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The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation

Open access
Aggarwal, Rajesh, Samwick, Andrew·1998·National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

Jensen and Murphy (1990a). A more direct test of the model focuses on its comparative static predictions.2 The standard principal-agent model posits an economic tradeoff between inducing the correct amount of unobservable effort by the agent and minimizing the amount of risk she is required to bear.In most principal-agent models, the pay-performance sensitivity will be decreasing in the riskiness or variance of the firm's performance.Executives in firms with more volatile stock prices will have less performance-based compensation.We use the variation in stock return volatility across firms to test whether executives at riskier firms have lower pay-performance sensitivities.We find that the pay-performance sensitivity of a manager's compensation is decreasing in the variance of her firm's returns.In general, the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the least volatile stock prices is an order of magnitude greater than the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the most volatile stock prices.These findings strongly support the principal-agent model.We also find that estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity that do not explicitly account for the variance of firm performance are biased toward zero.The variance of firm performance is an extremely important determinant of compensation, as implied by the principalagent model.Consider two firms, one with a high variance of returns and the other with a low variance of returns.Suppose that the CEOs of both firms receive the same compensation because the high variance firm had good performance and the low variance firm had poor performance.Running a regression of pay on performance, or simulating pay-performance sensitivities, without controlling for the variance of firm performance will incorrectly find no pay-performance sensitivity, since the CEO with better performance does not receive higher compensation.We find that omitting the variance of firm performance dramatically understates the average pay-performance sensitivity.Another prediction of the principal-agent model is that executive compensation should be based not only on the returns to the firm's shareholders but on every variable that provides unique information about the action taken by the manager.3 A prominent example of such a variable is the returns of other firms in the same industry, leading to a compensation contract based on the relative performance of the manager compared to her industry rivals.The prediction

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Metadata

Authors
Aggarwal, R., & Samwick, A.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
1998-07
OpenAlex
W3087278041
Cited by
234
References
1
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w6634
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Aggarwal, R., & Samwick, A. (1998). The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6634

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