The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective
Open accessAbstract
We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
Cited by
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553042476215 · Cited by 2,124
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe
Moravcsik, A. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551163 · Cited by 1,430
Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases
Ginsburg, T. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511511189 · Cited by 988
Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction
North, D. C. (1989) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(89)90075-2 · Cited by 950
TOLLISON, R. D. (1982) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00174.x · Cited by 785
La Porta, R., López‐de‐Silanes, F., Pop‐Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/381480 · Cited by 678
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Vanberg, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510427 · Cited by 528
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
McChesney, F. S. (1988) · The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15 · Cited by 397
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.16387892 · Cited by 395
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Powell, E. J., & Staton, J. K. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x · Cited by 371
Courts under constraints: judges, generals, and presidents in Argentina
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0578 · Cited by 323
The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0389 · Cited by 320
Cooter, R. D. (2000) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214504 · Cited by 300
WHITTINGTON, K. E. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051890 · Cited by 285
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2002) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1020320327526 · Cited by 284
Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective
Helmke, G., & Rosenbluth, F. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521 · Cited by 283
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556079 · Cited by 274
Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?
Hanssen, F. A. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464470 · Cited by 258
“When the Devil Turns … ”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review
Stephenson, M. C. (2003) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/342038 · Cited by 253
Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe
Finck, M. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108609708 · Cited by 203
Metadata
- Authors
- Landes, W., & Posner, R.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1975-10
- OpenAlex
- W3125136626
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.