The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek's Challenge to Habermas)
Abstract
For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth. Individual errors may be amplified rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational people to unjustified extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results, because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in aggregating widely dispersed information. The success of prediction markets offers a set of lessons for increasing the likelihood that groups can obtain the information that their members have.
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Cites
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.48.6.1467 · Cited by 1,850
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330041371321 · Cited by 889
Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions
Johnson, D. D. P. (2004) · doi:10.4159/9780674039162 · Cited by 192
Cited by
Popa, F., Guillermin, M., & Dedeurwaerdere, T. (2015) · Futures · doi:10.1016/j.futures.2014.02.002 · Cited by 434
Influencing Myself: Self-Reinforcement Through Online Political Expression
Cho, J., Ahmed, S., Keum, H., Choi, Y. J., & Lee, J. H. (2018) · Communication Research · doi:10.1177/0093650216644020 · Cited by 116
Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy
Herzog, L. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197681718.001.0001 · Cited by 80
Zackery, A., Shariatpanahi, P., Zolfagharzadeh, M. M., & Pourezzat, A. A. (2016) · Futures · doi:10.1016/j.futures.2015.11.002 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Sunstein, C. R.
- Venue
- Episteme
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 192-213
- ISSN
- 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-0117
- OpenAlex
- W2046602826
- Cited by
- 200
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 251.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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