Cited by 340Embodied and Extended CognitionFree Will and AgencyDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 96 of the 97 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 49 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency

Open access

Abstract

This paper considers agency in the setting of embodied or active inference. In brief, we associate a sense of agency with prior beliefs about action and ask what sorts of beliefs underlie optimal behavior. In particular, we consider prior beliefs that action minimizes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between desired states and attainable states in the future. This allows one to formulate bounded rationality as approximate Bayesian inference that optimizes a free energy bound on model evidence. We show that constructs like expected utility, exploration bonuses, softmax choice rules and optimism bias emerge as natural consequences of this formulation. Previous accounts of active inference have focused on predictive coding and Bayesian filtering schemes for minimizing free energy. Here, we consider variational Bayes as an alternative scheme that provides formal constraints on the computational anatomy of inference and action-constraints that are remarkably consistent with neuroanatomy. Furthermore, this scheme contextualizes optimal decision theory and economic (utilitarian) formulations as pure inference problems. For example, expected utility theory emerges as a special case of free energy minimization, where the sensitivity or inverse temperature (of softmax functions and quantal response equilibria) has a unique and Bayes-optimal solution-that minimizes free energy. This sensitivity corresponds to the precision of beliefs about behavior, such that attainable goals are afforded a higher precision or confidence. In turn, this means that optimal behavior entails a representation of confidence about outcomes that are under an agent's control.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This theoretical paper recasts agency and choice as active inference, where prior beliefs about control minimize the KL divergence between attainable and desired future states. It shows that expected utility, exploration bonuses, softmax choice rules, optimism bias, temporal discounting, and marginal utility emerge from variational free-energy minimization.

Key findings

  • Agency is modeled as prior beliefs that action minimizes the divergence between distributions over final states and goal states; value decomposes into an entropy/exploration bonus plus expected utility (Equation 4).
  • Precision or inverse temperature is not a free parameter but is optimized as a sufficient statistic of beliefs about policies; this yields softmax choice rules and quantal response equilibria as consequences of free-energy minimization.
  • In a simulated 16-trial “limited offer” game with two control states (reject/accept) and five hidden states, the agent accepted a high offer after it replaced a low offer on the 11th trial; expected precision rose markedly after the high offer and remained at its maximum value of eight.
  • Temporal discounting and a convex marginal utility relationship emerge from Bayes-optimal inference under time-sensitive contingencies; the paper reports prior utility vector σ([1,1,1,2,4]ᵀ), meaning the high offer is believed accepted exp(4−2)=7.39 times more than the low offer, and the low offer exp(2−1)=2.718 times more likely than neither.

Methods

  • Theoretical/computational modeling: active inference is formalized with a Markovian generative model over hidden states, control states, and precision, inverted using variational Bayes under a mean-field assumption.
  • Simulation: a limited-offer game with T=16 trials, two control states (reject/stay or accept/shift), five hidden states (low offer, high offer, no offer, accepted low offer, accepted high offer), identity sensory mapping A=I, and gamma prior over precision with α=8 and β=1.
  • Main analysis: iterated variational updates for expected hidden states, policies, and precision; simulated choice behavior and precision dynamics are compared with softmax/QRE formulations and dopaminergic responses.

Limitations

  • The paper states that using discrete-time variational Bayes instead of continuous-time predictive coding “necessarily implies a loss of biological realism,” although it provides an explicit model of discrete choices.
  • The paper states that the mean-field factorization with respect to precision is an approximation because the true posterior will show mild conditional dependencies between precision and hidden states.
  • The paper states that neurobiological plausibility of variational message passing remains an open question and that proper validation of active inference will require careful model comparison using empirical choice behaviors and detailed mapping between model variables and neuronal correlates; the functional anatomy in Figure 4 is described as “purely iconic” and “should not be taken too seriously.”

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598

Cites

96 of 96 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Show all 132 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 47
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 47
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
85 of 85
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Policies are selected under the prior belief that they minimize the divergence, or relative entropy, between a probability distribution over states that can be reached and states agents believe they should occupy, which are states or goals believed a priori to have high utility.

    “We assume that policies are selected under the prior belief1 they minimize the divergence (relative entropy) between a probability distribution over states that can be reached and states agents believe they should occupy—states or goals that agents believe, a priori, have high utility.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Action is sampled from posterior beliefs about control states.

    “In other words, under the assumption that action is sampled from posterior beliefs about control, we can treat decision-making and action selection as a pure inference problem that necessarily entails optimizing beliefs about behavior and its consequences.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The agent knows its past actions by observing them.

    “For simplicity, we have assumed that the agent knows its past actions by observing them.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Inference underlies a sense of agency.

    “In the context of behavior, we suppose that inference underlies a sense of agency.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The true generative process is Markovian.

    “These particular mean field assumptions are not approximations, because the true generative process is Markovian.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Neuronal activity encodes sufficient statistics.

    “If we assume that neuronal activity encodes sufficient statistics, then the variational update scheme could provide a metaphor for functional segregation—the segregation of representations corresponding to the mean field assumption, and functional integration—the recursive (reciprocal) exchange of sufficient statistics during approximate Bayesian inference.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The approximate posterior factorizes over past hidden states, future control states, and precision, and factorizes successive states over time.

    “Here, we have assumed a factorization over (past) hidden states, (future) control states and precision. Furthermore, we have factorized successive states over time, which means we only have to represent the current state explicitly.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The approximate marginal over precision is a gamma distribution with shape parameter same as the prior α = 8 and rate parameter optimized.

    “Equation (6) assumes the approximate marginal over precision is, like its conjugate prior, a gamma distribution; where the shape parameter is the same as the prior α = 8 and the rate parameter is optimized.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The entropy term in Equation (4) is small enough to be ignored.

    “Assuming the entropy term in Equation (4) small enough to be ignored, it is easy to see that expected marginal utility directly informs choices: (10)”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The offer will be withdrawn before the final outcome is reached (prior belief).

    “can be explained simply by prior beliefs that the offer will be withdrawn before the final outcome is reached.”
10 of 10

Claims other papers make about this one

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Figure 6 reverses the colors assigned to the two choices

    Minor

    The main text assigns green to staying and blue to accepting, while the Figure 6 caption assigns blue to staying and green to accepting.

1 of 1

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Metadata

Authors
Friston, K., Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., & Dolan, R. J.
Affiliations
  • Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
  • University College London (GB)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Friston, Karl
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Published
2013
Volume
7
Pages
598-598
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2093466600
Cited by
340
References
97
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 1
FWCI
14.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
  • UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Wellcome Trust (091593, 098362, 098362/Z/12/Z, 088130)
  • National Institute for Health and Care Research
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
active inference, sense of agency, free energy principle, variational inference, predictive coding, bounded rationality, expected utility, exploration bonus, optimism bias, Kullback-Leibler divergence, decision-making, inverse temperature, optimal control

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