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Cited by 252

Discretion in Hiring

Hoffman, Mitchell, Kahn, Lisa B, Li, Danielle·2018·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjx042
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  • In a field study of pre-hire testing in 15 firms employing low-skilled service-sector workers, managers who made more exceptions to test recommendations hired workers with shorter average tenures.

    “In a field study of pre-hire testing in 15 firms employing low-skilled service-sector workers, managers who made more exceptions to test recommendations hired workers with shorter average tenures [46].”

    From Borrowed Competence: When AI-Driven HR Builds Startups’ People Capability and When It Hollows It Out (2026) · cites this paper as [46]

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Research works printed but not linked: 27

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  3. Alonso, Ricardo and Niko Matouschek, Optimal Delegation, Review of Economic Stud- ies, 75 (2008), 259-3.
  4. Autor, David, Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (2001), 1409-1448.
  5. Autor, David and David Scarborough, Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2008), 219-277.
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  8. Brown, Meta, Elizabeth Setren, and Giorgio Topa,Do Informal Referrals Lead to Bet- ter Matches? Evidence from a Firm's Employee Referral System, Journal of Labor Economics, 34 (2016), 161-209.
  9. Burks, Stephen, Bo Cowgill, Mitchell Homan, and Michael Housman, The Value of Hiring through Employee Referrals, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (2015), 805- 839.
  10. Dana, Jason, Robyn Dawes, and Nathaniel Peterson, Belief in the Unstructured In- terview: The Persistence of an Illusion, Judgment and Decision Making, 8 (2013), 512-520.
  11. Dessein, Wouter, Authority and Communication in Organizations, Review of Eco- nomic Studies, 69 (2002), 811-838.
  12. Farber, Henry and Robert Gibbons, Learning and Wage Dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996), 1007-1047.
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  14. Horton, John, The eects of algorithmic labor market recommendations: Evidence from a eld experiment, Journal of Labor Economics, 35 (2017), 345-385.
  15. Jovanovic, Boyan, "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," The Journal of Political Economy, 87 (1979), 972-90.
  16. Kahn, Lisa B. and Fabian Lange, Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures, Review of Economic Studies, 81 (2014), 1575-1613.
  17. Kleinberg, Jon, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil Mul- lainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, Quarterly Jounral of Eco- nomics, 2018, forthcoming.
  18. Kuncel, Nathan, David Klieger, Brian Connelly, and Deniz Ones, Mechanical Versus Clinical Data Combination in Selection and Admissions Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, Journal of Applied Psychology. 98 (2013), 10601072.
  19. Kuziemko, Ilyana, How Should Inmates Be Released from Prison? an Assessment of Parole Versus Fixed Sentence Regimes, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 128 (2013), 371-424.
  20. Lazear, Edward, Kathryn Shaw, and Christopher Stanton, The Value of Bosses, Jour- nal of Labor Economics, 33 (2015), 823-861.
  21. Li, Danielle, Expertise and Bias in Evaluation: Evidence from the NIH American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9 (2017), 60-92.
  22. Li, Danielle and Leila Agha, Big Names or Big Ideas: Do Peer Review Panels Select the Best Science Proposals? Science, 348 (2016), 434-438.
  23. Pallais, Amanda and Emily Sands, Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals, Journal of Political Economy, 124 (2016), 1793-1828.
  24. Riviera, Lauren, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms, American Sociological Review, 77 (2014), 999-1022
  25. Stanton, Christopher and Catherine Thomas, Landing The First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring, Review of Economic Studies, 83 (2015), 810-854.
  26. Autor, David and David Scarborough, Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2008), 219-277.
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Authors
Hoffman, M., Kahn, L. B., & Li, D.
Affiliations
  • University of Toronto and National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research
  • MIT and National Bureau of Economic Research
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2017-10-10
Volume
133
Issue
2
Pages
765-800
ISSN
  • 0033-5533
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1093/qje/qjx042
Cited by
252
References
0
Language
en

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