but no transmission was reported in hospital B, the second of two designated SARS hospitals.Our study documents lack of SARS-associated coronavirus transmission to hospital B workers, despite variable infection control measures and the use of personal protective equipment.V ietnam was one of the first countries affected by the global severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak and on April 28, 2003, was the first country to be removed from the World Health Organization (WHO) list of SARS-affected countries.Sixty-one patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS were hospitalized in two hospitals, six of whom died; including the index case-patient.All case-patients were epidemiologically-linked to the index case-patient, and most outbreak amplification occurred within one hospital.We investigated whether nosocomial transmission occurred among healthcare workers in the second hospital. The StudyThe SARS outbreak in Vietnam began with the admission of a traveler from Hong Kong on February 26, 2003, to hospital A, a 56-bed, three-story, privately owned and expatriate-operated facility located in Hanoi.Within 2 weeks, extensive nosocomial transmission of SARS occurred in workers, patients, and visitors in hospital A. On March 12, hospital A was closed to new admissions except for sick hospital A workers.On that date, the 120bed, six-story public hospital B began admitting patients with suspected and probable SARS.Hospital B treated 33 patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS between March 12 and May 2, 2003, the discharge date of the last patient (Figure ).Of these, 23 were admitted directly to hospital B, and 10 were transferred from hospital A to hospital B on March 28.Many of hospital B's 33 patients were exposed to SARS as patients or visitors in hospital A.No nosocomial SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission was reported in hospital B, and none of its 117 healthcare workers (defined as all staff working in the hospital building during the SARS outbreak) became ill with a SARS-compatible illness.This situation occurred despite obvious challenges to infection control.When hospital B began admitting patients, visitors were not tightly restricted, the main elevator was out of service, and families and workers often used the designated patient elevator.Researchers (K.C.L., H.Q.N.) and infection control advisors working daily on the hospital B wards reported variable infection control and patient isolation, particularly during the early weeks.On March 19, formal infection control training was organized and substantial technical support and supplies arrived from WHO, Médecins Sans Frontières-Belgium, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.Systems were established to restrict visitors, and entry guards and Médecins Sans Frontières' advisors were tasked with distributing and monitoring personal protective equipment, such as N95 masks, gloves, gowns, and hand sanitizer.Two of the authors of this article (K.C.L., H.Q.N.), who worked daily on the wards observed that infection control practices improved considerably after these interventions.To help researchers determine whether SARS-CoV transmission occurred among hospital B healthcare workers, staff were offered serologic testing from May 12 to 14

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Ksiazek, 2003, A novel coronavirus associated with severe acute respiratory syndrome., N Engl J Med, 348, 1953, 10.1056/NEJMoa030781 · DOI · Paper page
  2. 2003, Severe acute respiratory syndrome—Singapore, 2003., MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep, 52, 405
  3. Riley, 2003, Transmission dynamics of the etiological agent of SARS in Hong Kong: impact of public health interventions., Science, 300, 1961, 10.1126/science.1086478 · DOI · Paper page
  4. Lipsitch, 2003, Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute respiratory syndrome., Science, 300, 1966, 10.1126/science.1086616 · DOI · Paper page
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  6. Vu, 2004, SARS in Vietnam, February–May, 2003, Emerg Infect Dis, ◼◼◼, 10

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Metadata

Authors
Ha, L. D., Bloom, S. A., Hien, N. Q., Maloney, S. A., Mai, L. Q., Leitmeyer, K. C., Anh, B. H., Reynolds, M. G., Montgomery, J. M., Comer, J. A., Horby, P., & Plant, A. J.
Venue
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Published
2004-02
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
265-268
ISSN
  • 1080-6040 (ISSN-L)
  • 1080-6059
OpenAlex
W2046086311
Cited by
94
References
2
FWCI
6.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Lack of SARS Transmission among Public Hospital Workers, Vietnam. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3201/eid1002.030707
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Ha, L. D., Bloom, S. A., Hien, N. Q., Maloney, S. A., Mai, L. Q., Leitmeyer, K. C., Anh, B. H., Reynolds, M. G., Montgomery, J. M., Comer, J. A., Horby, P., & Plant, A. J. (2004). Lack of SARS Transmission among Public Hospital Workers, Vietnam. Emerging Infectious Diseases. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1002.030707

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