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Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence

Open access
Persson, Torsten, Tabellini, Guido · 1991 · National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

Is inequality harmful for growth?We sujgest that it is.To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth promoting activities, such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge.In the paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally captures this idea.The model has a politico-economic equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and initial conditions.We then confront the testable empirical implications with two sets of data.A first data set pools historical evidence-which goes back to the mid 19th century-from the US and eight European countries.A second data set contains post-war evidence from a broad cross-section of developed and less developed countries.In both samples we find a statistically significant and quantitatively important negative relation between inequality and growth.After a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not distorted by measurement error, reverse causation, hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems.

Overview

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TL;DR

The paper argues that inequality is harmful for growth because distributional conflict leads to policies that reduce private appropriation of returns from accumulation. It supports this with an overlapping-generations politico-economic model and with historical and post-war cross-country regressions showing a negative inequality-growth relation.

Key findings

  • The theoretical model predicts that a more equal distribution of basic skills increases growth, a higher average skill level increases growth, and less political participation by the poor (or more by the rich) increases growth; the effect of the rate of return is inconclusive.
  • In the historical sample of nine currently developed countries, income inequality has a negative coefficient on per capita growth; an increase of 0.07—one standard deviation in the sample—in the income share of the top 20% lowers average annual growth just below half a percentage point, and differences in distribution alone explain about a fifth of the variance in growth rates.
  • In the post-war cross-section of 67 countries, the ratio of top 20% to bottom 40% income has a negative coefficient that is generally significant at the 5% level; a one standard deviation increase in inequality decreases growth by just below half a percentage point, and the regressions explain up to 40% of the variance in growth.
  • The negative inequality-growth effect is stronger in democracies: in the democratic subsample the inequality coefficient rises in absolute value and becomes strongly significant, while in the non-democratic subsample it drops and becomes insignificant.

Methods

  • Theoretical: an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous individuals, median-voter political equilibrium, and a redistributive policy variable; equilibrium growth depends on private appropriability, average skills, political institutions, and initial conditions.
  • Historical empirical sample: nine currently developed countries (US and eight European countries), 20-year periods back to 1830, 57 observations for per capita growth; OLS regressions of growth on inequality, schooling, political participation, and GDP, with sensitivity checks for measurement error, reverse causation, serial correlation, and omitted variables.
  • Current empirical sample: 67 countries, 1960–85; OLS and two-stage least squares regressions of growth on inequality, primary schooling, GDP per capita, urbanization, industrialization, and democratic/non-democratic subsamples; instruments for inequality include agricultural labor force in 1960, male life expectancy ratio in 1960, GDP60, PSCHOOL60, and SSCHOOL60.

Limitations

  • Stated: the predictions concerning political institutions are not strongly supported; adequate data are either unavailable or lack sufficient variation, and the political participation measure NOFRAN is insignificant with the wrong sign in the historical sample.
  • Stated: time dummies make all coefficients insignificant and turn the inequality coefficient positive, suggesting the regressions may pick up time variation and that an omitted variable such as World War II could be correlated with both inequality and growth; continental dummies in OLS reduce the inequality t-statistic close to zero, though 2SLS results remain significant at the 10% level.
  • Stated/evident: the broad-sample inequality measure RATIO is generally measured in the 1970s, in the middle rather than at the beginning of the growth period, comes from different sources with potentially different criteria, and may have comparability problems; the broad sample also includes countries with very different institutions, and the model abstracts from population growth and short-run fluctuations.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3386/w3599

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
Affiliations
  • Stockholm University (SE)
  • Ifo Institute for Economic Research (DE)
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
1991-01
OpenAlex
W2108475781
Cited by
684
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 24
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (8909263)
  • Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Income, Poverty, and Inequality
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Growth and Productivity
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economic Theory and Policy
Keywords
income inequality, economic growth, distributive conflict, political economy, growth-promoting activity, capital accumulation, knowledge accumulation, political institutions, developed and developing countries

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