How do we think machines think? An fMRI study of alleged competition with an artificial intelligence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Mentalizing is defined as the inference of mental states of fellow humans, and is a particularly important skill for social interactions. Here we assessed whether activity in brain areas involved in mentalizing is specific to the processing of mental states or can be generalized to the inference of non-mental states by comparing brain responses during the interaction with an intentional and an artificial agent. Participants were scanned using fMRI during interactive rock-paper-scissors games while believing their opponent was a fellow human (Intentional agent, Int), a humanoid robot endowed with an artificial intelligence (Artificial agent, Art), or a computer playing randomly (Random agent, Rnd). Participants' subjective reports indicated that they adopted different stances against the three agents. The contrast of brain activity during interaction with the artificial and the random agents didn't yield any cluster at the threshold used, suggesting the absence of a reproducible stance when interacting with an artificial intelligence. We probed response to the artificial agent in regions of interest corresponding to clusters found in the contrast between the intentional and the random agents. In the precuneus involved in working memory, the posterior intraparietal suclus, in the control of attention and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, in executive functions, brain activity for Art was larger than for Rnd but lower than for Int, supporting the intrinsically engaging nature of social interactions. A similar pattern in the left premotor cortex and anterior intraparietal sulcus involved in motor resonance suggested that participants simulated human, and to a lesser extend humanoid robot actions, when playing the game. Finally, mentalizing regions, the medial prefrontal cortex and right temporoparietal junction, responded to the human only, supporting the specificity of mentalizing areas for interactions with intentional agents.
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Citations
Cites
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The precuneus: a review of its functional anatomy and behavioural correlates
Cavanna, A. E., & Trimble, M. R. (2006) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awl004 · Cited by 5,128 · cited 2×
“, 2002), and in particular when the content to be retrieved is highly imageable (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006).”
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Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1884 · Cited by 3,782 · cited 7×
“As both regions play a central role in mentalizing, that is adopting an intentional stance in an interaction (Frith and Frith, 1999; Gallagher et al., 2002; Amodio and Frith, 2006), our data clearly demonstrate that when participants’ belief about the intentional nature of their opponent was manipulated, brain areas i…”
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People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
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“Increased response in these regions (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006) has been repeatedly reported for interacting with an intentional agent, including in experimental settings similar to the one used here (Gallagher et al., 2002; Krach et al., 2008).”
ResultInteracting Minds--A Biological Basis
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.286.5445.1692 · Cited by 1,714 · cited 5×
“Mentalizing is the inference of the hidden mental states, such as intentions, desires and beliefs, that cause intentional agents’ behavior, and it is particularly important for social interactions (Frith and Frith, 1999).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSocially intelligent robots: Dimensions of human-robot interaction
Dautenhahn, K. (2007) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.2004 · Cited by 1,210 · cited 1×
“…therefore, increasingly important as human-robot interactions will impact issues of public concern in the near future, in particular when assistive technologies for education and healthcare will be concerned (Billard et al., 2007; Dautenhahn, 2007; Mataric et al., 2009; Chaminade and Kawato, 2011).”
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“Another line of research compared the neural bases of social interactions using economic games played against a human to the same games played against a computer (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004), but didn’t provide information about the algorithm controlling the computer’s output.”
BackgroundCognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro–caudal organization of the frontal lobes
Badre, D. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.004 · Cited by 980 · cited 2×
“Alternatively, interacting with an artificial intelligence could engage areas involved in calculus and rule-solving computations, in the left intraparietal sulcus (Simon et al., 2002) and anterior part of the prefrontal cortex (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre, 2008), respectively.”
BackgroundMapping of Contralateral Space in Retinotopic Coordinates by a Parietal Cortical Area in Humans
Sereno, M. I., Pitzalis, S., & Martinez, A. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1063695 · Cited by 682 · cited 3×
“The posterior intraparietal sulcus, that shows a similar effect of agents, is in the human homolog of monkey’s lateral intraparietal area LIP (Sereno et al., 2001) involved in eye movement (Simon et al., 2002) and in attentional shifts (Sereno et al., 2001), and could participate together with the precuneus, in orient…”
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Fractionating theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 · Cited by 1,656
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Tholen, M. G., Maliske, L., Margulies, D. S., Mars, R. B., Sallet, J., & Kanske, P. (2021) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000303 · Cited by 619
Robots As Intentional Agents: Using Neuroscientific Methods to Make Robots Appear More Social
Wiese, E., Metta, G., & Wykowska, A. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01663 · Cited by 286
Hong, J.-W., & Curran, N. M. (2019) · ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications, and Applications · doi:10.1145/3326337 · Cited by 217
“Indeed, such a result might be expected given that previous studies have found that believing that one is interacting with a human vs. a machine results in the activation of different parts of the brain [30] and even affects the sensory processing of information [33].”
BackgroundChugunova, M., & Sele, D. (2022) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101897 · Cited by 118
Corti, K., & Gillespie, A. (2016) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.12.039 · Cited by 118
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chaminade, T., Rosset, D., Da Fonseca, D., Nazarian, B., Lutcher, E., Cheng, G., & Deruelle, C.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 6
- Pages
- 103-103
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2100531526
- Cited by
- 118
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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