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Cited by 219

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism

Open access
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Pathak, Parag, Roth, Alvin, Sonmez, Tayfun · 2006 · National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing parents.This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a strategy-proof mechanism.Using detailed records on student choices and assignments, we present evidence both of sophisticated strategic behavior among some parents, and of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others.We find evidence that some parents pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while others appear not to.In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism.This interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies a new rationale for strategy-proof mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical argument in Boston's decision to change the mechanism.We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the (also strategy-proof) top trading cycles mechanism.

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Crossref · 10.3386/w11965

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Metadata

Authors
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P., Roth, A., & Sonmez, T.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2006-01
OpenAlex
W1512121180
Cited by
219
References
3
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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