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Cited by 16Political Influence and Corporate StrategiesElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationFiscal Policies and Political Economy

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Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street

Dorsch, Michael·2013·Public Choice
DOI 10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6
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Metadata

Authors
Dorsch, M.
Affiliations
American University of Paris (FR)
Corresponding author
Dorsch, Michael
ORCID
Dorsch, Michael
Venue
Public Choice
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2011-10-19
Volume
155
Issue
3-4
Pages
211-228
ISSN
  • 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-7101
DOI
10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6
OpenAlex
W2006640936
Cited by
16
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2012: 2
FWCI
4.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Public Choice (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
congressional voting, campaign contributions, special interest politics, rent-seeking, endogeneity bias, financial crisis

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