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Cited by 9Social Media and PoliticsMedia Influence and PoliticsMisinformation and Its Impacts

AI and Social Media: A Political Economy Perspective

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Acemoglu, Daron, Ozdaglar, Asuman, Siderius, James·2025·National Bureau of Economic Research
DOI 10.3386/w33892
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Abstract

We consider the political consequences of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by online platforms engaged in social media content dissemination, entertainment, or electronic commerce. We identify two distinct but complementary mechanisms, the social media channel and the digital ads channel, which together and separately contribute to the polarization of voters and consequently the polarization of parties. First, AI-driven recommendations aimed at maximizing user engagement on platforms create echo chambers (or “filter bubbles”) that increase the likelihood that individuals are not confronted with counter-attitudinal content. Consequently, social media engagement makes voters more polarized, and then parties respond by becoming more polarized themselves. Second, we show that party competition can encourage platforms to rely more on targeted digital ads for monetization (as opposed to a subscription-based business model), and such ads in turn make the electorate more polarized, further contributing to the polarization of parties. These effects do not arise when one party is dominant, in which case the profit-maximizing business model of the platform is subscription-based. We discuss the impact regulations can have on the polarizing effects of AI-powered online platforms. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

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  • The possibility to quickly create increasingly trustworthy deepfakes interacts with the global reach of world-famous platforms, such as those owned by Meta, which have occasionally contributed to political misinformation and disinformation dynamics.

    “The possibility to quickly create increasingly trustworthy deepfakes interacts with the global reach of world-famous platforms, such as those owned by Meta, which have occasionally contributed to political misinformation and disinformation dynamics (Acemoglu et al., 2025).”

    From Deepfakes, Democracy, and the Ethics of Synthetic Media: A Synthesis of the SOLARIS Project (2026) · cites this paper as Acemoglu et al., 2025

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Research works printed but not linked: 42

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Cited by

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Authors
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & Siderius, J.
Affiliations
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • Dartmouth College (US)
ORCID
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Publisher
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2025-06
DOI
10.3386/w33892
OpenAlex
W4411333973
Cited by
9
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2022: 2
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
Keywords
artificial intelligence, social networking sites, political polarization, echo chambers, filter bubbles, recommendation algorithms, platform business models, party competition, platform regulation

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