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The Incentive Effect of Scores: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees

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Paravisini, Daniel, Schoar, Antoinette · 2013 · National Bureau of Economic Research
Cited by 40

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We design a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the adoption of credit scoring with a bank that uses soft information in small businesses lending.We find that credit scores improve the productivity of credit committees, reduce managerial involvement in the loan approval process, and increase the profitability of lending.Credit committee members' effort and output also increase when they anticipate the score becoming available, indicating that scores improve incentives to use existing information.Our results imply that credit scores improve the efficiency and decentralize decision-making in loan production, which has implications for the optimal organization of banks.

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Crossref · 10.3386/w19303

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Metadata

Authors
Paravisini, D., & Schoar, A.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2013-08
OpenAlex
W1481093217
Cited by
40
References
6
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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