An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The fundamental feature of private contracting is its relational nature.When faced with unforeseen or unexpected circumstances, private parties, as long as the relation remains worthwhile, adjust their required performance without the need for costly renegotiation or formal recontracting.Public contracting, on the other hand, seems to be characterized by formalized, standardized, bureaucratic, rigid procedures.Common wisdom sees public contracts as generally more inflexible, requiring more frequent formal renegotiation, having a higher tendency to litigate, and providing weaker incentives.In sum, public contracts are perceived to be less "efficient."In this paper I develop a theory of public contracting that accommodates these stark differences between private and public contracting.The thrust of the paper is that these differences arise directly because of the different hazards present in public and purely private contracts, which directly impact the nature of the resulting contractual forms.A fundamental corollary of this result is that the perceived inefficiency of public or governmental contracting is simply the result of contractual adaptation to different inherent hazards, and as such is not directly remediable.Finally, I apply the main insights from the general framework developed here to understand the characteristics of concession contracts.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast*, B. R. (1990) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x · Cited by 1,793
Cited by
Creating and Capturing Value in Public-Private Ties: A Private Actor's Perspective
Kivleniece, I., & Quelin, B. V. (2012) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2011.0004 · Cited by 389
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24201 · Cited by 88
Roques, F., & Finon, D. (2017) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.035 · Cited by 77
“Hollburn and Spiller (2002), Spiller (2009), and Henisz and Zellner (2010) focused on the “reforms of the reforms” that have been implemented in emerging economies that are confronted with the challenge of attracting investment.”
BackgroundInstitutional responses to electronic procurement in the public sector
Doherty, N. F., McConnell, D. J., & Ellis‐Chadwick, F. (2013) · International Journal of Public Sector Management · doi:10.1108/ijpsm-04-2012-0048 · Cited by 36
“However, private and public sector procurement is different in a number of key respects: public sector procurement is often hidebound by formalised, bureaucratic and rigid procedures [Spiller, 2008], and constrained by political imperatives [Murray, 2009].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Spiller, P.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2008-08
- OpenAlex
- W2144872981
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w14152
- The paper
- Spiller, P. (2008). An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w14152
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.