A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis?This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions' lobbying and mortgage lending activities to answer this question.We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-07 and with worse outcomes in 2008.In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing originations of mortgages.Moreover, delinquency rates in 2008 were higher in areas where lobbying lenders' mortgage lending grew faster.These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during the rescue of Bear Stearns and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal returns when the bailout was announced.Finally, we find a higher bailout probability for lobbying lenders.These findings suggest that lending by politically active lenders played a role in accumulation of risks and thus contributed to the financial crisis.
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Cites
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
Mayer, C., Pence, K., & Sherlund, S. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.27 · Cited by 720
The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis
Mian, A., Sufi, A., & Trebbi, F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.1967 · Cited by 375
Cited by
Mayer, C., Pence, K., & Sherlund, S. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.27 · Cited by 720
The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Kermani, A., Kwak, J., & Mitton, T. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.10.001 · Cited by 615
Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?
Bonica, A., McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.3.103 · Cited by 488
Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Bertrand, M., Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.12.3885 · Cited by 483
In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments
Hadani, M., & Schuler, D. A. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2006 · Cited by 391
The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis
Mian, A., Sufi, A., & Trebbi, F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.1967 · Cited by 375
Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street
Dorsch, M. (2013) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Igan, D., Mishra, P., & Tressel, T.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2011-05
- OpenAlex
- W3122849979
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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